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Abstract 
An expert system must reason with certain and uncertain information. This thesis is con- 
cerned with the process of Reasoning with Uncertainty. Nilsson's elegant model of "Proba- 
bilistic Logic" has been chosen as the framework for this investigation, and the information 
theoretical aspect of the maximum entropy formalism as the inference engine. These two 
formalisms, although semantically compelling, offer major complexity problems to the im- 
plementor. Probabilistic Logic models the complete uncertainty space, and the maximum 
entropy formalism finds the least commitment probability distribution within the uncertainty 
space. 
The main finding in this thesis is that Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic can be succesfully 
developed beyond the structure proposed by Nilsson. Some deficiencies in Nilsson's model 
have been uncovered in the area of probabilistic representation, making Probabilistic Logic 
less powerful than Bayesian Inference techniques. These deficiencies are examined and a 
new model of entailment is presented which overcomes these problems, allowing Probabilistic 
Logic the full representational power of Bayesian Inferencing. The new model also preserves 
an important extension which Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic has over Bayesian Inference: the 
ability to use uncertain evidence. 
Traditionally, the probabilistic, solution proposed by the maximum entropy formalism is 
arrived at by solving non-linear simultaneous equations for the aggregate factors of the non- 
linear terms. In the new model the maximum entropy algorithms are shown to have the 
highly desirable property of tractability. 
Although these problems have been solved for probabilistic entailment the problems of 
complexity are still prevalent in laxge databases of expert rules. This thesis also considers the 
use of heuristics and meta level reasoning in a complex knowledge base. Finally, a description 
of an expert system using these techniques is given. 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
For the purposes of this thesis I will adopt the pragmatic approach and define an expert 
system as a computer program which works to solve a specialized problem in the same way 
that a human expert would [88,112,45]. To do this, an expert system has to be able to store 
and manipulate the knowledge of an expert, to be able to reason with the knowledge given 
to it, and to be able to present results to the end user in an acceptable fashion. 
Expert systems have developed within the computer science sub-area of information tech- 
nology (figure 1.1). With their development, information technology has expanded to include 
the artificial intelligence paradigms of knowledge processing and expert knowledge processing; 
and software engineering has been enriched with methods of abstraction which allow program 
knowledge to be separated from* program control [46]. 
However, expert systems have inherited the standard information technological problems 
of run-time complexity and algorithmic correctness. This thesis is concerned with the process 
of deduction that goes on within an expert system, and with the'pTeservation of correctness 
and the removal of complexity from expert systems. ' 
1.2 The Expert Perspective 
In calling someone an expert in a particular field we recognise two things: firstly that the 
field itself is sufficiently complex as to warrant careful decision making; and secondly that 
the person to whom we are refering has consistently demonstrated extreme proficiency in 
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Figure 1.1: Expert System Technology within Information Technology 
dealing with everything from simple to very detailed problems in the field. Typical expert 
fields are: diagnostic medicine, mineral prospecting, programming, process control, financial 
management, design and planning [133,37]. 
But how does an expert differ from another worker in the field who is able, but not as 
capable as the expert? Patil has shown [92] that in a real life clinical situation, an expert 
is only ever dealing with a small number of hypotheses (no more than five or six) at one 
time; whereas, a non-expert is typically entertaining many more. It has become dear that 
the expert is consciously combining not only information in a logical way so as to manipulate 
possibility, but also with regard to its importance and certainty [10,34]. So that the reasoning 
process is complicated not only with a number of possibilities, but also to the extent that 
these fluctuate in terms of likelihood as the investigative process proceeds. 
1.3 The Software Engineering Perspective 
Programmers, trying to write programs which do helpful work in sufficiently complex data 
fields, turned to expert systems with the hope that it would be possible to distil the subtle 
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niture of an expert's reasoning process and use this'as a, knowledge base rather than to try 
to model the same level of expertise in a computer program by working towards it from 
first principles. Thus, the feature which distinguishes a true expert system from an ordinary 
program is its ability to use the knowledge of an expert in coming to a conclusion. 
A major motivation in developing expert systems is that interacting with an expert system 
should be like interacting with the expert who supplied the knowledge. Also, an expert's time 
will usually cost a lot of money, wheras it costs very little to make an online expert system 
available to users. Online expert systems offer the added advantage that many people can use 
the expert's knowledge at the same time. With these points in mind, an expert system must 
be able to produce plausible, if not certain, solutions to problems (the same way an expert 
would). It must also be able to explain its reasoning, and demonstrate that its reasoning 
procedures are valid (the same way an expert might). 
Considering an expert system as a piece of software, the algorithms used should conform 
to a number of rules of good software engineering. Such rules include [31]: 
1 Use simple but powerful general solutions 
2 Can be easily understood by others 
3 Can be easily modified if necessaxy 
4 Are correct for clearly defined situations 
5 May be understood on a number of levels 
6- Are economical in the use of computational resources 
7 Are documented well enough to be used by others 
8 Are not dependant on being run on a particular computer 
9 Are able to be used as a sub-procedure for other programs 
10 Produce pleasing and satisfying solutions 
Table 1.1: Desirable Characteristics of Good, Algorithms 
The state of the art in expert systems technology is such that current expert systems can 
be shown to exhibit many of these pleasing features of good algorithms, but not all [57,130]. 
The problem facing the software engineer in Artificial Intelligence is to provide software which 
operates within these constraints while at the same time performing the desired function of 
intelligence. 
3 
The Artificial Intelligence Perspective 
Computers are symbol manipulators [55,56]. Early applications for computers have been in 
storing factual data, and performing quick arithmetical operations on numbers. However, a 
dear area of development for computer applications was in the psychological field of cogni- 
tion. The science of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has developed to explore the possibilities of 
reasoning, learning, perception and language understanding on the digital computer. 
So, in the first instance, AI application programs should obey the laws of good algorithms 
given in section 1.3. Secondly, AI programs must have simple and complete methods for 
representing and manipulating the basic elements of human knowledge. Thirdly, AI programs 
must have'a way of quantifying uncertainty in knowledge so that the best use of available 
evidence is made when forming a decision. The approach adopted throughout this thesis is to 
use knowledge modelling techniques from the mathematics of predicate calculus and modal 
logics to model uncertain. knowledge; and uncertainty management techniques taken from 
probability theory to quantify the strength of uncertainty. In the event that probability theory 
cannot be used to quantify uncertainty, (for reasons of complexity or. lack of information), 
heuristic measures are proposed which may be used instead. 
1.4 Overview of Thesis 
The four disciplines: mathematics, statistics, psychology and computational science are the 
basic tools for reasoning with uncertainty in expert systems. This thesis examines how far 
the synthesis of disciplines can be achieved using the particular method of Nils Nilsson's 
Probabilistic logic [89,83,52], with particular reference to the maximum entropy formalism 
[54]. (Throughout the text I shall use the abbreviation of "Probabilistic Logic" to replace 
"Nils Nilsson's Probabilistic logic". ) In the course of my investigations various extensions 
have been made to Probabilistic Logic, and a complex expert system is realised as a fruit of 
this process. 
In the first section of the thesis, there is a brief history of the development of material 
from mathematics and statistics which has a bearing on this thesis (chapter 2). Also in the 
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first section is a description of present day systems for reasoning with uncertainty (chapter 
3). The second section of the thesis, introduces various extensions to Nilsson's probabilistic 
logic (chapters 4) which allow an efficient use of the maximum entropy formalism (chapter 5) 
and relates these new results to Bayesian Inference techniques (chapter 6). The third section 
(chapters 7,8 and 9) of the thesis concerns approximation techniques, the use of heuristics 
in a large system, and finally a full scale application of the major theoretical results of the 
thesis. 
Chapter 2: The Mathematical Tools for Reasoning With Un- 
certainty 
In chapter 2 the mathematical and statistical perspectives on automated reasoning are briefly 
summarised. This chapter is used to show how vigorously the contributory aspects of rea- 
soning with uncertainty have been debated. The mathematical preliminaries essential to this 
thesis (automatic deduction techniques, theories of probability, Bayesian Inference) are intro- 
duced in this chapter. Also discussed in this chapter are the limits which naturally appear 
on any system attempting to reason with uncertainty. 
Chapter 3: Automated Systems 
Chapter 3 shows how the theories of reasoning with uncertainty have been developed in the 
time of the digital computer. The most difficult problem with providing a complete imple- 
mentation of Bayesian Inference for instance has always been the problem of computational 
complexity. 
This problem manifests itself in one of two ways: either the computer takes too long to 
compute and present its results (either because human time considerations render waiting the 
required time impractical, or simply because the computation will never complete); or because 
the computer does not have enough space available in which to store its local computations. 
These two problems are known as time and space complexity, and more than any other single 
factor they have directed a dominating influence upon the implementation of reasoning with 
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uncertainty on the digital computer. 
Chapter 4: Enhancements to Probabilistic Logic 
The main finding in this thesis is that Nilsson's probabilistic logic (89] can be succesfully 
developed beyond the structure proposed by Nilsson. In this chapter Nilsson's probabilistic 
entailment model is examined in detail. Various conventions are introduced for dealing with 
complex entailment problems. Some criticisms are made of Nilsson's proposed model, and 
ultimately a new interpretation of the semantic tree is presented. This involves the introduc- 
tion of the "context split", which provides an extensive use for conditional probabilities in 
Nilsson's probabilistic logic. 
Originally, Nilsson intended the task of his probabilistic logic to be that of computing the 
bounds of probability predictable from an underspecified probability model. A new algorithm 
for computing the bounds of an entailment procedure is presented in this chapter which will 
give the absolute bounds of an entailment procedure without having to resort to geometric 
considerations. 
Chapter 5: The Maximum Entropy Formalism 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the maximum entropy formalism. The maximum entropy formal- 
ism has been succesfully developed as a theory of information measurement [114). In terms 
relevant to this thesis it can be viewed as a descriptor of the information content imposed on 
a probability distribution by the guiding probabilities in an entailment process (that is, the 
probabilities of the antecedents, and the probability of the rule of inference). In particular the 
fixed point of maximum entropy identifies a probability distribution over the possible worlds 
of an entailment problem which makes the least additional assumptions about the nature of 
the interactions between the sentences involved [79]. 
The maximum entropy formalism is of special interest to the expert system community in 
that it has a sound mathematical history from which to draw its credibility. The drawback 
with this method of choosing a probability distribution to fit the information available, is that 
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it introduces an extra complexity level into the proceedings. In general, the solution proposed 
by the maximum entropy formalism is arrived at by iteratively solving simultaneous equations 
for the aggregate factors of the non-linear terms. 
In this chapter the complexity of the traditional solution method is examined. An algo- 
rithm for solving the maximum entropy equations for the new semantic tree is given, and its 
complexity is examined. This algorithm gives an immediate solution for the aggregate factors 
of the entailment problem. The implications of the result are examined. 
Chapter 6: N ilssonian and Bayesian Inference Compared 
Chapter 6 is concerned with an examination of Nilsson's probabilistic logic in the light of the 
Bayesian theory of Inference. This is possible because of the new bounds algorithm which has 
the ability to use conditional probabilities in Probabilistic Logic, and the ability to quickly 
determine the factors of the maximum entropy equations. In particular, the meaning of 
probabilistic entailment is cast in a new light. The information required by the two logics is 
compared and contrasted. The final analysis in this chapter is a description as to how far the 
two theories may be unified. 
Chapter 7: Incidence Calculus 
Bundy's Incidence Calculus [13,12] is examined in chapter 7. Incidence calculus is similar to 
Probabilistic Logic in that it uses possible worlds. The theory proposed by Bundy allows the 
implementor to choose the number of possible worlds, and the system employs a mechanism 
for fashioning these worlds into possible worlds, and for assigning probabilities in a manner 
consistent with the rules of probabifity theory. Incidence calculus puts at our disposal a 
framework which allows for heuristic mechanisms for probability assignment, which become 
more attractive as the complexity of the entailment problems increase. 
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Chapter 8: Entropy and Meta-Level Reasoning 
In this chapter the role of the maximum entropy formalism is extended to encompass meta, 
level reasoning: that is to choose which of a number of rules will provide the most information 
on being processed. A new measure is introduced which calibrates the certainty in a proba- 
bilistic rule of entailment. As a result of this development a new way of viewing the linguistic 
hedges of Fuzzy Logic is introduced. 
Chapter 9: The Use of Heuristics 
In an attempt to deal with real world situations in which either not enough information is 
available to completely specify a probability model, or where a model is too complex to go 
through the time consuming process of assigning every required conditional probability for a 
complete probability model, chapter 9 presents various simplification heuristics. Ultimately, 
these strategies can be used in situations where as little information as that provided in 
Nilsson's Initial model is provided. The problems of knowledge interleaving are examined. 
Chapter 10: An Application of Probabilistic Logic in Vision 
A system of Probabilistic Logic based on the the results of chapters 4,5 and 9 has been 
developed. The new system was succesfully applied to a problem in two dimensional vision, 
and chapter 10 shows how the system performed. 
1.5 Appendices 
Appendix A has a list of all the typographical conventions used throughout the thesis to 
denote logical and probabilistic elements. Also in this appendix is a brief description of the 
interpretation tables and maximum entropy equations used throughout. It may be found 
useful to flip back and forth to this section whenever any question of notation arises. 
Appendix B is a very brief resurni of the mathematical and statistical prerequisites for 
reading this thesis. Appendix C is an extension of chapter 5, which shows the proof of the 
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derivation of aggregates in an entailment rule whose probability is 1. Appendix D is an 
extension of chapter 9 which compares the effect of two heuristics on a set of rules. 
1.6 Scope of the Thesis 
The thesis combines two great interests of mine: automated deduction and reasoning with 
uncertainty. The simple aim of the thesis is to show that the two approaches of probability 
theory and predicate calculus can be mutually consistent with each other within Nilsson's 
probabilistic logic. The ultimate use of this will be as a means of reasoning with uncertainty, 
in a consistent and semantically justifiable way, in expert systems. 
1.7 Declaration 
The work presented in this dissertation was carried out by myself, except where due ac- 
knowledgement is made. This thesis has not been submitted to this, or any other, university. 
However, material taken from this thesis has been, or will be, published as follows: 
* "Reasoning with Maximum Entropy in Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic", which was pre- 
sented at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence in 1989 [66]. 
9 "Enhancing the Inference Mechanism of Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic" which appeared 
in "The International Journal of Intelligent Systems" [65]. 
e "Reasoning with Maximurn Entropy in Expert Systems" which is the text of an invited 
talk presented to the "10th International Workshop on Maximum Entropy and Bayesian 
Methods" In Wyoming 1990, published in (671. 
"Model Based Object Recognition using Maximum Entropy and Nilsson's Probabilistic 
Logic" which was cowritten with Patrick McAndrew and Andrew Wallace of the Vi- 
sion department of lleriot-NVatt Computer Science department and appeared in "The 
International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence" in 1991 (68]. 
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Chapter 2 
MATHEMATICAL TOOLS FOR 
REASONING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY 
2.1 Introduction 
Present day methods for reasoning with uncertainty have grown from two major domains. 
The first is mathematical inference techniques. The second is automatic deduction techniques 
for the digital computer. In mathematics, the most important step forward for automated rea- 
soning came with the publication of Whitehead and Russell's book "Principia Mathematice, 
in which rules for reasoning alongside the implication rule, were constructed for organising the 
knowledge of mathematics in a set theoretic formalism. Another development in twentieth 
century logical systems is the systemised notion of a "possible world", as opposed to the real 
world. Theories for dealing with possible worlds are the youngest of all those mentioned thus 
far, and are reported here insofar as they are relevant to the subject of reasoning with logic 
and probabilities. 
However, semi-deci d ability in predicate calculus makes it mathematically impossible to 
implement a calculus for reasoning with logical possible worlds with the property that all of 
the possible worlds for an uncertain situation can be enumerated. And so, although the work 
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of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers laid foundations for reason- 
ing with uncertainty in mathematics, it also discovered that reasoning with uncertainties in 
mathematics has clearly visible and insurmountable obstacles. 
A history is given of the evolution of reasoning with uncertainty from the time of Jakob 
Bernoulli (1713), through to the ideas of the nineteenth and twentieth century mathematicians 
and statisticians. These three hundred years have been contentious years for the subject, and 
have yielded three complementary definitions for the meaning of probability: the range theory 
of probability, 
-the 
frequency theory, and the subjectivist theory. Each of these definitions 
offer different perspectives on the meaning of reasoning with uncertainty. Their similarities 
and differences are explored in this chapter in a mathematical context. The results of this 
investigation reveal the probabilistic problems facing the set-theoretic mechanisms. 
2.2 Uncertainty and Mathematical Logic 
The idea of using a formal system to reason about propositions goes back to Aristotle in 
the 7th century BC, whose collected works, the "Organon", introduced logic as a tool for 
sharpening thought. He enumerated fourteen forms which a correct argument could take, 
and a further five were added by his pupil Ariston. These forms were called "syllogisms" 
[106]. An example of a syllogism would be: 
All Fridays are pay days 
Today is Friday 
Therefore, today is pay day 
Syllogisms can be read from top to bottom. A syllogism is a group of three logical 
sentences, two antecedents and one conclusion. The line separating the conclusion from the 
antecedents indicates the process of reasoning. 
In the nineteenth century, George Boole developed what is now known as Boolean algebra: 
a calculus for manipulating variables representing TRUE and FALSE. Frege [44) in his paper 
"Begriffsschrift" combined the propositional logic formalisms with those of Boolean algebra. 
He introduced the notion of a language proposition, and the law of "modus ponens" (the 
method of bridges). For this he needed a definition of sentences which can express facts in 
the predicate calculus. His definition is used throughout the text and is given below: 
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Definition 2.1 A sentence in predicate calculus is a well formed formula, constructed from 
atomic facts; or facts joined by the logical connectives and (&), or (V), and not (-). 
The rule of modus ponens, although not strictly necessary since it can be stated in terms of 
connectivity primitives was also introduced as a symbol of convenience to denote the process 
of entailment at work in the syllogism. The rule of entailment is also used throughout this 
text, and its meaning is defined below: 
Definition 2.2 The symbol to denote entailment, (or material implication), is =>,, and it is 
used between logical sentences in the form A*B, which may be read if sentence A is true, 
then conclude B. 
In this scenario, A#-B is an instance of the rule of entailment, the sentence A is the rule's 
antecedent and the sentence B is the rule's consequent. Syllogisms can now be written: 
A#-B 
A 
Therefore, B 
In classical logic the rule of "modus ponens" allows us to use the proposition set (A, 
A =: 0) to entail proposition B. That is, if A is true, and A =: ýB is true, then B must also be 
true. The truth-table for implication, first given by Russell and Whitehead [107], table 2.1, 
shows the four possible labellings of truth values to the predicates A, B and A =::,. B. 
A B A#-B 
t t t 
t f f 
f t t 
fI f t 
Table 2.1: Truth Table for Implication 
For the purposes of this thesis a familiarity with the concepts of predicate calculus [46] is 
assumed, so that the problems may be explored in some depth. 
Although English sentences can be expressed in terms of formal logic, and although the 
proof procedure allows the implementation of the entailment rule, there have been misgivings 
about the semantics involved with the rule of entailment. There have been developed what 
are now known as "the paradoxes" of material implication [107,58]: 
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(p& - p) * q. That is, from any proposition of the form p& ev p any proposition 
whatsoever can be deduced. 
2. q #- (pV - p). For any proposition, any other proposition of the form (pV ,' p) can 
be deduced. 
3. -p=;: >- (p =ý- q). From any false proposition, any proposition whatsoever can be 
deduced. 
4. q =::, (p =ý- q). That is, every true proposition can be deduced from any proposition 
whatsoever. 
These "paradoxes" derive from the implication table, which equates the meaning of p =: >. q 
with ,pVq whereby, when an antecedent is false and the rule true, the consequent can 
be either true or false. This puzzling relation has led logicians to reconsider the meaning of 
deducabifity. 
The deducabifity of q from p can be said to only mean that it is logically impossible for 
p to be true, and q to be false. However, as pointed out in [58], "No one is likely to deny 
that the logical impossibility of (p& - q) is a "necessary" condition of q's deducability from 
p, but it has been suggested that it is not a "sufficient" condition on the ground that there 
should be some connection of 'content' or 'meaning' between p and q. " 
This semantic problem aside, the logic of propositions and entailment has given rise to 
a calculus of certain belief management which allows deductions based on the truth of an- 
tecedents to be manipulated in a correct and verifiable way. These misgivings about. the 
nature of entailment have relevance only when the antecedents are false. This particular 
problem reappears [89,66], when we consider the set-theoretic mechanism for generalising 
classical logic. 
The introduction of a rule of inference over such rules, made computational reasoning a 
possibility; and heralded the way for knowledge-based and expert systems. 
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The Set Theoretic Limits of Automatic Deduction 
The work of Whitehead and Russell [107] was intended to show that all of mathematics was 
an elaboration of the laws of logic [27]. They assumed that Set Theory could be used to 
represent the laws of logic, and set about representing the tools of mathematics in this new 
notation, using axioms (the basic theorems) and rules for producing new theorems from old 
ones. Such rules were formulated using logical implication (or entailment). The motivation 
for this development was the development of a procedure which would discover the truth or 
falsity of any logical sentence by finding either that it was an axiom (default theorems), or 
that it could be produced from axioms by repeated application of production rules on earlier 
theorems [56,55]., 
This introduced a strict mathematical concept of provability into the science of automated 
deduction. For some sentences, such a procedure is guaranteed to find proof either of the 
sentences' truth or falsity. For these sentences, the question of logical implication is decidable 
[46]. This property is not true for all sentences however, and there exist sentences for which 
neither the sentence itself nor its negation can be produced by the above procedure. That is, 
neither the sentence nor its negation are implied by the axioms and/or repeated application 
of the rules of inference. For such sentences, the above procedure will never terminate, and 
for this reason, logical implication is only semi-decidable [56]. 
Modal Logics 
Modal Logic allows for reasoning with uncertainty in mathematics, where uncertainty about 
the truth or falsity of a proposition means more than one possible scenario has to be con- 
sidered in the reasoning process (58,45]. Aristotle introduced the notion of "modal logic"; 
which extends properties of, propositions to include necessity, contingency, possibility and 
impossibility, as opposed to just true or false. So that, true propositions can be divided into 
two categories: those that are necessarily true, and those which are true by contingency. 
The world in which we live may be called the. real world. In this world many things are 
true, some of which we know about, others we do not know about. We conjecture about 
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the nature of uncertain things by introducing possible worlds with sentences such as "if some 
event was actually true in the real world, what would be the consequences of this". Possible 
worlds fall into several different categories: 
1. A logically possible world might be defined as one which conforms to the rules of logic. 
A world where "Peter is a boy" and "Peter is a girl" is not logically conceivable, and is 
therefore an "iTpossible" world. 
2. A physically possible world might be defined as a world which has the same physical 
characteristics as the real world- so that in such a world, 'the speed of sound in air is 
restricted to 330 metres per second. 
3. A conceivable possible world is a world which could be imagined. For example, a world 
where everyone had free access to pubEc transport. 
4. A temporally possible world is one which we could imagine developing on from the 
present world over a period of time. For example, we could imagine that in five years 
time the Russians will have landed on Mars. 
All of the above listed examples of possible worlds require a few common characteristics 
from any calculus which intends to reason over them: 
(i): Each possible world has to be dealt with separately from any others. 
(ii): In each world there is a strict set of assumptions which, when contravened, would make 
a world into an impossible world. 
(iii): In each world there are rules which allow worlds to be developed, or examined in greater 
detail. 
In possible worlds, we require only that the rules of deduction of ordinary predicate 
(propositional) logic apply. For example, the proposition "2 +2= 4" is true from logical 
necessity; and the proposition "Britain is not a member of the European Monetary System" 
is only contingently true. Similarly, false sentences can be split into two groups: those which 
are false by logical necessity, and those which are contingently false. (For example, "2 +3 
4" and "Russia has a democratic system of government"). 
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Resolution Refutation Systems 
Robinson [105], in 1965, introduced the resolution principle: a mechanical procedure to per- 
form inference. The resolution principle is applied in resolution refutation systems. In a 
typical theorem proving problem there is a set S of well- formed- formulas from which we wish 
to prove a goal formula w. -The 
first step is to negate the goal and add this negation to S. 
The expanded set is then converted to a set of clauses, and we use the resolution principle in 
an attempt to derive a contradiction, that is the occurrence of a fact and its negation, which 
is signified when the empty clause, NIL, is produced. Robinson showed that if the resolu- 
tion principle is applied to an unsatisfiable set of clauses then NIL can always be produced 
eventually. 
The Development of a Probability Calculus 
There were many conflicting views among philosophers, mathematicians and statisticians, as 
to what may be the precise meaning of probability. The reasons for this may be attributed to 
the many branches of science and commerce in which the concept of probability has emerged 
[60,26,73]. Commercial insurance against risks which was practiced as early as the fifteenth 
century; the practice of life insurance; the theory of mathematical games of chance; and the 
combination of judicial evidence all developed their own concepts of probability. 
In statistics the concept of probability developed from studies of games of chance. This 
subject was developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into a "geometry of the 
die" by Pascal, a theory of event combinations by Fermat and finally Jakob Bernoulli's range 
theory of probabifity [60]. 
2.3 Rules of the Calculus of Probability 
The four basic rules which any calculus of probability must satisfy were formulated by early 
twentieth century statisticians [69,61]. These rules can be regarded as the basic building 
blocks for reasoning with uncertainty which have been arrived at over much argument and 
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debate amongst the great statistical mathematicians from the time of Bernoulli. 
Definition 2.3 In all the statistical rules throughout this text the expression p(alh) is to be 
read as the probability of a being true given that h is true which is defined to be p(a&h)lp(h) 
[38]. 
We can consider a to be a proposition, and h to be some data or evidence which is relevant 
to the occurrence or non-occurrence of a. For example, one might be interested to know 
the probability that it will rain, r, given that the sky has become overcast with dark clouds 
(sodc), that is, p(r I sodc). 
The meaning associated with the word probability has been considerably developed over 
hundreds of years. Essentially, there are three probability interpretations: 
1. the range theory of probability; 
2. the frequency theory of probabiEty; 
3. the subjective, or, belief theory of probability. 
In aH of these theories the probability of the occurrence of an event is a number which must 
satisfy the foHowing four axioms: 
p(alh) ý: 
p(hlh) =1 (2.2) 
p(alh) + p(- a1h) =1 (2.3) 
p(a&blh) = p(alh)p(blhka) (2.4) 
From equations 2.1,2.2 and 2.3 it follows that all probability values are within the range 
0 to 1. From equations 2.3 and 2.4 comes the addition principle: 
p(a V b1h) = p(a) + p(b) - p(a&b). (2.5) 
If a and b are mutually exclusive (that is, they cannot both be true at the same time), then 
p(akb) is zero, and the addition principle becomes simplified to: 
p(a V b1h) #- p(a) + p(b) 
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the special addition principle. 
If p(alh) = p(alh&b) then a and b are probabillstically independent. That is, the probabil- 
ity of a given that h and b have happened is in no way different from the expected probability 
of a given that only h has happened. 
2.4 The Range theory of Probability 
Jakob Bernoulli can be regarded as the founder of probability theory as a branch of mathe- 
matics. His posthumously published "Ars Conjectandi" [7] formed a bridge between the "a 
priori" methods of cbmbinatory probability, (which by definition required only knowledge of 
the gaming situation, and no evidence for validation or support), and the early "a posteriori" 
methods of statistical theory (which deduced results from supportive evidence). This early 
work was based on a range theory of probability. 
In its simplest form, if we consider h to be a hypothesis, then we must break h down into a 
number N of alternative conditions. That h is fulfilled (or true) means that one of hl, h2,... hN 
is fulfilled. Some of these alternatives, say M, entail the occurrence of a; the, remaining ones 
entail the occurrence of - a. The probability of a given h (p(alh)) is the ratio MIN. 
The mutually exclusive alternatives, (hl, h2t.. AN), covered by a proposition are what is 
called its range. The range theory of probability satisfies the four axioms 2.1 to 2.4, and 
defines the probability of a given h as the measure of the range of h-and-a divided by the 
measure of h alone. 
The Principle of Insufficient Reason 
The main difficulty confronting this range theory of probability concerns measurement of the 
ranges, and effectively the numbers M and N. Bernoulli stressed that the alternatives into 
which h is to be analysed ought, to be equally possible; this rule is called the principle of 
insufficient reason [7], or in Keyne's terminology the principle of indifference [69]. 
Reliance on the principle of insufficient reason for measuring probabilities in a range has 
certain attractions in games of chance, where there is usually agreement amongst experts as 
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regaxds gaming situations where alternatives are equally possible. Bernoulli himself noted 
that the inventors of games of chance "took pains to set up so that the numbers of cases 
would be known and- so that-all these cases could happen with equal case" [7]. 
With these two tools at his disposal, Bernoulli then turned his attention to the relationship 
between frequency data drawn from many sample runs, and the definition of probability as 
given above. To this end, he developed the binomial theorem, which may be stated as follows. 
If an experiment of two possible outcomes has the same probability p, (i. e. MIN), of success 
from trial to trial, then the probability of seeing m successes in n trials is: 
(n ) 
", (, -. -m p(tnln, p) =m (2.6) 
Bernoulli then showed that as the number of trials n --+ oo, the observed frequency 
f=m/n of successes tends to the probability p. With this expression Bernoulli became the first 
mathematician able to relate the result of a random experiment (m/n) within a mathematical 
model to the absolutely perfect results which were to be expected (MIN). 
0 Reasoning with the Range Theory: Bayes, Theorem 
In the problems considered in probability theory, the population numbers concerning the 
range of the hypothesis, and the range of the event are known, (i. e. N and M respectively). 
For this theorem to be of practical use to the theoretical statistician, an inversion of the 
originally stated goals had to be solved. The inversion problem may be stated thus, given 
that the sample is known (that is, n the number of trials, and m the succesfull trials), but 
the population is unknown, how can we predict the population numbers M and N, and hence 
the true probability of an event, with accuracy. 
It is likely that in many trials the observed frequency f will be close to the true probability 
p. But the question was, how to describe this process in a precise mathematical theorem. 
That is, the binomial law gives the probability of m, given (M, N, n), so how can we derive 
from this a formula for the probability of It given (m, N, n)? 
Thomas Bayes [5], in 1763, provided the first example of an inversion of the binomial 
theorem. Ile developed a theory to answer questions such as: "Suppose a solid or die of 
19 
whose number of sides and constitution we know nothing; and that we are to judge of these 
[the number of sides and the probability of each number showing at any given throw] from 
experiments made in throwing it. " His result states that given the sample data (m, n), he finds 
that MIN lies in the interval: 
p< MIN <ý+ dp (2.7) 
where: 
p(dplrn, n) = 
(n +11p M(l - P) n-' dp (2.8) in! (n - M)! 
Pierre Laplace [77,75], in 1774, developed the theory of inverse probabilities in greater 
generality. In Laplace's terminology, we let 11 stand for some observable event which can be 
analysed into C1, C2, ..., C. mutually exclusive and exhaustive causes. If the causes Ci, as 
in the principle of insufficient reason, are considered equally likely, then having seen event 11 
to be true, the posterior probabilities of the Ci are: 
p(cilIl) = p(II I Ci) 
Eýv 2=1 p(ii1ci) 
(2.9) 
It is therefore necessary to know the probabilities p(HjCj) for each of the causes. If the Ci 
are not considered equally likely, but have prior probabilities p(CiII), where I denotes prior 
information, then the result becomes: 
p(CiIII) = 
P(, Ilci)p(cill) 
Ej, ý Ip (I, I cj) p (cj I I) 
In this case, we also need to, know values for p(CiII), the conditional probabilities of the 
causes in the light of whatever other evidence comes to light. This is known as "Bayes' 
Theorem" [60,24,125], and, as can be seen from equations 2.9 and 2.10, it requires a lot of 
precise information. In fact, if there are x causes, the complete system requires 2, r conditional 
probabilities p(IIICi) to represent all possible states of presence and absence of the x causes 
taken together. The problem is compounded when the conditional probabilities p(CiII) have 
to be supplied for every possible type of prior information having a bearing on causes Ci. 
Laplace's best. results came from 2.9. His failure to use equation 2.10 to any great effect, 
and the fact that he did not provide a detailed description of the derivation of the two results 
2.9 and 2.10 left the theory of inverse probabilities open to criticisms of not being well-founded. 
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Statisticians gradually turned towards a definition of probability as something other than a 
function over ranges. - This developmental period led to the frequency theory of probability, 
and the beginnings of sampling theory. 
2.5 The Frequency Theory of Probability 
Early proponents of the frequency theory, spoke of probability only as a relative frequency 
"in the long run". This is the view that p(EIII) means the relative frequency with which the 
event E takes place when condition 11 is fulfilled. That is, the probability of event E given 11 
is the proportion of 11 situations which lead to E events. John Venn, was first to develop a 
mathematical theory for the frequency theory of probability [127]. Venn defined an event's 
probability as the limiting value which it's relative frequency approaches as the number of 
occasions of observation are indefinitely increased. 
The German mathematician Richard Von Mises [85,86] further developed the concept by 
adding a qualification of randomness in the events being measured. Ile gave an example of 
a traveller walking along a road on which milestones are placed: laxge ones at whole miles, 
small ones at every tenth of a mile (including the whole miles). Von Mises reasoned that a 
probability could not simply be the limiting value of a relative frequency. "If we walk long 
enough along this road, calculating the. relative frequencies of large stones, the value found 
in this way will lie around 1/10... the deviations from the value 0.1 will become smaller and 
smaller as the number of stones passed increases; in other words, the relative frequency tends 
towards the limiting value of 0.1 This result may induce us to speak of a certain 'probability 
of encountering a large stone'. " 
To prevent such a scenaxio he introduced the idea of a collective: "such sequences of events 
or observations, which satisfy the requirements of complete lawlessness or 'randomness"'. The 
traveller's scenario is ruled out of being a collective because there is a way of selecting the 
stones which would cause a fundamental change in the relative frequencies. That is, starting 
at a whole mile and register every second marker passed, the relative frequencies converge 
towards 1/5 instead of 1/10. His demand of randomness in the recording of the event he 
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called "the principle of the impossibility of a gambling system". This extended Venn's work by 
defining two properties possessed by a collective appropriate for the application of probability 
theory: 
1. The relative frequencies must possess limiting values (as with Venn's definition) 
2. These limiting values must remain the same in all partial sequences which may be 
selected from the original one in an arbitrary way 
With this qualification, Von Mises introduced a considerable difficulty into the theory of 
probability, namely, the problem of how to determine a truly random distribution. 
Reasoning with the Frequency Theory 
Many problems in statistical inferencing lead to repetitions of experiments having two possible 
outcomes. For example, "Is the readership of the Sun newspaper equally split between males 
and females? " In this example, the population which is described by the readership of the Sun 
newspaper can be tested by asking the simple question: "Are you female? " And recording the 
answers (yes, or no). Our interest will be in the proportion (p) of responses to the affirmative, 
divided by the size of the population. 
In realistically difficult statistical questions, such as this one, it is not generally possible 
to collect data from the total population of interest; and so samples from that population 
are tested instead. And so, reasoning with the frequency theory of probability is called the 
theory of sampling. 
In the example given above, we wish to test the hypothesis that 50% of the readership 
of the Sun newspaper is female, i. e. p=1/2. This is a statistical hypothesis. Let x be the 
number of female Sun readers in the sample, and n be the number of Sun readers in the 
sample. If x/n is close to 1/2, the hypothesis gains credence from our sample; whereas, if x/n 
is continually far from 1/2, we will begin to doubt that p=1/2. However, even when p=1/2, 
fluctuations in the random sample could produce a value of x/n far from 1/2. As n becomes 
larger however, these fluctuations become less and less likely, and eventually, the fluctuations 
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should be lost as the true value for p is more and more closely approximated by x/n. This 
behaviour is known as the strong law of large numbers. 
In hypothesis testing, the assumption "p=1/2" is known as the null-hypothesis. The 
number of women, x, in a population of size n, has a Binomial distribution, which may be 
approximated by a Guassian distribution, whose mean is np, and whose variance is np(I-p), 
for the null hypothesis. 
If there is a 50: 50 split female: male in the population then the chance that x will differ 
from n/2, given by the Binomial theorem, by more than 1.96VGT4 is 0.05. This means that 
a number recorded outside this range makes our null hypothesis very probably, (probability 
ý: 0.95), wrong. For example, in a sample of size 50, the probability that x is outside the 
interval (18,32) is 0.05; and so, any number of successes in the ranges 0-18,32-50 make the 
null hypothesis very unlikely. 
Problems with Sampling Theory 
Choosing a sample to be tested from a population is open to human bias and the results from 
an investigation lose credence if a sample is improperly chosen. For example, if we were to 
investigate the null hypothesis on a sample drawn from an all women hospital or in a male 
dominated work setting. To ensure that the sample is a fair representation of the population, 
the sample must be chosen with respect to the principle of excluded gambling systems (85]. 
The problems involved in selecting an unbiased sample reflective of the nature of the 
population led to the development of stratified sampling, where certain possible samples are 
eliminated from those possible; cluster sampling, where certain combinations of individuals 
are grouped into the sample; and multi-stage sampling methods which allow for combinations 
of cluster and stratified sampling [123]. 
Coupled with the frequency definition of probability, was the development, in the early 
twentieth century, of techniques for inference using this notion of probability [98]. This 
resulted in the production of the Chi-squared test, the principle of maximum likelihood, 
unbiased and or efficient estimators, confidence intervals, fiducial distributions, conditioning 
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on ancillary statistics, power functions and sequential methods for hypothesis testing. All of 
these methods test how well sample data conforms with model predictions. 
None of the sampling models take known prior information into account, and the place 
of such evidence in the reasoning process is replaced by hypothesising the existence of "nui- 
sance" parameters. A nuisance parameter is defined as a parameter which "is included in a 
probability model for an experiment because it is necessary for the good fit of the model, but 
that is not of prime interest to the investigator" [73]. 
Although there are misgivings about the frequency theory, it prevailed strongly throughout 
the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century. However, Cox [25] points out that pure 
significance tests, while useful, are of limited importance, particularly because they give 
no idea of the magnitude of possible departure of the results in the sample from the null 
hypothesis. 
2.6 The Subjective Theory of Probability 
Many philosophers and statisticians have spoken of probability as a measure of belief or 
certainty. Ramsey [104] and De Finetti [40] made the first attempts to systematise the notion 
of partial belief into a framework of mathematical probability obeying the four laws required 
of a statistical calculus. 
A person's measure of belief in a concept may be measured by proposing a bet as to the 
truth of the event, and observing the lowest odds that will be accepted. The odds of an event 
are defined to be the ratio of the probability of the event, and the probability that the event 
will not happen. A probability can be converted to an odds ratio by using the formula: 
ODDS = 
PROBABILITY 
1- PROBABILITY 
For example, if an expert meteorologist is quite sure it is going to rain, we would ask if 
there was a4 to 1 chance, or an evens chance, and so on; until the expert finally settles on the 
odds most appropriate to quantifying the belief. Odds given in this way can be transformed 
back into probabilities with the foHowing equation: 
PROBABILITY = 
ODDS 
(2.12) ODDS+ 1 
24 
where a4 to 1 shot has odds 4, and a1 to 4 shot has odds of 0.25. Ramsey pointed out 
that a distribution of partial beliefs contrary to the four laws of the abstract calculus of 
probability, would be inconsistent in the, sense that it would "violate the laws of preference 
between options". The ideas of Ramsey and De Finetti were further developed by Savage 
[110], who became the founder of a "subjectivist" or "personalist" school in probability and 
statistics, and Cox [25]. 
The Re-emergence of Bayesian Statistics 
Jeffreys reintroduced Bayesian Inference to statistics [61] and criticisms of the well founded- 
ness of the range theory of probability (and consequently Bayesian Inference methods) were 
overcome when Cox [25] answered the question: "is it possible to construct a consistent set 
of mathematical rules for carrying out plausible, rather than deductive reasoning? " [60]. Ile 
found that if degrees of plausibility are represented by real numbers, then the conditions of 
consistency can be stated in the form of functional equations, whose general solutions can be 
found. Ile then defined probability as the scale over which the degrees of plausibility were 
defined. Ile deduced the only consistent set of rules of combination to be: 
p(A&BIC) = p(AIB&C)p(BIC) (2.13) 
p(AIB) + p(- AIB) =1 (2.14) 
These two equations are precisely those of 2.3 and 2.4; and, with the addition of the 
equations 2.1 and 2.2, a calculus of probability may be defined within which the theory of 
inverse probabilities is consistent. 
2.7 Probability: Subjective or Objective? 
I 
Two schools of thought have emerged as to the conception of probability as a degree of belief, 
on the part of the subjectivists; and as a relative frequency, or as a theory of ranges on the 
part of the objectivists. There is however a great overlap between the two methods. 
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Supporters of the frequency view have found that an adequate analysis of the probability 
of an event, requires that the event being tested be randomly distributed through the sampling 
data. Supporters of the range theory of probability have needed the principle of indifference for 
determining certain situations equipossible in certain fundamental alternatives. The question 
is asked whether the knowledge of randomness or equipossibility are not forms of knowledge 
forced onto an inference model. If the answer to this is no, then it is not possible to think of 
the objectivist models as being able to exist without recourse to subjective knowledge of the 
sampler, thus bolstering up the case for probability as a subjective entity. 
On the other band, subjective probabilities must be based on knowledge acquired in 
some knowledge elicitation process. If the sources of this knowledge are to be considered 
reliable, then the information they provide must objectively describe the nature of events in 
the domain of interest. In this instance, it is not possible to think of the subjectivist model 
being supportable without recourse to the objectivist model. 
Also, although there seems to be a great conflict of opinion between those championing 
a frequency theory of probability, and those championing a range theory of probability; in 
chapter 2 it becomes clear that both lines of development have contributed to the development 
of set theoretic mechanisms. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Any attempt to integrate the two branches of statistics and mathematics faces major problems 
of complexity. The mathematical development of the predicate calculus has bequeathed us 
modal logic, an efficient means of performing inference (Robinson's resolution theorem) and 
the problem of semi- deci dability in the first-order predicate calculus (an unfortunate setback). 
The statistical development of probability has (via Cox) produced a sound mathematical 
basis for Laplace's "B ayes' Theorem" and given us a system which is precise, voracious in its 
appetite for data and not very flexible. 
An understanding of these problems places us in a position to see why simplification 
methods, such as those discussed in chapter 3, have had to be used in the early expert 
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systems, and why ultimately, any system of reasoning both with mathematical logic and 
probability theory must also employ simplification strategies of one sort or another in an 
attempt to reduce the complexity problem. 
27 
Chapter 3 
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR 
REASONING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the major requirements of an automatic system for reasoning with uncertainty is that 
it should demonstrably perform its reasoning task within a reasonable amount of time. Thus, 
the early methods for reasoning with uncertainty made various simplifications to the reasoning 
process in order to make it tractable. On the whole, -these techniques of simplification have 
been a good movement within artificial intelligence in that they have opened up the field of 
expert system technology, and demonstrated a crucial role for subjective probability estimates. 
However, the simplification strategies operated by these early systems lead, in the long 
run, to continued and sustained errors of judgement on the part of the reasoning process. 
So much so, that criticisms can be made against almost all of the present day methods for 
reasoning with uncertainty. This chapter will show how the simple methods of reasoning with 
uncertainty have developed into the complex methods of reasoning with uncertainty which 
honestly address the problems discussed in the previous chapter. 
One interesting dynamic in the development of good methods of reasoning with uncer- 
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tainty from poorer methods, is the reintroduction of complexity problems. Methods for 
reasoning with uncertainty using set-theoretic inference mechanisms, have been proposed by 
Cheeseman [16], Bundy [13], Nilsson [89], and Pearl [95]. Each of the authors were dissat- 
isfied with current methods of reasoning which are non-set theoretic. These dissatisfactions 
can only be viewed with respect to the major inferencing mechanisms of today. This chapter 
examines the development of these mechanisms and illustrates their shortcomings. 
3.2 Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 
With the development of the computer in the Second World War, mechanised thinking pro- 
cesses staxted to seem plausible. Alan Turing, in asking the question "can machines think? " 
[126] started the search for "artificial" intelligence in a computer system. the quest for devel- 
oping this "thinking" aspect of computation became topical. The first major breakthroughs 
in this area were in reasoning using first order calculii ( [105]), and in general problem solving 
using domain independent generate-and-test techniques ( [87]). 
Robinson provided a computational procedure for performing reasoning with implication 
rules. Newell, Simon and Shaw provided a system which could solve a family of problems in 
a general way with recourse only to simple deductive techniques. This system made use of 
the resolution principle, and was called the General Problem Solver. 
Library of 
Methods 
G. P. S. 
I Problem I 
Figure 3.1: General Problem Solver 
The authors of GPS believed that a collection of problem solving methods could be 
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grouped together in a library, and a way to increase the intelligence of the GPS would be to 
continually add more and more new rules. This turned out not to be the case. In fact, as 
more and more rules were added, the computation of solutions took longer, and, the reasoning 
process became so diverse that in some cases, results of relatively easy problems could not be 
reported in real time. The reasoning process of GP8 lacked specific direction. 
The introduction of the program DENDRAL [11], altered the way such research was 
considered. At Stanford University, the Professor of Genetics devised a program to enumerate 
all possible legal configurations of atoms in a molecule from a chemical formula. The program 
was then further refined in an attempt to identify molecular compounds from analatical data 
from a mass spectrograph. The work produced a program to solve a difficult analytical task, 
using highly domain- dependent knowledge. This was the beginning of the shift from domain 
independent solution methods, to doinain dependent methods [36], and culminated in the 
development of Knowledge Based Systems, and Expert Systems. 
Expert systems are designed to deal with problems whose specifications, and solution 
methods are complex. Such complex problems usually offer many possible solutions. Ex- 
pert systems, specifically are intended to function as an expert would when presented with a 
problem in the expert's area of expertise. 
The background to this subject is epistemic knowledge [72]. A knowledge based system [45] 
is a system which is able to manipulate "knowledge" in order to perform a given task. Expert 
systems, being a sub-area of knowledge based systems, are used in areas where an expert 
may be found. Expert knowledge is distilled from an expert's experience, and structured 
symbolically in a computational formalism in such a way as to model relations between data 
elements in the expert's domain the way the expert would. 
In DENDRAL [11], the molecular structure of organic compounds was deduced from the 
results of a mass spectrograpli reading, using expert knowledge on how to interpret the lines. 
DENDRAL is very much used by chemists, and results from the program have been cited 
in many academic papers. However, quantified uncertainty as such, was not needed in the 
reasoning mechanism. The rules were the straightforward if-then rules of propositional and 
predicate calculus. DENDRAL exhibits causal reasoning procedures whose. motivations were 
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Knowledge 
Base 
Inference 
Mechanism 
Problem 
Figure 3.2: Standard Knowledge Based System 
provided by the expert encoding the rules. and as such performs the task of an expert very 
well. However, since there are experts who must, in the course of applying their expertise, deal 
with uncertainties in reaching towards conclusions, it became inevitable that mechanisms for 
representing and manipulating uncertainties must also be found. This lead towards methods 
for "inexact", or "plausible" reasoning. 
3.3 The Purely Bayesian Approach 
Expert systems were first used most successfully in the field of medical diagnosis where they 
superceded the use of purely Bayesian methods of reasoning. To understand, why this pro- 
gression took place, consider the very succesfull Dayesian model produced by the designers 
of the ARF system which was a program to diagnose one of 14 diseases causing acute renal 
failure [49]. 
The differentiation among these 14 possibilities was carried out using 31 clinical param- 
eters. Each parameter had approximately three to four possible values, so the sample space 
of findings was approximately 100. Data tables indicating the prior probabilities of the hy- 
potheses and the conditional probabilities of diseases, given various symptomatic findings, 
were used by the program to interactively query the user as the reasoning process progressed. 
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The algorithm is as Mows: 
1. Construct a vector of prior probabilities for the 14 possible hypotheses. 
2. Using Bayes'Theorem, reevaluate the hypotheses based on given information. 
3. If any probability reaches a previously defined threshold value, (e. g. 95%), stop the 
investigative process, and report results. 
4. Identify the finding with maximum information content, from entropy considerations. 
Ask about the finding with maximum expected information content. 
5. Go back to step (2). 
This procedure produced impressive results when applied in several medical application 
domains; was economical and directed in its attempt to reason; and was able to arrive at the 
same clinical diagnoses as experts over 33 cases on which it was tested [50]. 
The creators of ARF, when looking to further develop the system, turned to techniques 
of Artificial Intelligence. The reasons for this switch can be listed as follows: 
* Bayesian Inference demands a lot of information before it will form an opinion. (750 
conditional probability estimates were needed by ARP to discriminate between the 14 
causes of acute renal failure. ) 
9 For reasons of implementational simplicity, the list of diseases were considered to be 
mutually exclusive, and exhaustive -a condition not typical in medicine where a 
patient may have many correlated illnesses. 
e The findings in the program were considered to be conditionally independent, that is, 
that the probability of a patient having a particular symptom is conditioned only upon 
the present disease under investigation, and not on the other findings already made. 
For example, in ARF it is not possible to correlate nausea and vornitting. 
a The database of the program is conditioned on the patient population from which it 
has been derived; and so extending the program with results from a new population, or 
porting the program to anew work location degrades the program's critical performance. 
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e The entire repertoire of hypotheses known to the program had to be updated each 
time a new finding is reported. In internal medicine where there may be thousands 
of hypotheses, this requirement becomes impractical, and wasteful, given that in an 
expert situation, an expert clinician is, typically, dealing with only a small number of 
hypotheses (no more than five or six) [92] whereas, a non-expert is typically entertaining 
many more. 
e In choosing the information to expand into questioning, the program must think ahead, 
by evaluating probability distributions of expected answers in the light of the entropy 
changes liable to be induced. This requirement demands heavy usage of computational 
resources. 
3.4 Fuzzy Logic 
Tjncertainty which is 'described by people is necessaxily couched in a linguiitic formalism, 
corresponding to the language in which the uncertainty is expressed. Probability may be 
regarded as a language for coping with uncertainty; however natural language itself also 
provides tools for making subtle distinctions between things. 
Winograd's natural language system SlIRDLU [132] used a natural language interface to 
manipulate blocks on a tabletop. As defined, all of the objects were equally distinct; so that 
a blue-green block was no closer to being a blue block, than a yellow block. Fuzzy logic over 
Fuzzy set-theory attempts to overcome this kind of inability [135,34]. 
Fuzzy set theory 1134], allows an element of the language to be a member of any of a 
number of sets, and assigns a number (ranging from 0 to 1) to the elements of each set which 
describes the objects level of membership within each set. This number is called a membership 
value. 
For example, the shape of the object shown in figure 3.3 could be fuzzy described as: 
[(triangular, 0.6) (oval, 0.3) (round, 0.1) (square 0)], where the numbers measure a goodness 
of fit of the object to each of the possible shapes. 
As another example, the colour of an object may be described by one person as 'green', 
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Figure 3.3: A Fuzzy Object 
and by another as 'a sort of blue-green'. Internally, the colour of it may then be described: 
[Colour(Green, 0.75) Colour(Blue 0.25)]; or alternatively if a colour is stored in terms of its 
wavelengths in nanometres, and we know that the wavelengths of green and blue are 445- 
490 and 500-575 respectively, then the colour 'sort of blue-green' may be represented with a 
wavelength 495 nanometres. So a linguistic function 'sort-of', can be predefined for each of 
the colours. 
In the above example, 'sort of'is used to demonstrate the concept of a Ilinguistic hedge': a 
linguisticl function which causes some amount of shift, of an object's membership value within 
a group, in such a way as to accord with human expectations. Other such hedges are: 'very', 
&nearly', 'rather', 'too', 'almost', etcetera. 
The truth or falsity of a proposition is not a certain event, but is rather modelled on a 
standard Gaussian curve [38] which measures possibility. An uncertain event is given a point 
on the curve and is assigned a possibility number in the region [0,1]. Fuzzy Set theory offers 
three rules for dealing with conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of uncertain propositions: 
p(A&B) = minimum (p(A), p(B)) 
p(AVB) maximum(p(A), p(B)) 
p(- A) =1- p(A) 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
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Problems with Fuzzy Logic 
Disadvantages of this formulation are its sensitivity to only the smallest possibility, in the case 
of the conjunction rule; and to only the laxgest, in the case of the disjunction rule [119,130]. 
This makes the reasoning process optimistic when estimating the strength of conjunction; and 
pessimistic when estimating the strength of disjunction. For example, for a sentence whose 
associated possibility is 0.6, Fuzzy logic would give a possibility of p( AA0.4; and 
a possibility of p( A Vý -. A )=0.6. 
3.5 MYCIN: A Method of Certainty Factors 
Mycin [10], can be regarded as the first rule-based reasoning mechanism from which reasoning 
with uncertainty in expert systems has been derived. The primary task of MYCIN is to 
determine what significant organisms exist within a patient. Aspects of diagnosis are broken 
down into triples of context- at tribute-value groups. 
For example, if our current patient is called John Knox, then this information is coded 
in the following way. The context is 'the patient, the attribute is 'name' and the value is 
'John Knox'. In such a way, the address of John Knox could be stored as context 'the pa- 
tient', attribute 'address', value 'lligh Street, Edinburgh'. Or a context might be a particular 
organism, an attribute of the organism might be it's shape, and the value would then be the 
organism's actual shape. 
Rules in MYCIN are then of the type: 
IF < antecedents > THEN < action or conclusion > (3.4) 
And an example of a rule (taken from [10]) is: 
IF: 1) The stain of the organism is gram positive and 
2) The morphology of the organism is coccus and 
3) The growth confirmation of the organism is chains 
THEN: There is suggestive evidence (0.7) that the identity of 
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the organism is streptococcus 
Attached to each context- at tribu te-valu e (c-a-v) group, there is a certainty factor, which 
is an indicator of how certain the'fact is. So that, we may break the above rule down to: 
IF (ORGANISM-STAIN-GRAMPOS Cl) 
(ORGANISM-MORPIIOLOGY-COCCUS C2) 
(ORGANISM-GROWTII-CIIAINS C3) 
TIIEN: (ORGANISM-IDENTITY-STREPTOC Cf) 
where C1, C2, C3 represent the present certainty factors of the respective antecedents, and 
Cf is the certainty factor associated with the rule. (In this case 0.7. ) The factors C1 to C3 
are calculated by MYCIN, and it chooses the minimum of these (using the Fuzzy and-rule 
[6,1081 to be the certainty factor of their all being true together. Call this certainty factor 
af. 
If the rule creates the first value for the certainty of c-a-v, then the new certainty factor 
is: 
af *Cf (3.5) 
If a certainty factor already exists for c-a-v, then let CC = af * Cf and let Co be the old 
factor for c-a-v. The new certainty factor for c-a-v is: 
Cn = CC + Co - (CC * Co) (3.6) 
if Co >0 and CC > 0. 
Cn = CC + Co + (CC * Co) (3.7) 
If Co <0 and CC < 0. 
Cn = 1. (3.8) 
If CC =1 and Co=-l, or, CC=-l andCo= 1. 
Cn = CC + Co (3.9) 
- min(ICCI, lCol 
In all other cases. 
36 
Problems with MYCIN ý 
This method for handling uncertainty is very computationally efficient, and was developed 
through a heuristic process of trial and error. This has led to many criticisms about its ad-hoc 
nature [15,130]. In particular, the system has been criticised for the way its results deviate 
from expected probabilistic results as the reasoning process becomes deeper [1]. 
3.6 The Prospector Model for Handling Uncertainty 
The Prospector model combines both the standard Bayesian techniques, and techniques of 
Fuzzy Logic, on a database of rules. A rule in the Prospector model is of the form: 
if E then (to degree LS, LN) II 
where LS is known as the sufficiency factor, and LN is known as the necessity factor. At- 
tached to each proposition is its currently estimated odds of being true, where the odds of an 
uncertain proposition are defined: 
o(H) 
p(II) 
1 P(H) 
(3.11) 
The odds of an event are as defined in the subjective theory of uncertainty. As the probability 
of an event approaches 1, the odds of the event approach infinity; and as the probability of an 
event approaches 0, so do the odds of the event. The probability of an event can be recovered 
from its odds by the transformation: 
P(H) (3.12) 
The sufficiency factor of a rule is usually a number very much greater than one, and the 
necessity factor is usually a number very much less than 1. So that, when the odds of an 
event are multiplied by a sufficiency factor, we expect its probability to be increased; and 
when multiplied by a necessity factor, we expect its probability to decrease. 
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3.7 , Prospector's Inference Mechanism 
As in Bayesian Inference, when there is no uncertainty about the evidence there is no un- 
certainty about the hypothesis in the light of that evidence. That is, when evidence E is 
definitely present, the odds of hypothesis 11 in the light of E are: 
o(H I E) = LS * o(II) (3.13) 
and when E is absent: 
o(II I E) = LN * o(II) 
C 
Figure 3.4: PROSPECTOR's Interpolation Schema 
Uncertainty about E is expressed on a scale of belief from -1 to 1. A belief of -1 means 
E is false, +1 means E is true, 0 means there is no knowledge about E one way or the other. 
Numbers intermediate to these extremities are to quantify uncertainty in the truth or falsity 
of the proposition E (see figure 3.4). If the belief number is positive, then the new odds are 
interpolated between o(H) and o(IIIE) depending on the value of belief and equation 3.13; 
and if the number is negative, then the odds are interpolated between o(H) and o(- HIE), 
depending on the belief value and equation 3.14. 
When two or more pieces of evidence affect the same hypothesis, Prospector allows the 
38 
-1 
evidences to be considered conditionally independent given the hypothesis. So that: 
p(E, &E21II) = p(E, III)p(E21II) (3.15) 
and 
11- , p(EI&E21-H) = p(Ell-II)p(E21-II) 
(3.16) 
It is now no longer possible to'evaluate the true odds of hypothesis II, so the o function is 
replaced by an o* function, an approximation of the odds, such that for one hypothesis and 
n pieces of evidence: 
o*(HIE) = lli'=, LiO(II) 
Problems with Prospector 
The assumption that all evidences are conditionally independent at the level of the hypothesis 
whose probability is to be updated is unwarranted. The situation becomes clearly wrong when 
we consider the example of finding one piece of evidence capable of proving the hypothesis 
definitely true. In this situation, all the other evidences being independent from this piece of 
evidence, are also independent of the hypothesis [10]. 
In local computations Prospector's approximation method deviates only slightly from 
probability theory; but White has'shown [130], that as the process of reasoning becomes 
deeper the results become extremely unreliable. 
3.8 The Use of Entropy in Reasoning with Uncertainty 
The entropy of a probability distribution [54,16,2], is a function which operates over a whole 
probability space and is a measure of the extent to which the probability is concentrated 
on a few points or dispersed over many. Probability distributions with a low entropy have 
probability concentrated on certain elements of the probability space; distributions with a 
high entropy have the probability spread more throughout the space. More formally, the 
entropy of the probability mass function px(x) may be regarded as a descriptive quantity, 
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just as the median, mode, variance and coefficient of skewness may be regarded as descriptive 
parameters. It is an indicator of the degree of disorder in a probability space. 
Definition 
If pi is the probability that the discrete random variable X takes the value xi and pi ý: 
i=1,2,..., n, and pi, = 1, then the entropy of X is II(X) where 
n 
H(X) = II(PljP2v ---gPn) 
EPilOgPi- (3.17) 
In the examples here we will use 2 as the logbase; although any base can actually be used 
[54]. 
Example 1 
We are provided with four coins and told that one of the coins is counterfeit. The situation 
is shown pictorially in figure 3.5, where the four probability distributions are labelled DI to 
D4. In each of these distributions, probabilities pi to P4 are associated with the four coins, 
where p,, describes the likelihood of coin n being the counterfeit. The entropy of each of the 
distributions is show in column 11. 
Distribution p(n) = Prob associated with coin n 
P1 p2 p3 p4 
Entropy (H) 
DI 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 2 
D2 1/2 1/6 1/6 1/6 1.8 
D3 3/4 1/12 1/12 1/12 1.2 
D4 1 0 0 0 0 
Figure 3.5: Entropy as a Changing Property of Probability Distributions 
The distribution with maximum entropy is D1. More precisely, D1 is the maximum 
entropy distribution for a sample space of four points when there are no probability constraints 
on the points other than that they must sum to one. More generally, for any n points, the 
distribution which has the maximum entropy is that which assigns 1/n to each. The reduction 
in entropy from Dl to D4 demonstrates the effect of having more information about the change 
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in probabilistic likelihood of one of the coins over the others. D4, (entropy 0), represents the 
case where there is no uncertainty as to which coin is counterfeit. 
Information is embodied in each of the distributions, and we can see that the distribution 
which says least about the identity of the counterfeit coin is DI. This equation of information 
with entropy leads to the maximum entropy principle: Of all probability distributions which 
satisfy the constraints imposed by the known aggregate probabilities, choose that distribution 
which has the maximum entropy or, equivalently, contains the least information. 
When there are more probability constraints on the points in the possibility space, the 
absolute maximum entropy distribution (D1 above), cannot normally be applied. The solution 
method for dealing with this problem is given in example 2. 
Example 2 
This example is adapted from one provided by Bard [3]. Jack and Jill work in an office with 
several co-workers. The probabilities are 7r, that there is somebody in the office, 7r2 that Jack 
is in the office, and 73 that Jill is in the office. What is the probability that both Jack and 
Jill are in the office? 
Sentence a b c d e Probability 
7' 1 1 1 1 1 _ 1 
SOMEBODY 1 1 1 1 0 7rj 
JACK 0 1 0 1 0 72 
JILL 0 0 1 1 0 73 
Table 3.1: Interpretation Table for Office Example 
The possible worlds are labelled with small letters a, b, c, d and e. The possibilities are: 
(a) somebody in the office, but it is neither Jack nor Jill, (b) Jack but not Jill is in the office, 
(c) Jill but not Jack is in the office, (d) Jack and Jill are both in the office, (e) nobody is in 
the office. Table 3.1 is an interpretation table for this scenario, with the possibilities (a) to 
(e) explicitly represented by worlds a to e respectively. The tautology r is true in all possible 
worlds and is included to ensure that all the probabilities sum to 1. 
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Solution 
The probability of world e is known. It is 1 -7r,. The probability constraints are formed 
thus: if a sentence is true in any of the possible scenarios (a-e), then the probability of that 
scenario helps to make up the probability of the sentence. From the table, the equations to 
be solved are: 
a+b+c+d = 7r, 
b+d= 7r2 
c+d= 7r3 (3.18) 
The procedure for obtaining a solution is based on standard Lagrangian methods and 
can be expressed as follows: associate an unknown variable with each unknown aggregate, 
one for each row of the semantic tree. We will assign a,, a2, a3, and a4 to the rows for r, 
SOMEBODY, JACK, and JILL respectively. Each possible world can now be rewritten in 
terms of the multiplication of aggregates where the aggregate is included in the multiplication 
list only if the world has the value one in the corresponding row of the semantic tree. 
a= ala2 
b= ala2a3 
c= ala2a4 
d= ala2a3a4 
e=a, (3.19) 
Substituting expressions 3.19 into equations 3.18 we obtain: 
ala2(l + a3)(1 + a4) 7rl 
ala2(l + a4) 72 
ala3(l + a3) -'ý 7r3 (3.20) 
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So that: (d) = ala2a3a4 12-1r3; which is the required probability from the maximum Irl 
entropy distribution. 
Problems With Entropy Solutions 
The two main problems with using maximum entropy directly in an expert system are: 
9 The enumeration of all of the semantic possibilities becomes a non-trivial task as the 
number of sentences increases, and without these semantic enumerations any entropy 
solution is rendered invalid. 
In general, the solution of the non-linear entropy equations can only be acheived using 
an iterative approximation procedure which has been shown to be NP-Complete [91]. 
As n (the number of random variables) increases, such procedures eventually saturate 
and produce no result [56]. 
3.9 The Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
This method was first proposed by Arthur Dempster (1968) and later extended by Glen 
Shafer (1976). The set of all possibilities is called the "frame of discernment", denoted 0. 
These possibilities are assumed to be mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. Dempster-Shafer 
theory uses a real number in the range [0,1] to indicate the degree to which a piece of evidence 
supports a hypothesis. The impact of each piece of evidence on the subsets of 0 is represented 
by a function called a "basic probability assignment" (bpa). The bpa assigns a measure of 
belief to subsets of 0, and is a specially developed generalisation of the statistical probability 
density function (pdf) [38]. The power set of 0 (29) is assigned a bpa by the special function 
"m" which assigns a number to each of the subsets of 29 such that the numbers all sum to 1. 
In a pdf, a number is assigned to each singleton of the hypothesis set such that the numbers 
sum to 1. 
The quantity "m" (A) is a measure of the belief assigned to proposition A, where A is some 
subset of 29, and the total belief sums to 1. This belief assignment may not be subdivided 
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amongst the subsets of A. ý The remaining belief (1 - 0.7) is then assigned to 0. That is, we 
cannot further choose between any of the subsets of 0 with the remainder of the belief. 
A function is introduced which gives the total amount of belief in hypothesis A, not only 
belief committed exactly to A, but also belief committed to all subsets of A. This function is 
called a belief function, denoted Bel. 
If Bell and Be12 are two belief functions whose bpa's are ml and M2 respectively, then 
Dempster's rule all ows us to compute a new bpa, denoted by Ml 0 M2, which represents the 
combined effect of mi and M2 on the frame of discernment. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence defines that the belief associated with the empty 
set (empty) must always be 0. A heuristic is employed on the orthogonality principle to 
achieve this. Dempster deals with the problem by normalising the computed values so that 
M1 0 M2(empty)=O, and all other values of the new bpa lie between 0 and 1. This is achieved 
by defining x as the sum of all non-zero values attached to empty in a given case. Ile then 
assigns 0 to M1 0 M2(empty), and divides all other values of ml (9 m2 by 1-n. 
Bel(A) gives the total amount of belief committed to subset A. The complement of A 
can be denoted AC. And so, the information contained in Bel(AC) is the amount of belief 
attributed to AC. Therefore, the quantity 1- Bel(AC) expresses the plausibility of A, i. e. 
the extent to which the evidence fails to doubt A. Therefore, the information contained in 
Bel concerning a given subset A may be conveniently expressed by the interval: [Bel(A), 1- 
Bel(AC)]. 
Critiscisms of the Dempster-Shafer theory have been made by Zadeh [108] and Pearl [97) 
about the nature of deduction and the admissibility of the orthogonality principle. These 
are that, although this technique has a method of broadening out the scope of its answers, 
there is no sound justification for this means of assigning beliefs, nor of reassigning belief 
which is initially assigned to a null hypothesis. Pearl, in comparing the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence with Bayesian Inference has said "in the Bayesian approach a proposition 
is believable when it is provably probable; in the D-S approach, when it is probably provable. 
Thus, the former uses probability as the object language and logic as a iiieta-language; the 
latter reverses these roles. " 
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3.10 From Extensional to Intensional Methods 
The artificially intelligent reasoning methods considered so far have been classified as e2r. 
tensional [99,97], which is typified by rule-based systems or production systems [88]. In 
such systems uncertainty values are directly attached to sentences, and the uncertainty of 
any formula is computed as some function of the uncertainty of the respective sub-formulae. 
Furthermore, all of these systems, necessarily, offer the user the ability to see into the system 
how conclusions and their uncertainty values have been built up: that is, a "window" into 
the system. 
The advantages of such systems are that no semantic information between propositions 
need be modelled, and that the speed of producing a resultant certainty factor from given in- 
formation is very quick. However the computational advantages have been acquired by a loss 
of reliable semantics in the inferring mechanism. White [130] has said that models already 
developed in statistics should be the tools for reasoning with uncertainty, and criticised arti- 
ficially intelligent reasoning mechanisms with the phrase "we are better off without windows 
if they are obtained at the cost of distorting what is seen through them". 
Bundy, in introducing Incidence Calculus [13] called these extensional methods "purely 
numeric" mechanisms and, in examining them in detail, clarified some fundamental limitations 
in their ability to function in a correct way over a probability space. These limitations can 
be summarised in the following manner [13]; where r represents a universally true sentence, 
and f represents a universally false sentence. 
P(r) =1 (3.21) 
P(f) =0 (3.22) 
Sentences representing propositions whose truth value is uncertain may be probabilistically 
quantified with a number between 0 and 1. The Mowing equations assign arithmetic func- 
tions to the propositional connectives: 
p(- A) =1- p(A) (3.23) 
p(A V B) = p(A) + p(B) - p(A&B) (3.24) 
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and, provided A and B are statistically independent: 
p(A&B) = p(A). p(B) (3.25) 
The caveat attached to equation 3.25 asserts that the relationship of independence holds 
between the propositions A and B. This assumption of independence between random vari- 
ables makes the calculation of probabilities of compound events computationally feasible. 
However, the truth or falsity of either of the propositions must have no effect on the other. 
The positive aspects of the independence assumption may be seen in the example of 
throwing a seven-sided dice once, and tossing a coin. If we wanted to know the probability 
of simultaneously obtaining a head on the coin, and a three on the dice, we can use the 
independence assumption to calculate the probability as: 1/7 * 1/2 = 1/14. Such an example 
illustrates the nature of the independence assumption: that perturbations in the sample space 
caused by one event being true have no effect on the result of the other event being measured. 
One might expect that the independence assumption has such a small effect that its conve- 
nience warrants its inclusion into the assumption axioms for the reasoning process. However, 
rules of inference which are based on a number of antecedents e. g. A, &A2& ... A,, * B, sug- 
gest that there is some dependence, or at least some relationship between the antecedents 
AI, A2t ... 9 An- 
i. e. since their truth together implies the truth of proposition B, there is 
obviously some relationship between them. 
Bundy uses a heavily weighted example to show how dangerous, both probabillstically 
and logically, the unconstrained assumption of independence can become. If we assume that 
the probability of proposition A being true is 0.75, then, using equation 3.25 and ignoring 
the caveat, p(A&-A) = 0.75 * 0.25 = 0.1875; also, from equation 3.25, p(AV-A) = 0.75 + 
0.25 - 0.1875 = 0.8125. Logically speaking, the real relationship between propositions A and 
,A has been muddied over by the independence assumption, and therefore the probabilities, 
(which should be 0 and 1), are unreliable. 
What the independence assumption asserts is that there is no correlation between the two 
propositions. In probability theory, whenever we are aware that two propositions A and B 
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are correlated, equation 3.25 may be replaced by: 
p(A&B) = p(A). p(B) + c(A, B). Vp(A). p(, A). p(B). p(- B) (3.26) 
, where the correlation, c(A, B) is a number between -1 and 1, such that 0 represents no 
correlation between the two, (i. e. the independence assumption), 1 represents the case where 
B is present whenever A is present, and -1 represents the case where B is absent whenever A 
is present. 
Although this equation can be used to replace equation 3.25, Bundy goes on to prove that a 
probability calculus which used this replacement would not have truth functional connectives. 
Truth functional copnectives have the ability to generate compound sentences from simple 
ones in such a way that the truth values of the compound sentences are determined solely by 
the truth values of the simpler sentences [13]. 
With these problems in mind, some development of systems for reasoning with uncertainty 
has taken place on the "intensional" approach [99]. In this approach uncertainty is attached 
to sets of "possible worlds", and is manipulated in accordance with the rules of set theory. 
For this reason Bundy has called such mechanisms "set-theoretic". The three methods in this 
category which have emerged since 1985 are: Incidence Calculus [13], Probabilistic Logic [89], 
and Stochastic Simulation [95]. In all these methods the semantics are clear and mathemati- 
cally justifiable, but the inference mechanisms have shown themselves to be coniputationally 
expensive. Because these problems are in the areas of data complexity the problems are those 
faced by the Bayesian Inferencing community, with the added limitations of mathematical 
deduction. - 
These mechanisms, on shifting the focus of system development away from the difficulty 
of creating an extensional calculus back to the consistent handling of uncertainty, have been 
less well integrated into the expert system community as a whole because of their inability 
to produce quick results. However, the developers of these mechanisms have chosen the 
simplest computational strategies which preserve consistency in the data sets, while still 
maintaining a way of examining the working of the system: a consistent "window" into the 
system. The development of the set-theoretic mechanisms is a movement towards the creation 
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of mathematically and statistically sound methods of reasoning with uncertainty which still 
maintain ease of overall system visuallsation. 
3.11 Network Models 
Inferno [103] is a "cautious approach to uncertain inference", which uses the idea of belief and 
plausibility, as per Demps ter- Shafer, except over a network model of probability assignments. 
The method is probabilistic, but is particularly cautious, (within a few steps the bounds 
of uncertainty approach [0,1]). There are problems in the uncertainty handling mechanism. 
Spiegelhalter [119] has said "although this seems to be a suitably "cautious" approach to 
probability propagation, Inferno appears' to confuse conflicting evidence with inconsistent 
evidence. " 
Inferno does not use the set-theoretic notion of possible worlds. Pearl has classified Inferno 
as a "local approximation to Nilsson's probabilistic logic" [97], and as such, it is not treated 
distinctly in this thesis. 
3.12 Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic 
Probabilistic Logic has been anticipated both in Bernoulli's range theory of probability [7], 
and by De Finnetti's pioneering work on subjective probability [41]. The computer is the new 
ingredient which brings a freshness to this subject. In Probabilistic Logic the sample space 
over which probabilities are defined is taken to be the total number of logically allowable 
possible worlds given by the state of uncertainty. Theorem proving software is used to collect 
all of the possible worlds (termination problems notwithstanding). 
If we are interested in only one sentence, S say, we could imagine two sets of possible 
worlds, W1 containing the worlds in which S is true, and, W2 containing the worlds where S 
is false. Nilsson's probabilistic logic allows probabilities to be assigned to logical sentences. 
In this example, we assign a probability 7r, to sentence S. If we have enumerated all the 
logically possible worlds in the set W1 union W2, then the actual world must be one of these. 
We model our uncertainty by imagining S to be in W1 with probability 7r., and in W2 with 
48 
probability 1-7r.. Since, all of the distinct possible worlds have been enumerated, the sum of 
the probabilities of the worlds equals one, and the worlds are mutually exclusive. 
p true true false false i 1 0 0 
=: ý, Q true false true true 
) 
1 
( 
0 1 1 
Q true false false true 1 0 0 1 
Figure 3.6: Nilsson's Possible Worlds Notation 
These possible worlds are derived by an exhaustive theorem prover [14] to completely 
produce all of the possible worlds. This is hampered by semi- deci dability problems, but, for 
the moment, we will consider this production of all possible worlds to be non-problematical. 
An example used by Nilsson is of the set P, P :*Q, Q, where the consistent possible worlds 
are modelled in figure 3.6. In the first column are the names for each sentence, in tile second 
to the fifth column are the possible worlds, and in columns six to nine is an abbreviated 
shorthand notation for this information. For the purposes of this example consider that the 
four possible worlds are individually labelled (from left to right) a, b, c and d. 
When the proposition P, and the rule P =: >, Q, are given probabilities (say 7r, and 72 
respectively), then Probabilistic Logic provides a method for assigning these probabilities 
amongst these four worlds consistently. If a consistent probability distribution can be assigned 
to the random variable represented by the possible worlds, we will have a probability for 
worlds 'a' and V (the only two worlds in which proposition Q is true). The sum of these two 
probabilities then is the entailed probability of proposition Q. 
The set of consistent possible worlds for a set of uncertain sentences can be found by 
constructing a binary tree of all possible assignments of true and false to each of the sentences 
and then testing each possible assignment using a theorem prover. Those assignments which 
generate an inconsistency are removed from the set. The remaining assignments are all of 
the logically consistent assignments of true and false to the uncertain sentences which is, 
throughout this thesis, referred to as the "semantic tree" of the logical sentences. This 
semantic tree is represented in a matrix notation, and Nilsson calls the resultant matrix the 
V-matrix. i. e. 
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1011 
1010 
ii '') 
From this he constructs the V'-matrix, which collects together all of the sentences for 
which there are probabilities. The difference between the V-matrix and the V'-matrix is that 
although they both have the same number of rows, the V'-matrix does not contain the last 
row of the V-matrix; but it does contain a new row (the first row) which is an Vs. This row 
is. to represent the tautology sentence, which is true in all possible worlds. So the V'-matrix 
is: 
00 
1011 
(' '1 1) 
Ile introduces the matrix H which holds the probabilities for all the included sentences, 
which has a corresponding matrix H' to represent the probabilities of the sentences we know. 
By default the probability of the tautology is 1, and from information provided we have 
P(P*Q)ý--72- So, the H' matrix is: 
7r2 
The final matrix used by Nilsson is called P, which holds the probabilities of each of the 
possible worlds. The solution to a problem of probabilistic entailment is to solve the equation: 
H, = V'P (3.27) 
to find the probabilities of possible worlds, and hence the probabilities of the entailed sentence. 
So that, in this example, we would be looking to solve the matrix expression shown in figure 
3.7 
(1)1111 p(a) 
7rl 1100 p(b) (3.28) 
7r2 1011 
p(c) 
p(d) 
Figure 3.7: Method of Multiplying Matrices 
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p(a) 
pb (3.29) 
p(c) 
p(d) 
for p(a), p(b), p(c) and p(d); which are the probabilities of the possible worlds a, b, c and d 
respectively. The probability of Q is then the sum of p(a) and p(d), where a and d are the 
two possible worlds in which Q is true. 
3.13 The Process of Probabilistic Entailment 
Usually there is more than one way of assigning probability to the possible worlds; and because 
of this, all we can say with certainty is that the probability of a probabilistically entailed 
conclusion, (Q in the example above), is bounded. This is best demonstrated geometrically. 
Consider the possible worlds a, b, c and d shown in the V-matrix (figure 3.6). These 
worlds, when considered as points in 3-space, can be used to outline a three-dimensional 
object (figure 3-8). The four axioms of probability theory (2.1 to 2.4) only require that 
probabilities attached to the propositions P, P*Q, and Q must lie in the convex hull of these 
points [46]. 
Theref6re, when probabilities r, and W2 are assigned to P and P #. Q respectively, the 
probability of Q is found by moving to point (71,72) on the P(P)-P(P=: ýQ) plane, and pro- 
jecting a line parallel to the P(Q) axis through this point. The line only touches the object at 
each'of the two points (IJ) and (1,0) (that is, (1,1,1) and (1,0,0) respectively). At the other 
points, either the projected line misses the object (in which case the assigned probabilities 
are inconsistent), or it passes through the object. Where the line passes into the object is 
the lower bound of the probability of the entailed sentence Q, and where it passes out of the 
object is the upper bound of the probability. 
Another way to perform probabilistic entailment would be to use Gaussian elimination 
methods. The row which was removed from the V-matrix, [1,0,0,1], represents the worlds in 
which Q is true (that is, worlds a and d). The method is to manipulate the rows of the V'- 
matrix, using arithmetic operations of addition and subtraction, to produce the row [1,0,1,0] 
and to use the same transformations on the H' matrix to get the corresponding probability 
51 
Figure 3.8: Geometric Considerations 
P(Q). 
In the event that this method does not work, Nilsson proposed a number of approximation 
methods which reduced the complexity of the entailment process by pruning the semantic tree 
in various ways. In particular he suggested a use for Jaynes's maximum entropy formalism 
[60] for producing the least commitment probability distribution to the possible worlds. This 
method is examined in - detail in chapter 5. Extensions to this basic model of Probabilistic 
Logic are presented in chapter 4. 
3.14 ýý Incidence Calculus 
Incidence Calculus is a set theoretic mechanism for reasoning with uncertainty which over- 
comes problems which have been perceived in the purely numeric methods of uncertainty 
management [13,45]. Bundy expands the idea of the probability of a logical sentence from 
being represented by a number to being represented by a set of points, each of which has a 
probability attached. The set of all points is the sample space and is denoted by V. Bundy 
says "The sample space is to be an exhaustive and disjoint set of points". 
Bundy's statement "Each point can be regarded as a situation, Tarskian interpretation, or 
possible world in which a sentence will be either true or false" indicates that W is supposed 
to encompass all of the logically possible worlds. The fact that the production of V does 
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not require a theorem prover, but could perhaps be guided and shaped by a human expert, 
or some other, mechanical, process of design makes Incidence Calculus a good complement 
to Probabilistic Logic, but necessarily an approximation to it. 
If A is a proposition sentence, then i(A) is defined to be the incidence of A, and is the 
subset of points in W in which sentence A is true. The dependence between two proposition 
sentences A and B is coded in the amount of intersection between their two incidences i(A) 
and i(B). 'Once incidences are assigned to each sentence proposition such that the probability 
associated with each proposition is honoured; the mathematical processes of set-union and 
set-intersection provide the incidences for the application of the logical 'or' rule (V) and 'and' 
rule (&) respectively. 
, For each incidence assignment, a pair of 
lower bound and upper bound assignments are 
kept. These are directly analogous to the belief and plausibility estimates provided in Demp- 
ster Shafer theory, and represent the amount of producible evidence which can support a 
proposition; and the extent to which it is not possible to prove the proposition wrong [113]. 
On acquiring an incidence assignment for a proposition, Bundy employs an "Inconsistency 
Detector" to check that the new assignment does not violate the bounds of the known assign- 
ments. If the assignment is inconsistent with incidences which have already been assigned, ý 
Bundy uses a "Legal Assignment Finder" to attempt to find a new incidence assignment 
pattern for the conflicting predicates which will code all of the known probabilistic informa- 
tion sufficiently. If no such assignment can be found, the program terminates with failure. 
Bundy proves his Legal Assignment Finder to be sound and complete for first order predicate 
Incidence Calculus. 
Problems with Incidence Calculus 
Bundy states [13] "Incidence Calculus can be implemented reasonably efficiently by represent- 
ing the incidences of sentences as bit strings and manipulating them with logical operations. 
Each incidence can be represented by a bit string of a fixed length, say 100 bits, each bit 
corresponding to an element of W. The longer the string, the greater the accuracy, but the 
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greater the cost in terms of space and time. " 
The most pressing problem with Incidence Calculus is the way it assigns the number of 
points to the sample space. When too few points are given to the set, uncalled for relations will 
be forced between sentences. This is one of the points Bundy criticised about the numeric 
mechanisms. On the other hand, when the set is overly large, there is redundancy in the 
system. This added redundancy must be removed as much as possible from the already 
computationally expensive inference mechanism. The problem of incidence assignment itself 
is still an open question, and a complete mechanism to deal with conditional probabilities is 
also lacking. 
3.15 Pearl's Stochastic Simulation 
Stochastic simulation is a method of computing probabilities using the frequency theory of 
probability. That is, by counting out how many times an event occurs over a number of 
samples, and dividing by the total number of sample data events [951. A causal model of a 
domain is used to generate random samples of hypothetical scenarios (possible worlds) that 
are'likely to-develop in the domain. The probability of any event or combination of events 
can then be computed by counting the percentage of samples in which the event is true. 
Pearl uses the following example, first'proposed by Cooper [20): Metastatic cancer (A) 
is a possible cause of d brain tumor (C) and is also an explanation for increased total serum' 
calcium (B). In turn' either of these could ex lain a patient falling into a coma (D). Severe fp 
headache (E) is also possibly associated with a brain tumor. The Bayesian network associated 
with this information is shown in figure 3.9, and the corresponding conditional probabifitY' 
information, which Pearl calls the link matrix is: 
P(a) = 0.2 
P(bla)=0.8 
P(cla)=0.2 
P(dlb, c)=0.8 
P(dlb, - c)=0.8 
P(elc)=0.8 
P(bl - a)=0.2 
P(el a)=0.05 
P(dj b, c)=0.8 
P(dj - b, " e) =O. 05 
P(el - c)=0.6 
Pearl [97] uses uppercase letters to represent propositional variables in the Bayesian net- 
work. A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph in which nodes represent proposition 
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Figure 3.9: Diagram of Causal Connections 
sentences and the arcs represent the existence of direct causal influences between linked propo- 
sitions. The strength of these influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. When 
assigning truth values, true or false, to the variables he uses the lower case equivalent letter. 
For example, in figure 3.9 A can be true or false, A=1 or A=O respectively; or alternatively, 
a or , a, respectively. Given the information in the link matrix, the goal is to compute the 
posterior probability of every proposition in the system, given that a patient is suffering from 
severe headaches (e), but has not fallen into a coma (, d); that is, E=1, and D=O. 
The first step is to initialise all of the unobserved variables (A, B, C) to some arbitrary 
initial state (for example A=B=C=1), and then let each variable in turn choose another 
state in accordance with the variable's conditional probability given the current state of the 
other variables. Pearl denotes WA to be the state of all variables except A. So that, in the 
initiallsation stage, wA is {B=1, C=1, D=O, E=1}; "and the next value of A will be chosen by 
tossing a coin which favours 1 over 0 by a ratio of P(alwA) to P(- alWA). The expression 
P(xlwx) is called the "transition" probability of variable X. Pearl then provides a way to 
derive the conditional probability of any variable X conditioned on the values wX of all other 
variables in the system. 
For this he needs to inspect only neighbouring variables of X, that is the Markov blanket 
of X. He calculates the Markov blankets of all the nodes. The Markov blanket of a node 
X is the direct parents of X, the direct successors of X, and all direct parents of X's direct 
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successors. Denoting Bx'as the Markov blanket of X, then from figure 3.9: 
BA=[B, C]; BB=[A, C, D]; 
Bc ='[A, B, D, E] ; BD = [B, C]; Bc, = [C] (3.30) 
From this information, and the knowledge that D and E are kept constant (0 and I 
respectively), we can compute the transition probabilities from: 
P(alWA) P(alb, c, d, e) aP(a)P(bla)P(cla) (3.31) 
P(bIWB) P(alb, c, d, e) aP(bja)P(djb, c) (3.32) 
P(clwc) = P(alb, c, d, e) = aP(cla)P(dlb, c)P(eic) , 
(3.33) 
where the a's are normalising constants that make the respective probabilities sum to 1. 
The transition' cycle then repeats itself in the order A, B, C until a query, for example, 
"what is the posterior distribution of A? " is to be addressed. Pearl allows the answer to such 
a query to be the percentage of times A registers the value TRUE; or, in a more complex 
manner, the answer is the average of the conditional probabilities P(A =II wA) computed in 
transition. 
Problems with Stochastic Simulation 
The major problem with Stochastic Simulation is the amount of time required before a result 
can be found; but a secondary problem has to do with the random world generation procedure. 
If the system ever gets into an undesirable position, it is possible never to generate some 
possible worlds. In this situation, the probability of these possible worlds is kept at zero for 
all time. Another problem is that, running the system twice in succession with the same data 
is not liable to give the same result, again because of the random fluctuations in the selection 
of the next world. 
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3.16 Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams 
Related to Stochastic Simulation are "Influence Networks" [78] and "Bayesian Networks" 
[971. The starting point for this work is to "view a Bayesian network not merely as a passive 
parsimonious code for storing factual knowledge but also as a computational architecture for 
reasoning about that knowledge" [93]. 
I This work is strongly linked with developing issues in probability theory and seeks to pro- 
vide efficient methods of structuring knowledge and fusing results both downwards through 
the network and back up to the top - hence allowing both top-down and bottom-up rea- 
soning. However, the architectures themselves do not involve the representation of possible 
worlds specifically, and do not make specific use of predicate calculus. As such, although it 
is a very interesting area, it is outside the scope of this thesis and is not dealt with. 
3.17 Conclusion 
The previous two chapters outline the strands which led towards the development of the set 
theoretic mechanisms. The most important factor is a desire for clarity in the uncertainty 
management process. This conceptual clarity is an overhead on the computation process, 
which, up until now, has been the most persuasive argument for making do with approx- 
imation schemes of inferencing such as those treated in this chapter. The simple numeric 
mechanisms of PROSPECTOR or MYCIN are easily implemented on a computer. However, 
problems of complexity, become evident even when using the Dempster-Shafer mechanism, 
and are a major issue in the possible worlds methods. In general, as the clarity of the infer- 
encing mechanism becomes increased, the complexity of the mechanism also increases. 
This thesis develops an inference mechanism, from within Nilsson's probabilistic logic, 
which adheres strictly to the theories of uncertainty in mathematical logic and statistics. The 
maximum entropy formalism is used extensively throughout. The most important question 
addressed is "Can reasoning with uncertainty using the set theoretic mechanisms be com- 
putationally efficient? ". I intend to show that it can. All of these points will be covered in 
the discussion of the extensions proposed for Nilsson's probabilistic logic, which also have 
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ramifications for Incidence Calculus and Stochastic Simulation. 
In summary, the complexity problems of the three set theoretic mechanisms are in the 
areas of possible worlds generation, and probability assignments to these generated worlds. 
For Probabilistic Logic, the complexity problems are in the areas of semantic tree generation, 
and entailment solutions. The former problem leads to computational complexity problems 
in space; the latter in time. This problems in space and time are equivalent to those shared 
,, 
by Incidence Calculus and Stochastic Simulation. These problems of Nilsson's probabills- 
tic logic are considered in more detail in chapter 4, where solutions are presented for the 
representational problems. 
oll 
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Chapter 4 
ENHANCEMENTS TO 
NILSSON'S PROBABILISTIC 
LOGIC 
4.1 Introduction 
Nilsson's probabilistic logic is chosen as a paradigm for set-theoretic reasoning with uncer- 
tainty because it requires knowledge of all of the possible worlds for all uncertain situation 
before it attempts to employ a statistical calculus in an attempt to reason with the uncer- 
tainty. Nilsson's probabilistic logic has the added feature that it is a combination of ideas 
from first-order logic and probability theory and thereby lies its usefulness in the field of rule 
based systems in which either data or rules of inference may be uncertain. 
Since we intend to investigate the nature of Nilsson's probabilistic logic when dealing with 
a large number of sentences, and therefore possible worlds, we introduce naming conventions 
to standardise this process. We also introduce a shorthand notation for viewing the sentences, 
the possible worlds of Nilsson's V-niatrix, and the probabilities in Nilsson's IF-matrix in one 
diagram. 
Pearl, in his book, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems" [97], summarises the 
difference between Bayesian Theory, Dempster-Shafer Theory, and Nilsson's probabilistic logic 
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in the following way. "While Bayesian theory requires the specification of a complete proba- 
bilistic model and the Dempster-Shafer sidesteps the missing specifications by compromising 
its inferences, Probabilistic Logic considers the space of all models consistent with the speci. 
fications that are available and computes bounds instead of point values for the probabilities 
required. " Pearl points out the major strength of Probabilistic Logic: the ability to produce 
the upper and lower bounds of probability for an uncertain sentence. But implicitly, he also 
points out a failing which is that in the model for Probabilistic Logic proposed by Nilsson 
there is no way to specify a complete probabilistic model so that point probabilities may be 
produced. 
The final aspect of this chapter is an interpretation of Probabilistic Logic slightly altered 
from Nilsson's proposed model. This new interpretation allows the inclusion of conditional 
probabilities, an extended role for the maximum entropy formalism, and a new proof of the 
absolute bounds of an entailment problem. 
The extension introduced allows Probabilistic Logic to use conditional probabilities in 
such a way that it is now possible to specify a complete probabilistic model for Probabilistic 
Logic, as for Bayesian Theory, and so to get point probability results. A proof is given as 
to how to deduce the bounds of an entailment without resorting to tracing the path of a 
convex hull in multi- dimensions [89]. A presentation of Probabilistic Logic is made which 
can incorporate heuristic information and rule integration into the reasoning process. These 
results are the first steps in opening up Nilsson's probabilistic logic to powerful aspects of 
both Bayesian Inferencing and Heuristic Reasoning. 
4.2 Probabilistic Entailment and the Interpretation Table 
Nilsson defines probabilistic entailment as an analogue of logical entailment such that, when 
we wish to infer from (A,, Aj=: 0) to deduce B probabilistically, and there is uncertainty 
about whether or not Al or Al=:,, B is true, the real world, which has the true values of 
the sentences Al, Al=::, B, and B, becomes a random variable, and can be one of a number 
of logical possibilities. These logical possibilities are produced exhaustively, typically by a 
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semantic tree theorem prover, and form the parameters of the uncertainty equations. In 
conventional set theoretic terms, this set of all possibilities is the uniticrsal sct. In statistical 
terms, this set is called the sample space or possibility space [38]. In mathematical terms, 
each of tbese possibilities is an extension [13,97], of the original micertain sentences; or 
alternatively possible worlds [46,58]. 
To introduce his probabilistic logic, Nilsson uses the sentences (P, 1'=>Q) to estimate the 
probability of logically entailed sentence Q. However, in order to standardise the use of inany 
antecedent sentences in an entailment rule, we introduce a number of conventions. When there 
are n antecedent sentences, we label the antecedents Al to A,,; and the entailed sentence is 
labelled B. In this notation, Nilsson's example becomes one of using (A I, AI=: ý-B) to estimate 
the probability of logically entailed sentence B. (The set of all antecedent sentences and the 
rule of entailment sentence is known as the "base set" for a probabilistic entailment [89]. ) 
In order to qxamine the elements of probabilistic entailment clearly, we introduce the 
"interpretation table". This is a shorthand notation for describing the entailment procedure of 
section 3.12. The interpretation table is a means of gathering together the denoted sentences, 
the possible worlds, and the probabilities attached to sentences into one diagram. A complete 
interpretation table for the worlds wbich form the base set for the inference is: 
Sentence abcd Probability 
r 1111 1 
A, 1100 7rj 
A, *B 1011 7R 
Table 4.1: Interpretation Table Reduced from (A,, A, =::,. B, B) 
The possible worlds of the V'-matrix are headed with small letters (a, b, c and d) and are 
collected in the middle column. The sentences which make this W-matrix are represented in 
the leftmost column, and the probabilities associated with these sentences (the elements of 
the IF-matrix) are in the rightmost column. These probabilities are labelled 7rl, 72, -, 7r,, 
for the antecedent sentences Al, A29 --- , A,,; and 7rn for the rule sentence. As in section 
3.12 for Q, sentence B is true in worlds a and d. That is, it could be represented by the row 
matrix [1,0,0,1] in the in the widdle colunin of interpretation table 4.1. 
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The entailment problem becomes one of assigning a probability to each of the possible 
worlds, such that, if the probability of a sentence S is 7rs, and S is true in worlds a and b, 
then p(a) + p(b) = rs. The tautology r is true in all possible worlds and is included in the 
set to ensure that all the probabilities sum to 1. 
From the above example we get the following constraints: 
a+b+c+d =1 
a+b = ri 
a+c+d = 7R 
#. c+d = 1-ri 
7rR 
a= 71 + 7rR -1 
which are the equations which must be solved from Nilsson's model of. 
V'P 
a) 
b) 
1100 
C) 
(4.2) 
7r2 1011 
p(d) 
A solution to these equations for p(a), p(b), p(c) and p(d) should provide enough infor- 
mation to determine the entailed probability of sentence B. That is, p(B) = p(a) + p(d). 
4.3, Defeciencies of Nilsson's Entailment Model 
Structurally, worlds c and d in equations 4.1 and correspondingly, the last two columns of 
table 4.1 above, have the same representation. This is because in worlds a and b, B can 
only assume one logical value, (true and false respectively). When Al is false however, and 
A, #- B is true, B can logically assume either of the values true or false. Hence, in the above 
example, c, (c. f. column 3), represents the world where B is false, and d, (c. f. column 4), 
represents the world where B is true. 
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An argument against the inclusion of both c and d in the interpretation table [66], is 
that if we were to pick a world at random from the interpretation table of table 4.1 and it 
so happened to be one of c or d, we would not be able to tell which of the two it was. All 
that we could say with certainty is that the chosen world represents the situation where A, 
is false, the rule Al =0 is true, and the sentence B can be either true or false. 
Pearl [97], comes to "the obvious conclusion that the material implication P*Q is 
the wrong interpretation of the conditional sentence 'if P then Q' ". This problem is a 
fundamental criticism of the nature of entailment and has already surfaced in consideration 
I 
of the paradoxes of material implication presented by Russell and Whitehead [107] discussed 
in section 2.2. 
Considering the solution of equations 4.1 the best estimate of the probabilities of worlds 
c and d is: 
c+d (4.3) 
Nilsson [89] solved this equation: 
71 c=d2 (4.4) 
thus imposing an unnecessary condition on the relationship between the possible worlds (- 
A,, A, =: 0, B) and (- At, A, =*B, rý, B), namely that they have the same probabilistic 
likelihood. In this way, we are forced to resort to a method of probability estimation which 
incorporates information into our reasoning process which is not necessarily true, and which 
in the long run threatens the integrity of the entailed probability. 
The Inadequacy of Nilsson's Equal Split 
Consider table 4.2, which shows the effect of using Nilsson's method of making a half-spl. it on 
such possible worlds for the entailed probability for the two cases of: p(Aj) = 0.9999, p(A2) 
= 0.9999, p(AI&A2 #- B) = 0.5; and p(Al) = 0.0001,, p(A2) = 0.0001, p(AI&A2 =: ý B) = 1. 
Both of these example sets give the same answer because of the assumption of equal 
probabilities for each of the possible worlds whose stalks are the same. However, a human 
observer, in the light of no other information would put more credence on the usefulness of 
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p(Al) p(A2) p(AI&A2 =: >- B) Entailed p(B) 
0.9999 
0.0001 
0.9999 
0.0001 
0.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
Table 4.2: The Inadequacy of Uncontrolled 50: 50 Splits 
the first result, simply because the antecedent probabilities are very strong, and the entailed 
probability is (almost) the total strength of the rule. In the second example, the world in 
which both antecedents are false, and the rule is true is by far the most probable world (0.99); 
and it is this world which contributes almost 0.5 to the strength of the entailment. 
This anomaly in the entailment process is very prevalent in the results from this method 
of entailment. The problem is compounded in situations where the level of uncertainty is pro- 
duced through delicate fluctuations of antecedent probabilities over a wide range of variables. 
It is clear that if the entailment procedure is to be employed with confidence in a problem 
involving uncertain variables that these offending possible worlds must be satisfactorily dealt 
with. 
Other Problems with Probabilistic Logic 
If Probabilistic Logic is to be used in earnest by the expert systems community, there are a 
number of problems which have to be solved. 
1. When there are a reasonable number of sentences in the base set, generation of the set 
of all possible worlds becomes time consuming and complex. 
2. Since in general the probabilities given will underdetermine the probability distribution 
to worlds, we are forced to make do with a range of possible probabilities for worlds. 
Choosing the best distribution among these worlds becomes increasingly problematical 
as more sentences are involved. Statistically speaking, this may be achieved by employ- 
ing the method of maximum entropy, which is a, notoriously time consuming process. 
3. The probability bounds need to be discovered by geometrically modelling the shape 
of the search space, and then finding upper and lower bounds for the probability of 
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thd entailed sentence. This means having some means of modelling shapes in a multi- 
dimensional coordinate system, and tracing out to the upper and lower bounds of an 
entailed sentence. 
4. All of the sentences are represented on independent axes, thus allowing no possibility of 
structuring correlation information between sentences. That is, there is no mechanism 
for including conditional probability information. 
These problems would have to be solved by any calculus of reasoning with uncertainty 
which attempted to reason with probabilities ranging over all logically possible worlds. It is 
with these problems in mind that the new interpretation table of section 4.4 is proposed. 
4.4 - The New Interpretation Table 
A new model for probabilistic entailment is proposed, which allows the option of specifying 
a full probabilistic model if one is available. Another option is the use of a partial model to 
narrow the probability bounds produced in the probabilistic entailment. The basic premise 
is that every world which is generated twice in the base set is only represented once in the 
interpretation table. Consider interpretation table 4.3. In this new layout the question arises 
Sentence abc Probability 
7' 111 1 
Al 110 rl 
A, =ý* B 101 7rR 
Table 4.3: Interpretation Table for (A,, A, *B). 
of what to do with worlds (e. g. world c), where the entailed sentence can be either true or 
false. 
An attractive aspect of the distribution shown in equations 4.1 is that the variables c and 
d can be treated separately, and therefore assigned independently. In the case where the 
last 
equation to be solved is c+d=1- rR, computationally speaking, the most obvious way to 
resolve this problem is to assign half of this value to each variable, as Nilsson proposed. This 
leads to the unacceptable consequences discussed above. 
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4.4.1 The Context Split 
The context split is introduced as a vehicle for assigning certainty to worlds in which the 
conclusion can be either true or false. Each uncertain world in which a split can be applied 
provides the contextual information necessary to estimate the certainty of the conclusion in 
this world, hence it is named the "context" under which the split is applied. 
In the new model the probability of B (of table 4.3) is all of the value of a, plus some 
proportion x of the value of c, where x indicates how likely it is that B will be true in the 
context of A, being false, and Al #-B being true. 
There are three ways in which a context split can be assigned: 
e the conditional probability of the conclusion in the light of the context can be used. This 
use of conditional probability is different to the way it is used in Bayesian Inference, 
(that is p(Blcontext) rather than p(contextjB)). The relationship between Bayesian 
Inference and Nilsson's probabilistic logic is further discussed in chapter 6. 
ea subjective probability (section 2.6) estimate from the expert may be used. It may be 
that the expert feels that when Al is false, there is little chance of B being true, and 
may therefore wish x to be small. 
ea heuristic measure may be used. One way of estimating x would be to use the ambient 
prior probability of B. Another way would be to base the calculation of x on how many 
conditions are being met in the context in which x is being applied. Another way would 
be just to assume that x is 0.5, and force equal probabilities between worlds (- Al, 
A, =0, B) and (, Al, Al =0, -B) as in table 4.1. 
These assignment techniques are further discussed in chapter 8 and examples of the use of 
heuristic measures are shown in chapter 10. 
4.5 Interpretation Tables for Larger Semantic Trees 
Consider table 4.4, which shows a rule with two antecedents, and whose equations are: 
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Sentence a b c d e Probability 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Al 1 1 0 0 1 7rl 
A2 1 1 0 1 0 7r2 
AI&A2 =::, - B1 1 0 1 1 1 7rn 
- Table 4.4: 
Interpretation Table for (A,, A2, Al&A2*B) 
a+b+c+d+e 
++e=r, + ? rn -1 
a+b+d = 7r2+7rR- 1 
a+c+d+e = 7r. R (4.5) 
This example demonstrates a further convention employed throughout the text. When 
drawing a protracted'interpretation table for an entailment, the worlds are ordered in a 
particular way. The world with all of the antecedents true, and the rule true is drawn in the 
leftmost column, (and is consequently always labelled a); the world with an of the antecedents 
true and the rule false is always next to this world, (and is therefore always labelled b); an 
the other worlds are to the right of this world. 
This convention makes it possible to visualise the two most important worlds with respect 
to the rule itself (that is, the world in which all antecedents are true and the rule is true; and 
the world where all antecedents are true and the rule is false). World b can always be assigned 
immediately because it is the only allowable extension of the uncertain sentences in which 
the rule can demonstrably be proven to be false (section 4-6). That is, for any uncertain rule 
(whose probability is greater than zero, and less than one), 
rR 
so the sentences become: 
a+c+d+e = 7R (4.6) 
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a+e = rl+rR-1 (4.7) 
a+d = 72+ZR-1 (4.8) 
that is: n+1 equations with 211 possible worlds to solve for. When the strength of the rule is 
1 the number of unknown variables remains the same because world b is the only world in 
this interpretation table which becomes an impossible world. 
4.6 Semantic Tree Case Analysis and Probabilistic Entail- 
ment 
In this section I show that 211 +1 possible worlds are created for an entailment of the form 
Al&A2&... A,, #-B, where n is the number of propositions in the antecedent list of the rule. 
This produces n+1 equations and 2n possible worlds to solve for. 
4.6.1 Propositional Calculus 
Firstly consider entailment in the propositional calculus of the set: 
JAI, A2? .... A,,, Al&A2&... A,, => B}? JB}. (4.9) 
. The three cases are: 
All Aj, A29 .... A,, true, and rule true. With the rule clause having all the Al, A2t... An 
negated, the rule is continuously resolved away by each literal, eventually releasing the 
literal B. Only the inclusion of -B in the set, would produce a contradiction. 
2. All Al, Ab .... A,, true, and rule 
false. The negation of the rule means that n+I clauses 
replace the rule, where all of the A,, A2 t ... A,, will be true, and the consequent is false. 
The inclusion of B in the set, would produce a contradiction. 
3. At least one of Al, A2t .... An false, and rule true. The literals in the rule cannot all 
be resolved away from the premises, and so no statement can be made about B from 
the rule. Consequently, either B or ,B will be consistent with the set. The number 
of worlds produced is 21 - 1. (i. e. only removing the all true world from the list of 
possibilities. ) 
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There is no analogous case for case 3 where the rule is false. This is because, the rule will 
split into n+1 clauses, with A,, A2,... A,, all true; and B false. Consequently, if any of the 
A,, A2ý ... A,, premises are false, a contradiction is immediately produced. 
4.6.2 Predicate Calculus 
Now consider the predicate calculus case: 
{3A1 (xi),..., 3An(xn)tV(Xls ... s Xn). Aj(xj)&... &An(Xn)=-> B(Xij---iXn))t {3 B (a,,..., an)) - 
(4.10) 
When the conclusion is negated, the clause produced is: ev B(vI, v2,..., vit), where vi, ... I Vn 
are variables. When it is just simplified the clause produced is: B(g I, g2,... gn)where9I9---t9n 
are constants. The cases are: 
1. All 3AI (xi), ..., 3A,, 
(x,, ) true, and rule true. 
When all of the antecedent propositions are true this produces the clause list A, (cj),..., An(Cn) 
where the cl t ... i cn are constants. 
The rule being true gives - AI(xi),.. - An(Xn) Where 
the xi, ---I Xn are variables. From these we can resolve away to produce from the rule 
clause: B(cl, c2, and the inclusion of -, B(vl, v2,..., vn) produces nil. 
All 3Aj(xj),..., 3A. (x,, ) true, and rule false. The rule converts to n+l clauses: the 
A,, (c,, ), for i=1 to n, where c,, is a unique constant for each predicate functor A,,; plus 
a final clause which is , B(cl,..., c,, ). The inclusion of B(gl,..., g. ) would not produce 
nil, and neither would the inclusion of B(vl,..., v,, ). 
3. At least one of 3A, (xl),... 3A,, (x,, ) false, and rule true. A directly analogous case to 
case 3 above. The rule does not free any information about the consequent, and so the 
second set can be true or false. Again we get 21 -1 Possible worlds. 
4.6.3 Results of Case Analyses 
The nature of these worlds is listed below, and for completeness, the effects of the worlds on 
the conclusion B is shown in brackets. 
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1. All Al, A2s ... A,, true, Rule true. (B true. ) 
2. All Al, A2,... A,, true, Rule false. (B false. ) 
3. At least one of AI, A2,... A,, false, Rule true. 
(B can be true or false. ) 
In a predicate calculus rule of the form: 
V(x1, x2,..., xn). A, (xl),... A(xn) => B(xlg x) 
with antecedent predicates existentially quantified, the same number of worlds is produced in 
direct analogy with the above cases, except that in case 2 the conclusion can be either true or 
false. So, in the predicate calculus the expert is given the opportunity of providing another 
context split. Throughout the thesis points about Probabilistic Logic will be drawn from the 
propositional rather than the predicate calculus, on the understanding that such examples 
are easily generalised to first order predicate calculus, and that the system can equally well 
cope with the generalised predicate calculus rule, given the extra context split for the world 
where the antecedents are all true; and the rule is false. This convention is adopted purely 
for typographical convenience. 
Consistency in the semantic tree. 
The implication rule imposes a consistency relation on the probabilities of the premises 
A,, & ... A,,. Namely, that 
in the world where the rule is false, (case 2), all of the premises 
are true. This logical necessity imposes the following probabiHstic constraint: 
For any probabilistic rule of the form p(Al&A2& ... A,, #- B) = rR, the probabilities of 
the premises are consistent if and only if- 
Vi. (i =1... n) p(Ai) >1- 7R (4.12) 
Simply because the probability of the world where the rule is false is (I - VR), and this is 
a possible world shared by all the premises. Consequently, the probability assigned to each 
premise must be at least this large, with some probability left over to be dispersed amongst 
its other possible worlds. 
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4.7 New Method of Entailment 
The use of a context split on the reduced semantic tree suggests the following new method 
of entailment to infýr probabilistically from the set A,, A2P .... A,,, Al&A2& ... An #- B to the 
set B, where Irl, 7r2,... 7r,, are the probabilities of the premises A,, A29 ... $An, and rR is the 
probability of the rule: 
1. Make the semantic tree for the base set to find the number of possible worlds. 
2. Assign the probabilities 7r,, 7r2,..., 7rn, 7rR amongst the worlds consistently. 
3. Each of these worlds provides a context in which to test tile consistency of B. Find in 
which of these worlds B can be true, false, or either. Allow the expert to provide context 
splits for the worlds where B can consistently be either true or false. 
The entailed probability of B is then the sum of the probabilities of all the worlds in which 
it can only be true, plus the respective context split proportions of the worlds where it can 
be either true or false. 
It is important to note that this model is peculiar to the rule of entailment, and as such 
bears some differences with regard to the standard Bayesian probabilistic model. In most basic 
terms, the entailment procedure does not need knowledge of the prior probabilities for each of 
the antecedent sentences (c. f. the problems of Bernoulli and Laplace which led ultimately to 
the development of the frequency theory of probability). It also does not need to work back 
from the singularity of all antecedents known with certainty to be in one state or another 
to approximate an uncertain condition in the state of the antecedents, and consequently to 
approximate the uncertain state of the inference (c. f. the PROSPECTOR approximation 
scheme [33]). 
4.8 A New Algorithm to Produce The Absolute Bounds of 
-an 
Entailment Problem 
Grosof [51] has examined the consequences of Probabilistic Logic as a reasoning tool'which 
performs the job that Dempster-Shafer theory purports to perform: namely the provision and 
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manipulation of bounded probabilities. 
However, a strong point in favour of the Dempster- S hafer theory of beliefs and of the cor. 
responding orthogonality principle [113,301, is its ease of implementation, and the tractability 
of the orthogonality function. However, it has been noted that the semantic inconsistencies 
which can be, produced, in particular when conflicting evidences are combined, make the 
theory unreliable [97,108]. 
I present a new algorithm for producing the bounds of a probability entailment in Proba. 
bilistic Logic, which does not require the tracing of the vertices of a multi-dimensional convex 
hull [89]. 
The formula can be expressed as follows. For any probabilistic rule of entailment of 
the form: p(AI&A2&... &A,, * B) < 1. The probabilities are labelled 1,71, Z2, ... 9 rns 7rR 
such that 1 is the probability of the tautology; 7ri I..., 7rn are the probabilities or propositions 
A,,..., A,,; and 7rit is the probability of the rule. The bounds of the entailment are given by 
the following expression: 
n 
max(O, 7R (1 - 7i) p(B) < rR, (4.13) 
4.9 Inductive Proof of Bounds Algorithm 
In the semanic tree for a set of sentences (c. f. tables 4.3 and 4-4) the maximum which can 
possibly be assigned to the worlds with all sentences true is the value 7rR. This assignment 
is made when all of the antecedent sentences are assigned a probability of 1, producing 
two worlds in the semantic tree - one with all antecedents true and the rule true (and 
consequently the conclusion true), and the other with all antecedents true and the rule false 
(and consequently the conclusion false). The former world is assigned a probability 7rR, the 
latter is assigned a probability of 1- 7rR. We are interested in the former world. The proof 
proceeds by showing how this upper limit can be maximally reduced in this world (with all 
of the antecedents true and the rule true) so that it holds the minimum probability possible 
for that world. This value is then the minimum probability which can be assigned to the 
conclusion (as it would be if all of the context splits were 0). The maximum probability 
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of the conclusion is always rR because the context splits for each of the worlds could be 1, 
(totally in favour of the conclusion), making the probability assigned to it 7rn. 
Base 
The base case, where n=1, is as shown in table 4.3. From this table we get the equations: 
bI- 7rR 
c 1-rl 
rR - (1 - 7ri) = rR - (I ý- 7ri) (4.16) 
These are the only solutions to the equations, and they satisfy the algorithm with n 
Step p 
The algorithm is true for n antecedents, now to prove it true for n+1 antecedents. 
i; 
The old tree for n antecedents can be separated into: 
one world with the rule false and all other antecedents true - the probability of this 
world is 1- rR (c. L equation 4.9 case 2 and equation 4.12); and 
2.2n worlds with the rule true and all possibilities of truth values attached to the an- 
tecedents (c. f. equation 4.9 cases 1 and 3). The sum of the probabilities of these worlds 
is therefore 7rR- 
To add in the new antecedent, take the world with the rule false, (1 above), and add the 
new antecedent after the'nth in this list with a value of true (c. f. equation 4.12). This is 
the only world with the rule false. Since A,, +, is true in this world the probability which 
is available to assign among the other worlds (with the rule true) is reduced by the amount 
(1 - 7R). This means that only - 
(1 - rR) r,, +l + rn - 1) is available to be assigned 
amongst these other possible worlds. 
Next take the old tree with the rule true, (2 above), and make two copies of this. In the 
first add the new premise A,, +l = true after premise A,, in the premise list. In the second add 
the new premise An+1 = false after premise An in the premise list. The difference between 
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the tree for n+1 propositions and n propositions is that in row n+1 there are now 2n I's and 
2n O's, and the rule is pushed down to position n+2. The new tree is made up of two identical 
copies of the old tree, one of which has a1 in row n+I, the other of which has a zero in row 
n+1. As described'in section 4.5 the number of worlds for n+1 antecedents is therefore: 
2*2n+l = 2n+l+l 
There are three cases to be considered: 
- 
Zn+, (I - 7r, 
) is Even after adding the new antecedent A,, +l the new expression 7rR i=l 
still greater than 0. 
2. Before adding the new antecedent A,, +l the new expression rR - Zin=, (l - ri) is less 
than or equal to 0. 
, i-, 
(l - 7ri) was greater 3. Before adding the new antecedent A, +, the expression 7rR - Fn 
than 0 and after adding A,, +, the expression 7rR - 
E'i=+11(1 - 7j) is less than or equal to 
0. 
Case 1: 7rn - Z'+'(1 - 7ri) i=l 
Add 7rn+li An+l- 
1. set prob : ý-- 7rn+l + 7rR -1 (this is the probability to be assigned to the possible world 
set)- 
2. take the old tree, and arrange its probabilities in increasing size. 
3. take the world with all antecedents true and the rule true, make the antecedent A,, +, 
false in this world and assign it the probability 1- 7r,, +,. Make the world with all of 
the old antecedents true and A,, +, true and assign this the residual of: 
n n+l 
7rR 7ri) 7rn+l) -': -- 7rR 7ri) 
4. For each of the other worlds make A,, +, true in the world, and assign it the value it had 
before., 
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5. The'total probability assigned to A,, +, is then: 
nn 
ri) + (7rR - 7ri)) r,, +I) = 7R + 7rn+l 
which is the required probability when 1- 7rR is subtracted froin the probability ? r,, +,. 
Since the tree for n antecedents has been correctly filled, this new tree, which maintains all 
of the probability assignments of the old also has a correct assignment for the tree extended 
by predicate An+l- 
Case 2: rR- E!, = 1 (1 - ri) <0 
In this case it is necessary that there is a way of assigning the probability for antecedent A,, +l 
without assigning probability to the world where all of the n+1 antecedents are true and the 
rule is true. 
1. set pset := 7r,,, +, + 7rR -1 (this is the probability to be assigned to the possible world 
set). 
2. take the old tree, and arrange its probabilities in increasing size. 
choose the world from the world set which has the smallest non-zero probability. Call 
this world pw, whose probability is w.,. 
4. if (pset - w.,, ) >0 then pset := pset - w_,; make two new worlds from the world pw with 
a new space for predicate A,, +, such that p(An+I true, pw true) = w., and p(A,, +, false, 
pw true) = 0. Return to step 3. 
5. if (pset - w., ) <0 then prest :=w.,, - pset; resid :=w,,, - prest; make two new worlds 
from the world pw with a new space for predicate A,, +, such that p(An+l true, pw true) 
= prest and p(A,, +, false, pw true) = resid. 
Make two copies of each of the other worlds. To one of the copies add the sentence 
A,, +, false, and assign this world the probability w, where w. was the probabillty'of 
the original. To the second add the sentence An+I true, and assign this the probability 
0. Stop. 
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Since the tree for n antecedents was built without the use of the world where all antecedents 
are true, this new tree has been constructed without use of this world, and so, consequently it 
has a probability of 0. The sentence A. +j has been added to the previous set with probability 
7rn+l in a consistent manner. 
Case 3: 7R - E! I'=I(l - 7ri) 
>0 7rR - (1 - 7ri) :50 
It is necessary to show that in this case, the bounds can be reduced to 0 to 7rR and that the 
probability of A,, +l can be assigned consistently. Add 7rn+l, 
An+1- 
1. set pset := 7rn+l + 7rn -1 (this is the probability to be assigned to the possible world 
set). Also, set pnot :=1-r,, +, (the probability of A,, +, being false). 
2. take the old tree, and create the assignment which maximally reduces the alltrue world 
(the world with all antecedents true and the rule true). The probability of the alltrue 
world is therefore: 
n 
7rn ri) 
CaH this praU. 
3. Let plast := prall, and prem := (1 - 7r,, +, ) - plast. 
4. Take the previous alltrue world, and make A,, +, false in this world with probability 
plast. We still need to use up probability prem where A,, +, is false, as well as assign 
true the probability r,, +, + rR - 1. 
5. set prob :F prem 
6. take the old tree, and arrange its probabilities in increasing size. 
7. choose the world from the world set which is the smallest non-zero probability. Call 
this world pw, whose probability is w,,. 
8. if (prern - w,, ) >0 then prem := prem - w.; make two new worlds from the world pw 
with a new space for predicate A,, +, such that p(A,, +, false, pw true) = w., and p(An+I 
true, pw true) = 0. Return to step 7. 
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9. if (prem - w.,, ) <0 then prest :=w,,, - prem; resid. :=w. - prest; make two new worlds 
from the world pw with a new space for predicate A,, +, such that p(A,, +, false, pw 
true) = prest and p(A,, +, true, pw true) = resid. 
10. For all other worlds pw, p(A,, +, true, pw true) = w., (the probability of pw in the 
assignment for n antecedents) and p(A. +, false, pw true) = 0. Stop. 
We have found a way of assigning worlds in the old tree where A,, +, is false the value of 
1-r,, +,, and have assigned the worlds where A,, +l is true a value of 7rR - 
(1 
- 7rn+l)t i. e. 
7rn+l + 7rR -1 without using the all true world. 
4.10 Consequences of the Boundary Algorithm 
The result makes it possible to provide the absolute bounds of an entailment without resorting 
to the multi- dimensional projection method provided by Nilsson in his derivation of proba- 
bilistic entailment. However, as Nilsson reports, the bounds of an entailment rapidly widen 
as the probabilities of propositions drop away from 1. Very soon, the bounds of a proposition 
are the simple lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 7rR. 
However, using boundary information in conjunction with conditional probabilities pro- 
vided by an expert we can narrow these bounds. It may not be practical for an expert to 
provide all of the relevant conditional probabilities; but tbe, expert may be able to provide 
some of the important ones, in which case, the bounds of the deduced probability may be 
reduced. If the expert can provide. the conditionals: p(BICl), p(BIC2), ... , p(BICn), where 
Cl, C2, ... Cn are contexts 
in which at least one of the antecedents are false, and the rule is 
always true, then, from equation 4.13, the bounds may be succesively altered: 
Ln =L+ p(DICl) 
U+ p(BICl) -1 
And so with each successive application of the context splits, the absolute bounds will be 
narrowed. This procedure simply makes use of the fact that p(BICI) + p(- BICl) = 1. The 
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use of this information in conjunction with a reduction in entropy (uncertainty) is considered 
in chapter 8. 
4.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter several criticisms have been made against the structure proposed by Nilsson. 
These criticisms are: the inability to use a complete probability model, and the conservative 
estimate of probability using the half split. To answer these criticisms aý new model for 
entailment has been proposed which allows the inclusion of conditional probabilities, in the 
form of context splits. The context split notion is introduced as a vehicle for supporting 
conditional probabilities in Probabilistic Logic, but it can also be used to support subjective 
heuristic estimates of how often a conclusion may be inferred in a particular possible world. 
Making the logic of conditional probabilities available to the entailment structure allows 
Bayesian Inference within Probabilistic Logic, a topic which is further explored in chapter 
6. Furthermore, if the context split is a heuristic function, we can use partial information to 
help the reasoning process to proceed. The better the heuristic function, the more accurate 
the results. This topic is further discussed in chapter 8. 
We have also introduced a new algorithm for estimating the probability bounds of an 
entailment process. We are now left facing the problem of underdetermination of the actual 
state of the antecedents. With this in mind,, we must model a probability distribution through 
our uncertainty space. The most acceptable such distribution is provided by the maximum 
entropy formalism, which is examined in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5ý 
THE MAXIMUM ENTROPY 
FORMALISM IN NILSSON'S 
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the structural aspects of Probabilistic Logic were developed to include 
conditional probabilities. In this chapter, the maximum entropy formalism is investigated 
with relation to choosing the most probable probability distribution for a set of uncertain 
sentences. In this sense, we are concerned with the information theoretic aspects of the 
maximum entropy formalism. 
Maximum entropy, as applied in information theory, is concerned with the semantic con- 
tent of a message passed between a transmitter and a receiver [114]. Typically, if the receiver 
receives the message as it was broadcast by the transmitter, then the receiver is said to have 
received perfect information from the process. In the theory of, communications, a signal is 
altered from some human readable form at the transmitter's end, into some transmittable 
form, then transmitted, and then reconverted into human readable form at the receiver's 
end. The most likely points for message degradation are at the conversion stages, and the 
transmission stage. This process has a direct analogy in expert systems. 
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Where expert systems are concerned, antecedent information is transmitted to tile rule of 
inference which then transmits information about the rule's consequent with some certainty 
value. That is, when all of the antecedents attached to the rule are correct, then the conclu. 
sion may be drawn with the predefined certainty attached to the rule. In this case perfect 
information has been transferred. 
However, degradation arises in this process when any, or- all, of the antecedents is, or are, 
uncertain. In this situation, information transfered to the rule has suffered degradation. The 
maximum entropy principle has been shown to give the least commitment [115] probability 
distribution subject to the probability constraints of the antecedents and the rule, to the 
entailed conclusion. The summation function which has been used to measure the entropy 
of a probability distribution has three simple properties which make it well suited to be a 
measure of the information content of the distribution [60,54,3]. For illustration purposes, 
consider an example of a set of n mutually exclusive possible worlds, and consider all the 
possible ways probability can be assigned to these possible worlds so that it sums to 1. The 
function used to measure the entropy of the distribution is H= E'jý-j pilogpi. 
The first property is that it does not matter in which order the summation of the individual 
terms (pilogpi) is applied; the function always gives the same result. The second is that 
the function is at a maximum when each of the possible worlds p, to p,, are assigned a 
probability of 1/n, the point of maximum dispersion of probability throughout the sample 
space. The third is that the function is continuous and reduces monotonically from this 
maximum, towards a value of 0 at the point where one of the possibilities p, to pn is assigned 
a value of 1; and all of the others are assigned a probability of 0. For probability distributions 
whose entropy value is between these two extremes, the fact that the function is necessarily 
monotonically decreasing means that, as probabilities are applied to the possibilities the 
information content in each of the intermediate states can be compared. 
For these reasons the entropy function has been used throughout this thesis as the measure 
of the information content within a probability distribution, with a view to reasoning with 
uncertainty in a mathematically justifiable way. 
In this chapter the Lagrangian derivation of the maximum entropy distribution is given, 
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and we examine the way the maximum entropy principle may be given a deeper role in Nils- 
son's probabilistic logic, which ultimately allows the user to specify a complete probabilistic 
model for the entailment process if one is available. A new solution to the maximum entropy 
equations for probabilistic entailment is derived which provides the correct values for the 
non-linear factors of the probability equations in a time small enough so that the mechanism 
of maximum entropy can easily sit within an expert system inference engine without causing 
intractable complexity problems. 
5.2 Derivation of The Maximum Entropy Solution 
The entropy equations will be derived within the matrix framework of Nilsson's probabilistic 
logic, as described in chapters 3 and 4. The Entropy Equation is approximated by a new 
function III which is written: 
Hl Epilogpi + li(Hi - RIP)+ 
12(112 
- R2P) R,, P) (5.1) 
i 
The variables 11 to 1,, are Lagrange multipliers. The variables R, to R,, are the rows of 
the VI matrix. The variables H, to H,, are the rows of the probability matrix H. P is the 
matrix with the probabilities of the possible worlds. III is exactly the entropy function when 
there is a probability assignment to each of the possible worlds which meets the marginal 
probabilities provided by the expert. 
We concern ourselves with each world individually (that is, each of the columns in V, and 
its corresponding probability in P). The new entropy expression is differentiated with respect 
to each world, setting the result to zero to derive the distribution with maximum entropy, 
giving for each world i: - 
- Yogpi + 1) - livii - I. V1. =0 (5.2) 
which can be written: 
logpi = -1 - livii - .... - 1,, Vl,, (5.3) 
=::,, pi = e-le-'lvil... e-',, v'- (5.4) 
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The aggregate factors of this multiplicative list can be simplified, in the sense that the 
column elements of V for possible world i (vi 1 to vin) may take values 1 or 0. If the value of a 
row x of world i is zero (i. e. v--i = 0), we note that the expression for pi loses the term e-1-Tvis, 
which simply evaluates to 1 in the expression. If the value vi = 1, then the exponential for 
dealing with row x of world pi can be simplified to e-1-. With these observations in mind, 
the following definitions can be used to simplify the expression: 
e-le-11 (5.5) 
aj = e-li, (for j=2 to n); (5.6) 
and, consequently each possible world pi can be written as a product of some of the aggregate 
factors al to a,, where the factor a.,, is included in the multiplication list only if there is a1 
at position v., i in the V' matrix. 
Now, the maximum entropy equations only require a solution for the factors a, to a,,; 
and this being done, the maximum entropy probability for each possible world can easily be 
reconstructed. The problem is that although for our n sentences we have n unknowns, the 
equations are nonlinear multiplications of these unknowns, and typically require solution by 
iteration. 
5.3 Entropy Equations 
As n increases, the difference between these numbers will increase rapidly, introducing (2n - 11) 
extra degrees of freedom. One way to remove the additional degrees of freedom is to maximise 
the entropy of the system [60,16,2]. 
In this approach each possible world is rewritten in terms of a multiplication of aggregate 
factors [3,16,89]. The notation used to associate these factors with the corresponding 
sentences for a rule with n antecedents is as follows: a, represents the factor for the tautology; 
the factors ai are associated with propositions Ai, for j equal 1 to n, and factor aR is associated 
with the entailment rule. An aggregate factor is included in the multiplication list for a 
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possible world only if the factor's associated sentence is true in that world. So, for table 4.3, 
we have: 
a= aa, aR; b=a, al; c= aan 
and the equations are rewritten as shown in table 5.1. 
1. aa, aR + aral + a-raR =1 
aa, aR + a, al = r, 
a, a, aR + aaR = 7r2 
Table 5.1: M. E. Probabilistic Equations for Table 4.3 
The equations which need to be solved from table 4.1 are shown in table 5.3. 
1. a, a, aR + a, al + 2a, aR =1 
2. aa, aR + aal = 7rj 
3. a, alaR + 2, laR = 72 
Table 5.2: M. E. Probabilistic Equations for Table 4.1 
(5.7) 
Once the entropy equations for table 4.3 are solved to give the required aggregate factors, 
the probability of B is simply a, alan + alaR. In the case of table 5.1, the probability of B 
is a, ajajj plus the context split proportion of the value alan. The provision of this context 
split will never lead to any difficulties, because in the worst possible case, the system can 
automatically assign the size of the split, using prearranged rules agreed with the knowledge 
engineer. 
5.4 The Iterative Method of Solution 
In Probabilistic Logic and Bayesian Inference when there are n uncertain sentences and hence 
2n different possible worlds, this is the number of degrees of freedom [73] of the system. Using 
the maximum entropy method the probabilistic equations relating to n uncertain sentences 
can always be rewritten in terms of n aggregate factors, and hence the degrees of freedom are 
reduced to only n. 
However, when we use the maximum entropy formalism to remove the additional degrees 
of freedom of an entailment problem, it is, still necessary to solve the non-linear entropy 
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equations. Such equations are solved iteratively if no generic pattern can be found within 
them. The update method of solution [16], is a particular case of the general one-point method 
of solution which covers all iterative methods of the form: 
an = F(a, ) (5.8) 
where the next iterative approximation of a value (a,, ) is found by applying some function (F) 
to the current value of a variable (a, ). The solution is found when none of the variables in the 
equations move by more than a predefined amount (c) from their current approximation. This 
is the method Nilsson suggested for solving the entropy equations for entallments involving 
small, numbers of antecedents. The method can be expressed as follows. 
1. Number the equations 1 ... n. 
2. For each ai solve equation i in terms of the other variables. 
3. 'Assume initial values for each of the ai. 
4. Choose the next ai, and recalculate it in terms of the others. 
5. , 
If the change in any of the ai's is more than 
c then continue from 4. 
6. Otherwise stop with success. 
Where c represents the tolerance in the approximation. This method will always converge 
to a solution, but the time taken is dependent on two things: 
1. the number of ai's to be solved for, and 
2. the initial starting values for the ai's. 
Table 5.4 shows times taken for this algorithm. As with all of the reported times, the hardware 
is a High Level Hardware 'Orion' with 8 megabytes of memory, and all programs have been 
written in C-Prolog [19]. The first column shows how many antecedents are involved in the 
rule, and the second shows how many cpu seconds the program took to provide a stable result 
with c equal to 0.1%. 
The accuracy achieved may be improved by making c smaller, but this vastly increases 
the time taken for solution. Paris et al [91], show that the problem of computing these 
factors to a reasonable accuracy is NP-hard, and consequently such methods are probably 
unfeasible. In fact, Pearl [97] dismisses Nilsson's use of the maximum entropy -formalism 
within the Probabilistic Logic because "computational techniques for finding a maximum- 
entropy distribution are usually intractable". An algorithm is presented in section 5.5 which 
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Antecedents Time (cpu secs) 
1. 2.883 
2. 12.283 
3. 45.2 
4. 150.52 
5. 475.33 
Table 5.3: Times for Iterative Solution 
will discover the factors for the extended system of Probabilistic Logic introduced in chapter 
4. 
5.5 The New Algorithm for Solving the Maximum Entropy 
Equations 
The algorithm can be expressed as follows. For any probabilistic rule of entailment of the 
form: p(AI&A2&... &A,, =ý- B) < 1, the corresponding aggregate factors are a,, a,, a2 
an, aR such that a, is for the tautology, a,... an are for the propositions A,... An; and an is 
for the rule of entailment. The probabilities are labelled 1,71,72,..., 7rn, 7rR such that 1 is the 
probability of the tautology; 7r,,..., r,, are the probabilities of propositions A,,..., A,,; and rn 
is the probability of the rule. The solution is as follows: 
7ri + WR -1 
1- 7rj 
(5.9) 
a, 
7rR 
ai 3=1 
aR 
7rR 
ajjjý. ai); J= 
5.5.1 Inductive Proof of Entropy Algorithm 
The proof proceeds in four stages. First, to derive the expression for the world where the 
rule is false. Second, to show that for each of the terms aj (j =1 to n) there is a direct 
match of terms on the numerator and denominator of the expression: (7ri + 7rq - vi), 
i. e. all the unknown worlds where sentence Aj is true divided by all the worlds where Aj is 
false. The third stage is related to the first and allows us to solve for ar. The fourth stage 
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Sentence Possible Worlds Equations 
r 1 aalan + aal + a,. an = 
Al 101 aalan + aal = 7r, 
A, =: * B 011 a, aI an + a,. an = 7riz 
Table'5.4: Sentences, Worlds, and Equations 
is for the final factor aR and is based on the worlds in which the rule is trues and a recursive 
expression for describing the contribution of each of the possible worlds to this probability: 
a, aRrIlLi (1 + ai) = rR. 
Base Case (n=l) 
From the equations of table 5.4: 
a, al =I- rR 
a, = 
aa, aR 
= . 
7rl - (1 - 7rR) 7ri + 7rR -1 
a, raR 
(1-71) 1-71 
a, r = 
alal - VR 
a, a, 
aR - 
a, a, aR + araR 
- 
araR(l + a, ) 7rR 
a, ral + a. ar(l + a, ) a, (l + a, ) 
And the above equations satisfy the algorithm with n=1. 
Step 
The algorithm is true for n antecedents, now to prove it true for n+1 antecedents. 
The new premise A,, +l is added to the antecedent arm of the rule, and placed after premise 
A,, in the premise list. We now have aggregate factors a-r, a,,..., an+l, aR- 
1. aal... an+l ý1- 7rR 
2. In each row there are now 21+1 possible worlds, where there used to be 2n. The difference 
between the tree for n+l propositions and n propositions, being that in row n+l there 
are now 2n 1's and 2n O's, and the rule is pushed down to position n+2. 
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For the half of the tree with O's in row n+1 we proved that there is a direct match to 
give each of the previous ai's. For the other half, we use the same enumeration, and find 
that the factor for proposition n+1 cancels out on top and bottom. Furthermore the 
numerator still only holds the worlds where sentence Ai is true, and the denominator 
the worlds where Ai is false. Therefore the equation still holds. 
Is the formula true for new row n+1? 
The new tree was made up of two identical copies of the old tree, one of which has a1 
in row n+1, the other of which has a zero in row n+1. Consequently, again it is possible 
to cancel the terms of the true worlds divided by the false worlds so that there is only 
a factor of a. +, left. 
I- 7rR 3. a, is trivially aia2 ... an+1 
4. The expression for all the worlds where the rule is true is: aaR fl, ý=j (1 + aj) 
When we include the new row, we have a new multiplicative factor: NVe have two copies: 
one with an a,,, +, in row n+1, and one with a 1. So the new expression for all the worlds 
is: 
nnn 
an+la, aR 11 (1 + ai) + aaR 11 (1 + aj) + an+l)a, an 11 (1 + aj) 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
n 
a, an Il (1 + aj) 
j=l 
In the event that the probability of the rule is 1, the world where the rule is false becomes 
an impossible world, and consequently the rule is subsumed into the tautology. In this case 
there are only n+1 factors, where aj (j 1 to n) and a, is The proof is I 7ri Ili'= I (1+dj) ' 
a generalisation from steps 2 and 4 above, and is detailed in appendix C in the interests of 
brevity. 
Consequences of the New Algorithm 
Once these aggregate factors are found for any consistent probability problem, the possible 
worlds can be rebuilt from the appropriate multiplication of factors. Not only will we have 
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the probability of a conclusion but also a detailed breakdown of the probabilities of the 
contributing possible worlds. Each of these possible worlds are contexts for the conclusion 
which the user of the system may require to see before committing him/herself to a decision. 
Thus, the underlying nature of the probability distribution is available, and this allows the 
user of the system to examine the probabilities of each of the possible worlds also. I 
For the case where the probability of the rule is one, the rule is subsumed into the tautol- 
ogy, and so we lose one of the aggregate factors. We use the same reasoning on a simplified 
version of the semantic tree, which gives the results: 
7ri 
aR + aj) 
These aggregate factors are now the building blocks for the probabilities of each of the 
possible worlds. Their values can range between 0 and infinity (non inclusive). (infinity cannot 
be attained, because this would mean that a proposition antecedent was definitely true, and 
therefore we adopt the collapsing procedure detailed above; and 0 cannot be attained because 
probabilities are constrained to be above the probability of (1-7rR) ). Because the factors are 
multiplied together to give the probability of a possible world, those factors greater than 1 
will have a promotional effect on the probability of a possible world, while those factors less 
than 1 will have an dernotional effect on the probability of a possible world. 
Table 5.5 shows times for this algorithm executing on the same problem data and hardware 
as that introduced in section 5.4. The first column shows how many antecedents are involved 
in the rule, and the. second shows how many cpu seconds the program took to calculate the 
values of all of the aggregate factors. The results can be compared with those reported in 
table 5.4. 
Observing the formula for deriving the factor ai associated with proposition Ai, we can 
see that there are three regions which the probability of a proposition can take an entailment 
process, whose values are derived: 
p(Ai) <1- rR (5.20) 
rR < p(Ai) <2 rn 
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Antecedents Time (cpu secs) 
1. 0.017 
2. 0.017 
3. 0.017 
4. 0.033 
5. 0.033 
Table 5.5: Times for Quick Solution 
7, R < p(Ai) <1 2 
(5.22) 
In the region of equation 5.20, the probability of the antecedent proposition renders the 
application of the entailment rule logically inconsistent. In the region of equation 5.21, the 
probability of the antecedent has a debiliting effect on that of the conclusion (ai < 1), and 
in that of equation 5.22, the probability of the antecedent has a positive effect on that of the 
conclusion. 
The factors can also be sorted in decreasing order, such that those at the front have the 
most positive effect on the probability of a possible world. This list can then be split into 
those factors which increase the probability of a world, and those which would reduce it. 
Thereby providing a mechanism for reporting any number of the most probable contributory 
possible worlds in an entailment. process. 
5.6 Entropy Equations in Probabilistic Logic 
The simple expressions used in this formulation have as their basis the algorithm for the quick 
determination of the aggregate factors of an entailment result. We wish now to generalise the 
procedure to make the probabilities of the possible worlds easier to calculate. We know that: 
a, al ... an = 
(I - rR) 
This is the world where the rule of inference is false, and all the antecedents are true. We 
also know that the factor a, aR is present in all of the other possible worlds (that is, in all of 
the other worlds the tautology is true, and the rule of inference is also true). From equations 
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5.10,5.11 and 5.9: 
a, a, R 
Q- 7rl)(1 - 72) ... 
(1 - 7rn) (5.23) 
7rR n-I 
we also know from equation 5.9: 
7ri + 711 -1 
ai =1- 
ri - 
(5.24) 
If, for each possible world, we collect the sentences which are true into the set W, (and use 
the variables f and g to denote aggregate factors), the probability for any possible world can 
be directly calculated from: 
p(world) = aaRlIf EIV 
rf + 7rR - (5.25) 
1- rf 
lIfEIV(7rf + 7rR - 1)IlgolV(l - 7r. ) (5.26) 
n-I 
R 
Where the probability of the rule is 1, this expression simplifies to: 
Ilf EtV7rflI9gl'V(l - 7r. 
) (5.27) 
These expressions make it possible to evaluate the probability of each of the possible worlds 
by multiplying n expressions, and when the strength of the rule is less than one, dividing by 
one variable. This makes the algorithm deterministic [56] but when all of the worlds are to 
be assigned a probability, the complete process is still, necessaxily, non-detertnýinistic. With 
this new method of finding the probabilities of the possible worlds we are now in a position to 
explore the possibility of using the maximum entropy result as a tool in Meta-Level Reasoning 
within a reasoning task. The complexity of this algorithm is examined in the next section. 
With this new method of finding the probabilities of the possible worlds we are now in a 
position to explore the possibility of using the maximum entropy result as a tool in Meta- 
Level Reasoning within a reasoning task; and this topic is explored in chapter 8. 
5.7 ComPlexity of the Algorithms 
Throughout this section n is used to refer to the number of antecedents involved in a rule of 
entailment. 
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In section 5.5 the composition of each aggregate factor is n multiplications, plus one 
division. The number of operations in total is n*(n+1), which is of the order n2. And 
so, the discovery of the aggregate factors may be achieved with a deterministic algorithm. 
In section 5.6 each possible world is assigned a probability in n multiplications plus I 
division. To assign a value to all of the possible worlds in an entailment problem will require 
211 * (n + 1) operations, which is exponential. However, this is a very low cost exponential 
equation for a process which not only works out the maximum entropy factors, but assigns 
each world a probability. The attractiveness of this function is best considered by remembering 
that any probability assignment to all of the possible worlds is necessarily exponential of the 
order 2", and the algorithm of section 5.6 is linear in that function. 
It is clear that for entailments involving anything up to 30 uncertain antecedents, it 
is plausible to work out the probability of each individual possible world. However, the 
complexity problem eventually becomes insurmountable. The exponential increase of the 
algorithm in section 5.6, is, although slow, intractable. It is at this point that we must 
look for simplification strategies if we wish to have rules with more than 30 or so uncertain 
antecedents attached. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Maximum entropy solutions to probability problems have been known for some time. They 
generally require iterative solution by constant updating of the terms of non-linear variable 
equations. In this way, they are provide a formidably difficult problem to computational 
solution methods. The conception of merging the theory of the maximum entropy principle, 
and the representation schema of Nilsson's probabilistic logic looks from the outset to be an 
impossible task- when one wants to model all possible worlds; and the other wants to assign 
each of these worlds a least commitment probability value commensurate with the probability 
constraints given by the problem setup. 
However, in this chapter, it has been shown that when Nilsson's probabilistic logic is 
extended to allow the inclusion of conditional probabilities, there is a polynomial time algo- 
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rithm for solving for the terms of the non-linear equations. These terms can be used in the 
reasoning process in many ways. For instance, if the probabilities of all the possible worlds 
is required then, the algorithm to build all of the worlds from these terms is necessarily non- 
deterministic. In this case, it is only feasible to build the worlds for rules of a small number 
(up to about 30) antecedents. However, beyond this point, (in fact more likely considerably 
below it), an expert will not be able to descriminate the probability fluctuations in a useful 
manner. In ths situation, key worlds can be evaluated, and probability bounds reduced to 
within an acceptable tolerance level. This topic is further explored in chapters 8 and 10. 
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Chapter 6 
NILSSON'S PROBABILISTIC 
LOGIC AND BAYESIAN 
INFERENCE 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been noted by Grosof [51], that the mechanism proposed by Nilsson can use conditional 
probabilities insofar as that once probabilities have been assigned to possible worlds, it be- 
comes possible to measure the intersections of groups of possible worlds and thereby produce 
values of conditional probabilities. The conditional probabilities are not used to form the 
probability distribution and are only used to describe it. This he refers to as conditional 
probabilities in terms of "post-construction". That is, conditional probabilities as a conse- 
quence of the probability assignment, rather than conditional probabilities used to shape the 
probability assignment. 
Ile then suggests that there should be a method of representing conditional probabilities 
explicitly in Probabilistic Logics. With the extensions developed in chapter 4 We are now in 
a position to do this. When the new model is combined with the ability to quickly derive the 
maximum entropy probability distribution of an entailment problem, developed in chapter 
5, Probabilistic Logic is in a position to tackle probability problems for which a complete 
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probability model is present. It is now able to solve problems that the Bayesian model solves, 
that is, to provide a point probability from a completely specified probability model. One 
advantage which Probabilistic Logic holds over Bayesian Inference is in its use of Jaynes's 
maximum entropy formalism to generate the most-probable probability distribution through 
our uncertain antecedent-rule data. This makes it possible for Probabilistic Logic to quote 
most-probable point probabilities for conclusions without recourse to interpolation schemas. 
Both mechanisms require the same amount of pieces of information to derive a point 
probability [52] and the two reasoning processes are compared in this chapter. The findings are 
that a valid statistical meaning for probabilistic entailment is more in line with the definition of 
conditional probability than with a generalisation of the rule of modus ponens and Bernoulli's 
rule of indifference. However, the two models use different conditional information. Bayesian 
inference is derived from a knowledge of the hypothesis whereas Nilssonian inference is derived 
from a knowledge of the evidence. In this regard Nilssonian inference is more amenable than 
Bayesian inference to expert systems situations where the evidence may be uncertain or 
incomplete. 
6.2 Information Cross Comparison 
There are two separate issues in the comparison: 
1. what is needed for a complete problem setup; and 
2. what information is used to make the final deduction? 
To answer the questions, consider the information shown in table 6.1 which shows the 
information required to specify the complete probability model for estimating the probability 
of event B conditioned on information about event Al. 
Information Needed for a Problem Setup 
That is, prior to the deduction, to apply Bayesian inference to find the probability of B, we 
need a prior probability for B (p'(B)). Bayesian inference is a method of updating probability 
and so it is necessary at aR times to have a present probability for the deduced event. We also 
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Bayesian Original Nilssonian Extended Nilssonian 
p'(B) 
p(Al B) p(Al =:,. B) p(Al B) 
p(Al , B) p(B I Al) 
Table 6.1: Information required by B. I. and P. L. 
need two conditional probabilities (2n for n> 1). So, it requires 2n +I pieces of information 
in setup. 
Nilsson's original mechanism only asks for one piece of information - the probability of 
the rule of inference - but it does not produce a complete probability model. The Extended 
version of Probabilistic Logic requires the probability of the rule of inference and 2n -1 
context splits, that is, 2n pieces of information. 
Information Needed for the Deduction 
To answer the second question from this example, Bayesian inference requires information 
about Al - that is, it needs to know either that Al is true, or that Al is false. When there 
is uncertainty about whether or not the conditioning event has actuaUy happened, we need 
an approximation schema, as, for example, PROSPECTOR's interpolation method [33], for 
estimating the effect of the probability of the evidence on the hypothesis. 
The original model for Probabilistic Logic is shown in column 2. In this model, no con- 
ditional probability information can be explicitly encorporated. However, uncertainty in the 
conditioning event Al is handled from within the model, probabilistic bounds can be pro- 
duced. The original model is not able to give any result when Al is false, which is something 
the Bayesian model does easily. 
The extended model for Probabilistic Logic, shown in column 3, requires the strength of 
a probabilistic entailment plus the conditional probability of the hypothesis given that the 
evidence is false. Not only can the extended model give bounds when there is uncertainty, 
but with the use of context splits, a point probability can be produced. The meaning of 
probabilistic entailment and context splits are discussed in section 6.3. 
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The General Case 
For the general case where there are n antecedents (A, to A, ) wMch. have a bearing on a 
conclusion (or, in Bayesian terminology, a hypothesis) B, the information required by each 
formalism is as follows: 
Bayesian Inference the prior probability of the conclusion, the conditional probability of 
each of the possible world in the light of the hypothesis being true 
Probabilistic Logic the probability of the rule, the conditional probability of the conclusion 
in the light of each possible world. 
It is one of the contentions of this thesis that the best form of context split (introduced in 
section 4.4.1) is a conditional probability (section 6.3). Since, in many cases it is not possible 
to give a conditional probability for a problem (see chapter 10) and in many others it is not 
possible to give enough conditional probabilities (see chapter 8) the more general vehicle of 
the context split has been introduced so that subjective probabilities and heuristics can be 
used. However, any subjective probability estimate given by an expert or heuristic method 
developed should aim to approximate the conditional probability. 
6.3 Assigning Probabilistic Meaning to Entailment 
Generalising the classical logic implication rule raises a number of questions, which we shall 
consider in this section with the aid of a dice throwing example. Suppose we have a fifteen 
sided dice, and proposition sentences Al and B which denote the propositions 'the number 
on the topmost face of the dice is odd' and 'the number on the topmost face of the dice 
is divisible by three'. And suppose we join the two propositions with the rule Al*B. The 
questions we will address with this example are: 
1. What is the probability of Al? 
2. What is the probability of Al=: ýB? 
3. What is the probability of B? 
To answer these questions, consider the sample space for the dice shown in table 6.1. 
We shall consider this to be a'fair' dice in so far as each of the possibilities is equally likely, 
and will assign a probability of 1/15 to each. Al is true in worlds (1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15) and so 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Al, -B - Al, -B Al, B - Al, -B Al, -B 
6 7 8 9 10 
- Al, B Al, -B - Al, -B Al, B - Al, -B 
11 12 13 14 15 
Al, -B - Al, B Al, -B- Al, -B Al, B 
Figure 6.1: Example of a 15-sided Dice 
has probability 8/15. The rule of entailment (- A1 VB) is true in worlds (2,3,4,6,8,9,10,12,14,15) 
and so has probability 10/15. To answer the final question, we will solve the equations asso- 
ciated with the probabilistic entailment rule with reference to the representations shown in 
table 6.2 and table 4.3 respectively. 
Sentence abcd Probability 
7' 1111 1 
Al 1100 7rl 
Al #- B 1011 7r2 
Table 6.2: Interpretation Table for Dice Example 
In terms of the representation of table 6.2 (Nilsson's original model) the equations are: 
a+b+c+d =1 
+b= 8/15 (ri) 
a+c+d= 10/15 (rR). (6.1) 
Which solve to give: 
3/15(ir, + rR - 1), 
5/15(l - 7rR), 
7/30((l - rl)/2). (6.2) 
and so a probabifity for B of a+c=13/30. 
In the extended model of Probabilistic Logic, shown in table 6.3 the equations are: 
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Sentence abc Probability 
7 111 1 
Al 110 7rj 
Al =>. B 101f 72 
Table 6.3: Interpretation Table for Dice Example 
a+b+c =1 
+b= 8/15 
a+c= 10/15. (G. 3) 
Which solve to give a= 3/15, b= 5/15, (both as before), and c= 7/15 (1 - rj); and so a 
probability for B of a+x. c. Where x is the expert's assessment of the conditional probability 
p(BI - Al). If the expert knows the problem domain and gives the correct conditional 
probability of 2/7 for x, the probability of B is 1/3 from this method. 
Bayesian inference gives the following solution when proposition Al becomes true: 
p(BIAl) 
p(AlIB). p'(B) 
p(A 11 B). pl(B) + p(A 1 B). pl(- B) 
3 
15 
3+5 
is 15 
3 (6.4) 
8 
where p'(X) represents the prior probability of predicate X, and p(XIY) is the probability of 
X conditional on Y. Neither of the methods of Probabilistic Logic obtain this value. 
A Probabilistic Meaning for Probabilistic Entailment 
The discrepancy arises because of the way probability has been assigned to the rule of en- 
tallment. This was simply done using the logical equivalence of - AlVB with Al *B, and 
summing the probabilities of the worlds in which this formula holds true. In fact, as the proba- 
bility of Al approaches 11 the probability of the conclusion necessarily approaches 10/15 (the 
strength of the rule). This result is too high, and forces us to consider what probabilistic 
meaning to assign to the rule. 
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Logically speaking, we have not taken into account the fact that our sentence Al has also 
to be consistent with these worlds. (This consistency relation is discussed in section 7). If 
this is done, we reduce our consistent possibilities for the rule to those worlds (3,9,15), of the 
worlds (1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15); and so the probability of the rule is 3/8. So in conclusion, one 
way to remove the discrepancy, is to equate the probabilistic meaning of p(Al =::,. B) with 
p(BIAl). More generally, the question we could ask the expert in order to get him to estimate 
the strength of a rule of the form AM ... &An #-B is: 'if the conditions Al,... An were all true, 
how often would you expect the rule of entailment to be true? ' 
If we use the value of 3/8 as the strength of our entailment rule, both equations 6.3 and 
equations 6.4 will produce equations which give a probability of 3/8 to B in the event of Al 
being true. However, we also know that for probabilities of Al greater than 5/8, Probabilis- 
tic Logic can derive a consistent probability for B in a manner similar to PROSPECTOR. 
Equations 6.3 can give us a probability value for proposition B which ranges from 0 to 3/8. 
Equations 6.1 will produce an optimistic result in the range 3/16 to 3/8. 
This interpretation of the probabilistic meaning of entailment ensures that the result 
produced at the extreme case of all the antecedents being true is in accordance with that 
obtained using Bayesian Inference. So that this result is a necessary upper bound, and that 
for the case where the antecedents are uncertain, the framework will bound the region of 
correct possibilities. Using the maximum entropy method will then give us the best estimate 
of what the uncertain probability is in this region. 
6.4 Probabilistic Logic plus Conditional Probabilities 
The addition of conditional probabilities to Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic, discussed in chapters 
4 and 5, means that to completely describe the probability model for a rule of entailment with 
n antecedents, 21 -1 conditional probabilities are required, plus the probabilistic strength 
of the rule. This is exactly the amount of conditional probabilities required in the Bayesian 
model. 
They both use the same amount of information, but the nature of the required information 
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is different [67]. Nilsson's is a MYCIN-like formalism with an extension to allow for the 
complete specification of a probabilistic model. A further aspect of the Nilssonian inference 
with the above model is that it addresses the problem of entailment using implication. With 
the above model we are able to code the exact amount of attachment between the antecedents 
and the conclusion, that is to describe the details of the connection between the antecedents 
and the conclusion across the rule of entailment [58]. 
The most outstanding problem with Probabilistic Logic now is how to make use of the 
semantic clarity, while controlling the complexity problem which Bayesian Inference has been 
trying to deal with for over a hundred years. 
Inference Conditioned on Hypotheses vs. Inference Conditioned on Evi- 
dence 
Observing the type of inference performed by the Bayesian schema, we see that it is condi- 
tioned on knowledge about the hypothesis; whereas inference performed under probabilistic 
entailment is based on knowledge about the evidence. It may be that for some situations, the 
latter information may be more readily available from an expert than the former. For exam- 
ple, where an expert medical consultant is creating an expert system to be used for diagnosis 
of a newly emerging, and constantly evolving, disease. In this case, the prior probability of 
the presence of a disease in a patient may not be known, and the expert may feel more at case 
estimating the probabilities of the hypothesis based on evidence rather than the probabilities 
of the evidence based on the hypothesis. 
Nilsson's probabilistic logic opens up a new way of reasoning with uncertainty to the expert 
system community, and is particularly suited to experts who may think of their reasoning 
processes more in terms of entailment (and MYCIN), and less in terms of Bayesian Inference 
techniques (and PROSPECTOR). 
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6.5 Consistency in Probabilistic Logic 
If all of the contexts splits are conditional probabilities, and the rule of entailment is a 
conditional probability then it is clear that Probabilistic Logic can be described as Bayesian 
Inference acting in another way. Exactly the same amounts of conditional information are 
used by both. This has an interesting consequence for consistency problems in Probabilistic 
Logics. In section 4.6.3 a formula was produced for the calculation of consistency in an 
entailment problem: 
p(Ai) ý: (I - rR) 
for any rule of entailment involving n antecedents (Ai for i=1 to n), in a rule of entailment 
Alk... L, A,, =:: - D which has probability 7rn. 
Consider the example where we use the sets: {Aj, Al * BI shown in table 6.4 which 
has a probability model of. (p(AI) = 0.2, p(Al =ý- B) = 0.7, p(BI - A, ) = 0.4}. From 
Conditionals 11 obabilities Entailment 1 Entailment 2 
p(BIAI) 
p( I-A, ) 
0.7 
0.4 
p(Al B) - 
p(DI A, ) 
p(BIAI) 
p(- A, =: * B) 
Table GA: Swapping the Entailment Rule 
the consistency constraint, this rule cannot be fired. However, since all of the information is 
conditional probabil. ity information, the same information can be re-expressed: lp(- Al) = 
0.8, p(- Al * B) = 0.4, p(DIAI) = 0.2 }. and the mechanism of Probabilistic Logic can use 
this information to give the probabifity of B as: 0.2 + 0.7 * 0.2 = 0.34 (see section 4.4). 
The point is that the complete specification of conditional probabilities makes it possible 
to change the rule of entailment. This may be done by choosing one of the other context splits, 
making this the rule of inference, and forming the base set of antecedents as the corresponding 
truth values specified in the context split. If an inconsistency has been found for a particular 
ordering of the information, a new one might be found which renders the entailment consistent. 
An entailment is only truly inconsistent if there is no conditional probability p for which the 
probabilities of the antecedents in the context, as formed in the rule all are equal or greater to 
the value I-p. This is an expansion of Nilsson's probabilistic logic into the area of Bayesian 
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inference and, by the way, it provides a simple method of ensuring consistency in a Bayesian 
setup. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the effects of the extensions to Probabilistic Logic have been demonstrated 
and the probabilistic entailment has been compared with the Bayesian Inference mechanism. 
It has been shown that the logical nature of probabilistic entailment needs to be given a 
statistical context if consistent results are to be derived from within the Probabilistic Logic. 
This context is an identification of the probabilistic rule of inference with the conditional 
probability statement. Once this connection has been made, Probabilistic Logic can give the 
results with the same accuracy as Bayesian Inferencing with one major extension. 
When any or all of the antecedents attached to the rule of inference are uncertain, the 
apparatus of Probabilistic Logic plus the inference engine of the maximum entropy formalism 
make it possible to extract a probability distribution from the uncertainty that takes into 
account the nature of the uncertainty and which is the least commitment probability distri- 
bution based on that information. This process comes naturally to Probabilistic Logic and is 
a major extension to the Dayesian concept of reasoning with uncertainty. 
In the next three chapters the logical aspects of Probabilistic Logic are examined in their 
relatimship to Incidence Calculus and licuristic reasoning and control. 
102 
Chapter 7 
APPROXIMATION 
TECHNIQUES: INCIDENCE 
CALCULUS AS A 
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC 
7.1 Introduction 
The essence of Bundy's inciAnce calculus is that a sample space of points is chosen indepen- 
dently of the level of uncertainty of the sentences. In fact, although Incidence Calculus uses 
a set theoretic foundation, it is possible for two implementations to be perfectly correct, and 
to give different inference values. This is in contrast to the situation in Probabilistic Logic, 
where the number of points in the sample space is only known when the semantic tree is pro- 
duced. Three algorithms are presented which allow a complete implementation of Incidence 
Calculus within the framework of Probabilistic Logic. Ultimately, because Incidence Calculus 
is a weaker set-theoretic probabilistic logic, it can be useful in situations where a complete 
implementation of Nilsson's probabilistic logic is impossible or impractical. It can therefore 
be used as an approximation to Nilsson's probabilistic logic. 
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7.2 Incidence Calculus 
Assignment in Incidence Calculus is not done with reference to a Semantic Tree, as it is in 
Probabilistic Logic. Corlett and Todd took the problem of assignment, and suggested the 
use of Monte Carlo techniques to find legal incidence assignments for Incidence Calculus [22]. 
This gives rise to two problems. Firstly, the same information run on two different days 
can give different results. And, more importantly, the size of the incidence sets is arbitrarily 
chosen before the process begins. So that, Incidence Calculus can be wasteful of space when 
the set size is unnecessarily large, and it can force relationships between propositions when 
the set is too small. The latter of these two problems is one of the things Bundy wanted to 
remove when he proposed Incidence Calculus. 
The version of Incidence Calculus proposed here has neither of these problems. Two 
algorithms are proposed for incidence assignment, both of which will terminate. They are 
called into operation after the Semantic Tree has been generated, and now it is only the 
generation of the tree which is problematic. There is no problem in the Propositional Calculus, 
as the rule of resolution is sound and complete here [105]. However the first order Predicate 
Calculus is only semi-decidable [55]. A number of approximations are proposed to alleviate 
this situation. 
7.3 The Method of Reasoning 
The manner of reasoning is as follows. If a condition C is entailed from a set of data, whose 
truth is represented by predicate functions PI .. Pn, where n is the number of conditions 
involved In the entailment process, and each of these probabilities can be estimated; then the 
set is input as shown in table 7.1 where the bottom sentence in the table is the one whose 
probability value is to be estimated. 
Unless the expert connects predicates in one of the two manners listed below: 
1. By sonic entailed value being used in another reasoning process. 
2. By sonic predicates being dependent. 
10.1 
3(x, Pl(x)). 
3(x, Pn(x)). 
3(y, Pl(y)& ... &Pn(y)). V(Z, PI(Z)&... &p7l(z) 
3(u, C(u)). 
Table 7.1: Form of Probabilistic Entailments in Predicate Calculus 
then the reasoning processes are dealt with as independent. In fact, a system using these 
ideas would probably run best as a number of communicating sequential processes. This 
work suggests that not only is it crucial to keep the semantic tree as the basis for the startup 
procedures, but that, based on what the expert says, and the conditions which become pos- 
itively identified as true, (or false), as the reasoning process progresses, the semantic tree 
should be pruned and manipulated. The ultimate goal being to reduce the tree to the only 
possible worlds which are feasible for information given, and to distribute the given probabil- 
ities to each of these worlds in a controlled and mathematically sound manner. 
In the case of a predicate whose value is entailed, and which is used by another reasoning 
set; the user must wait until the producer has provided the answer. Communication between 
processes might hurry up, or slow down this process, depending on probability levels. How 
these processes run to alter the texture of W is covered below. 
Incidence Assignment and The Semantic Tree 
Before Incidence Assignment is attempted an interpretation table for the uncertain sentences 
is produced and the probability constraints on the possible worlds are recorded as in section 
4.5. Any solution to these equations, which assigns a non-negative probability to each possible 
world, will constitute a valid incidence assignment. 
The process for determination of incidences is then applied, and this consists of. 
1. Whenever a probability for a possible world appears in it's own probability constraint, 
remove it from all the other constraints (subtracting the probability from the constraint's 
probability) and declare it as a deduction. 
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2. If there are possible worlds on their own, call on the simplification algorithm to find 
intersections between the worlds. 
7.4 The Simplification Algorithm 
The basis for all of the following assignment algorithms is a simplification algorithm which 
has access to a procedure for finding minimal subsets. The motivation for this simplification 
'] are to be assigned probability routine is taken from the following premises. If [a,, a2, .... an 
P, then: 
1. the maximum probability for any of the worlds a, to an is P, 
2. the ininimum probability for any of the worlds al to a,, is 0. 
Therefore when all of the minimal subsets and associated probabilities are generated, as 
long as the assignments do not contradict these simple premises, the assignment will be 
consistent. Care must be taken to ensure that probabilities are only assigned from the smallest 
probabilities to the largest. The algorithm that ensures this is given below. 
1. Cive cacti world a unique label. 
2. For cacti proposition Pi, take the associated probability 7ri, and make two constraints 
thus. Sum the worlds tssociated with Pi to 7ri. Sum the rest of the worlds to (I - 7ri). 
3. Sort this set of constraints into ascending probabil. istic order. So that the first constraint 
in the list is the one with the smallest probabi1ity, and the last has the largest probabihty. 
4. Remove all subsets from supersets thus: If the worlds associated with proposition A are 
IVI, aiid the worlds associated with proposition C are IV2, then, if IVI E TV2, then make 
a new set of worlds IV3 to represent a new proposition D such that, 
p(D) = p(C) - p(A); 
IV3 = IV2\1, Vl 
5. Stop if there is an inconsistency detected. ie. a set of worlds getting two different 
probabilities attached. Or if a set of worlds is assigned a probability value less than 
zero. This is failure. 
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G. Stop if all worlds are assigned a positive probability value less than or equal to one. 
This is success. 
7. Sort them into increasing probability assignments again. These are our minimal rela, 
tionships. Stop when no more removals can be performed. Otherwise go back to step . 
3. 
7.5 Discussion of Simplification Algoritlim. 
This will generate more probabilistic constraints. However, it will always terminate, in one 
of two ways. Either, it will not be able to remove a subset froin a superset to provide a 
new proposition- in which case it terminates succesfully. Or, secondly, it will encounter an 
inconsistency. There are two forms of inconsistency. Either a set of worlds is produced twice, 
with different probability numbers. Or, to use the above example of getting proposition D 
from propositions C and A, 
p(A) > p(C) 
lit both of these cases, the offending results can be noted, and an explanation as to why 
the Inconsistency bas arisen may be offered. This form of inconsistency is easily fixed, and in 
the case of logical entailment using the rule of modus ponens, section 4.6.3 bas presented a 
simple method of ensuring that such inconsistencies never arise. 
7. G Assignment Algorithm 1 
The simplest approximation algorithm is the fol. lowing: 
1. Run the Si in pliri cation algoritlim. If there are no worlds yet to be assigned a probabil. ity, 
then a consistent assignment has been succesfully applied within the uncertainty space. 
2. Otherwise, take the first of the constraints Cl, such that, p(CI) = 7r,, Where length(CI) 
= L, and assign each of the worlds in C, a probabifity of r,, /L. 
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and again, this algorithm will not introduce inconsistencies when there is not a certain as- 
signment. 
7.7 Assignment Algorithm 2 
Without loss of generality assume that for random propositional sentences X and Y that the 
uncertainty of sentence X is represented by the possible worlds B, and the uncertainty of 
sentence Y is represented by the possible worlds A. Assume also p(X) is Xv and p(Y) is Yv. 
An estimate of AnD (the intersection of the sets A and B) is Xv * Yv. 
7.8 Justification for the Assignment Algorithms 
The simphrication algorithm produces groups of worlds which share common elements. For 
each member in the groups, the maximum probability value it may have is the minimum of 
the probabilities of the groups it appears in. A restriction on any assignment method then, 
is that a world may only be assigned a probabiNty value less than or equal to the smallest 
probability value of the minimal groups it appears in. 
In the case of algorithm 1, this condition will always apply when the group of worlds with 
the smallest probability is given an equal share of the probability of the group. 
Consider the case of a single shared world being assigned a probability value by algorithm 
2. Since, the combination will be between worlds whose probability must always be less 
than 1, if one of the groups being combined has the maximum possible value for the shared 
world, then an estimate for the probability of the shared worlds which is less than the world's 
maximum will be made. So, removing this world, and assigning the reduced probability value, 
does not cause inconsistency, since there is always a residual probability to be redistributed 
aniong the remaining worlds. 
If it is not possible, at some level, to use the compound event which shows the maximum 
possible value for that world, to remove it, then it will be possible at a later level. This 
is because, in this case, the world shares at least one common world in all it's compound 
events. And, these will be discovered when greater numbers of worlds are collected in the 
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form of intersections. So, the process starts again, looking for bigger intersections between 
compound events, and, when these intersections are found, new restrictions are imposed on the 
maximums. Inconsistency will only be seen when the sum of the maximums for a compound 
event is less than the actual probability assigned. 
One last point about inconsistency is that it is possible for a world to assume it's max- 
imurn possible value, (this happens when all the other worlds in the group which shows 
it's maximum possible value are false). So, in the case where the probability assigned to a 
world is less than the maximum allowed, the rest of the group should be able to redistribute 
the residual probability (maximum possible value - assigned value), between it's elements, 
since, consistently, the world assigned in question can range between probability zero, and 
it's maximum. 
The process will eventually terminate when there is an assignment for each world; or when 
there are two, mutually exclusive groups left, each assigned a positive value. In the latter 
case, these values can be equally divided between the worlds; since a good estimate on them 
is that they are equally likely. 
This assignment, when the sentence set is consistent, is a reasonable estimate. The expert 
now can be employed here to redistribute assignments within the relationships above, and 
this Is one way in which he/she can model the reasoning process to his/her knowledge. 
7.9 Sciiii-Dccidability and the Semantic Tree 
A major drawback to the use of exhaustive theorem. prover's to provide all of the possible 
worlds before the assignment process is applied, is the semi-decidable nature of predicate 
calculus. F'or example, a set of sentences for which at least one possible world will not stop 
generating new possibilities to test with the resolution principle is: 
Pl(cl) 
(V--). (I'i(x) * Pl(fl(x))) 
- (Pl(fl(fl(cl)))) 
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1. Since a vast proportion of the worlds can be dispensed with, because they will be shown 
to be inconsistent, perhaps worlds should be added from the most restrictive predicate 
equation in the initial set. This would mean that if we run out of space to represent the 
worlds, we would have done so in any reasonable mechanism for incidence assignment. 
Secondly, there may be a more efficient use of time by doing this. 
2. This would mean that the sentences would have to be pre-ordered before the tree gen- 
eration should be attempted, and that the semantic tree would be built up from small 
cliques. 
3. If we can order the sentences such that we can remove the ones which mutually recurse, 
we could make a partial semantic tree for the rest; which we could call the base. Maybe 
we could then have some higher level rules saying how we could add the recursive 
sentences in. We might involve the person with knowledge of the proof domain in 
telling us the semantics of the region. There is not have enough relevant information to 
deal adequately with the problem. 
The offending world in the above set of sentences is: 
111(cl) 
(V---)(Pi(-T) =*- Pi(fi(x))) 
... consistent clause set ... 
which produces: l', (ei), 111 (fi (ei», P, (fi (fi (ei»),... 
and so on witliout terminating. 
7.10 r-tiiictioiialityaiidtlicE-xpert 
We clearly need to know about the function fl. Asking the expert who provided the knowledge 
for such like Information inight be one way of dealing with the problem. Automaticany 
fl-igging such functions could be achieved in the Mowing ways: 
* Surrogate functions could be useful in such cases. For example for any function f, we 
can find another function g such that g C- f (g approximates f) under the Mowing 
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circumstances: 
I<i:: ý k) g'(x) = fi(x) 
where k is a preset constant defining the maximum depth of compatibility between the 
functions f and g. And also: 
(Vi. i > k) 9'(x) = -L (7.2) 
where -L represents failure of the function. Any possible world in which it is produced 
can be flagged and referred to the expert. Such approximations make the problem of 
generating the set of all possible worlds quite feasable, given that recursion is in fact 
limited on, aU computers to a maximum depth anyway. 
9 Another option might be to have distributed processes run for each of the possibilities, 
and say that a world is inconsistent until proven consistent. Bearing in mind that this 
theorem proving mechanism must be run before subjective probability estimates are 
applied. 
7.11 Conclusion 
Nilsson, in his initial paper suggested that it might be worthwhile to look for approximation 
techniques to solve the basic problem of inference in the Probabilistic Logic. Ile saw the 
biggest problem being the estimation of probabilities for entailed sentences when the dataset 
of sentences becomes too detailed. In his approximations he considered only matrix solutions 
to problems of inference, thereby restricting himself to points in the allowed range (collapsing 
Probabilistic Logic to a version of Incidence Calculus). 
This idea is pursued in this chapter and culminated in a complete implementation of 
Bundy's incidence calculus in Probabilistic Logic. The Semantic Tree has various properties 
when it is used to deal with rules. Proofs are provided on how to deal with inconsistency 
and tautology from within a rule. However, the process of semantic tree generation becomes 
a task in which various restrictions have to be made to the theorem proving process to force 
termination for all possible worlds; and the expert can be caUed in to adjudicate on possible 
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worlds which terminated without direct proof of true or false. 
Three algorithms which allow incidence assignment in incidence calculus have been intro- 
duced. The basis of these algorithms is a simplification strategy based on matrix manipulation 
techniques, and so the implementation will always discover if the subset we are concerned with 
can be generated from simple matrix manipulation methods on the rows and columns. Thus 
the reasoning process of Incidence Calculus can be standardised. 
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Chapter 8 
ENTROPY AND META LEVEL 
REASONING 
8.1 Introduction 
A real problem in expert system reasoning is "what to do when it is possible to expand more 
than one rule? ". Is there an intelligent, and computationally practicable method for choosing 
the next rule to expand? In this chapter the maximum entropy formalism in Probabilistic 
Logic is examined to determine when it can be used as a tool for meta-level reasoning. In 
this regard, entropy diagrams and an uncertainty measurement are introduced. A way of, 
iniplementing the linguistic hedges of Fuzzy Reasoning in the entropy mechanism is also 
introduced. 
8.2 The Complexity of the Large Database 
When a large number of rules are to be coordinated in a database various procedural problems 
arise which are in the domains of administration and control. Rule saturation is a key cause 
of complexity in a knowledge base. Alternative proposals for dealing with the problem are: 
1. Imposing an ordering on the rules. The situation arises that we need a strategy for 
choosing what to do next from what has been done before. Easily implemented ap- 
proaches are breadth-first, or deptli-first searches through the knowledge base. Both of 
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these approaches are static techniques, whose merits are discussed in [881. A problem 
with these approaches is the firing of many irrelevant rules, which cause confusion in 
the diagnostic process, and make the selection of further rules for firing more and more 
difficult. 
2. Employing Aleta-Level Reasoning. The problems faced are that the consultation process 
is usually creative on the part of the consultant, and, that speed is an important factor in 
the process. Meta-Level Reasoning is a process which purports to offer a way of judging 
the information content of the present diagnostic scenario with enough accuracy as to 
allow the next stage in the diagnostic process to be arrived at from rational calculations. 
A human expert dealing with uncertainty in a diagnostic session is able to assimilate the 
information at hand to limit the uncertainty in order to best proceed with the diagnostic 
procedure. This requirement of a human expert is the ability to summarise the current 
situation and make a rational decision as to how to proceed. Meta-Level Reasoning is used 
to perform this operation in an automatic system. 
Entropy is already widely used in the field of Information Theory [114] as an indicator 
of the information content in a message. In the next sections the relationship between the 
probabil. ities of the antecedents, and the entropy of a rule waiting to be fired is explored. 
The intention is to find the best way to minimise the uncertainty in the knowledge base, and 
thereby to efficiently discover the strongest conclusion attainable from the evidence. 
8.3 Entropy as a Tool to Aid Meta-Level Reasoning 
The quick assignment algorithms introduced in chapter 5, put us in a position where it is 
possible to do some pre-processing in order to see which of a number of rules it would be most 
appropriate to fire next in a diagnostic session. Ultimately, we would like to have a system 
which implemented Aleta-Level Reasoning on the current state of the reasoning task. That 
is, at any moment when there is a lull in the reasoning procedure, we should like to take a 
snapshot of the current position, and decide from this what would be the most fruitful course 
of action to pursue. 
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In section 3.8 it is shown that as the quality of information pertaining to an uncertain 
situation increases, so the entropy of the resultant probability distribution decreases. That is, 
as the uncertainty decreases the uncertainty space develops structure, (or equivalently, some 
of the possible worlds begin to look more likely than others). In chapter 5 expressions are 
derived for the three interesting probability regions of a logical sentence which have an affect 
on the entropy of the distribution. They are: 
p(Ai) <I- rn (8.1) 
7rn < p(Ai) <1_ 
7rR 
(8.2) 
2 
1- fR- < p(Ai) <1 (8.3) 2 
where in region 8.1, the probability of the antecedent proposition renders the application of 
the entailment rule logically inconsistent. In region 8.2, the probability of the antecedent has 
a debiliting effect on that of the conclusion (ai < 1), and in region 8.3, the probability of 
the antecedent has a positive effect on that of the conclusion. We shall focus on the sections 
shown in 8.2 and 8.3. 
NVe expect that for any assignment of probability to antecedents and rule the entropy of 
the maximum entropy distribution will lie between clearly dis ti nguish able bounds. This can 
be tested since it is possible to evaluate the entropy of any probability distribution using the 
expression: 
n 
Entropy Epilogpi. (8.4) 
i=l 
We shall use a structured assignment of probability to the antecedents, and plot the en- 
tropy of the maximum entropy distribution for each assignment on a graph of entropy versus 
probabiEty assignment. In the entropy calculations 2 is used as the logbase. 
8.4 Entropy Diagrams 
To examine the relationship between entropy and the probability of antecedents and rules, 
consider the exanipl. e of a rule with four antecedents, (AI&A2&A3&A4 =ý- B), whose proba- 
115 
bility is 0.72. The change of entropy as the antecedent probabilities are reduced is plotted in 
figure 8.1 using the following procedure: 
1. Assign all of the antecedents a probability of one. 
2. Let x= 
3. Assign y the value of the entropy value of the resultant maximum entropy distribution. 
Plot the point (xy) on the entropy diagram. 
4. Make antecedent I the current antecedent. 
5. If the probability of the current antecedent can be reduced by a preset amount, (in this 
case 0.025), and still render the antecedent in region 2 or region 3 then, reduce the 
probability by this amount. Increase the x-coordinate by 1. Assign y the value of the 
entropy value of the resultant maximum entropy distribution. Plot the point (x, y) on 
the entropy diagram. 
6. When another subtraction of the set amount would create an inconsistent entailment 
process the current antecedent is kept at its minimum. 
7. If antecedent i is the current antecedent then update i such that: 
if i=n, i: = 1; if i<n, i: = i+ 1 
and inake antecedent i the next current antecedent. 
8. If the current antecedent is at its minimum, then stop; otherwise return to step 5. 
In this ordered way the process plots out the change of entropy of the maximum entropy 
distribution for all the possible probability values of the antecedents. 
In the entropy diagram of figure 8.1 the probabilities of antecedents are-decreased in 
sequence as explained above. That is, each probability is decreased, the entropy of the 
distribution Is plotted, and the list of antecedents is rotated. This diagram shows the two 
points of minimum entropy (when all probabilities are 1, or 1- 7rR respectively- both these 
fixed points corresponding to minimum entropy of 0.59). The maximum entropy point is 
when all probabilities have a probability Of 1- TR/2, giving maximum entropy of 2.59. 
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Figure 8.1: Four Antecedent Changes In Entropy 
8.5 Explaining The Shape of The Entropy Diagram 
8.5.1 Maximum Possible Entropy 
In chapter 3 (section 3.8) it was shown that the maximum entropy possible for a set of 
uncertain sentences is when each of the associated possible worlds are assigned the same 
probability value. So for n possible worlds which span the probability space each world is 
assigned a probability of I/n. 
For a rule of inference whose probability is irR applied over n antecedents there are 2" +1 
possible worlds (section 4.6). Of these, one world represents the case where all antecedents are 
true and the rule false. This world is immediately assigned a value 1- rn, leaving 21, possible 
worlds which suin to the probability 7rR. The maximum possible dispersion of probability is 
to give each of these worlds the probability 7r,. /211. Since each antecedent is true in exactly 
half of these worlds the probability to be assigned to each antecedent is 7rR12. Including 
the probability of the other world (with the rule false) in which all antecedents are true, the 
probability of each antecedent is therefore: 
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a. ww ow I" 
ZR 
-7 + (1 - 7rR) =1- 
IR- (8.5) 
which is the point as shown in equation 8.2, and the turning point in figure 8.1. 
In summary, the calculation of the maximum possible entropy for a rule of inference 7rR 
is therefore: 
7rR). Iog(l - 7rR) +2n. 
7rR. log 7rR ý -n . 2n 
7rR)-109(1 - 7rR) + 7rR-IOq 
WR (8.6) 
2n 
The terms are: the probability calculation related to the rules uncertainty; and the 2n prob- 
ability calculations for each possible world with the rule of inference true. This is a straight- 
forward calculation which can be evaluated at any time: all that is required is the strength 
of the rule and the number of antecedents which will be involved. 
8.5.2 Minimum Possible Entropy 
when all of the antecedents are true there are only two possible worlds: one with all an- 
tecedents true and the rule true; the other with all antecedents true and the rule false. This 
corresponds to the uncertainty in the rule (probability 7rn). The entropy of this distribution 
is then: -(7rn. 1o_q(7rR) + (1 - 7rR). Iog(l - 7rR)) 
8.6 Maximum Entropy and Fuzzy Logic 
These diagrams will be of particular interest to the proponents of the linguistic hedges of 
Fuzzy Logic [133,108,102]. Consider the example of a rule with four antecedents. If there 
are varying degrees of uncertainty on the four antecedents, the Fuzzy-and rule is to assign 
the value of least certainty to the conjunction of the uncertainties (section 3.4). 
Alternatively, we could project the level of positive or negative influence, guided by the use 
of linguistic hedges, onto the correct part of the entropy curve, and read off the appropriate 
entropy probability value, which could then be reworked into a linguistic hedge. The entropy 
diagram of figure 8.1 shows how the uncertainty in a probability distribution can be related 
to entropy. 
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Ara 
Certainty Factor 
Instead of using a numerical formalism for the x-coordinate of this diagram, figure 8.2 
shows how a linguistic hedge could be used directly to model the uncertainty. A system of 
Probabilistic Logic could use "certainty factors" (c. L section 3.5) which projected a num- 
ber in the region [-x, x] onto the linguistic hedge "uncertainty" of figure 8.2 where 0 (the 
point of maximum entropy), -x is false, +x is true (the points of minimum entropy). For 
values between 0 and x (or -x) an interpolation can be made on the x-axis, the probability 
distribution chosen from the y-axis and a resultant uncertainty produced. 
Probability itself could be modelled as a linguistic hedge. Consider figure 8.3 where the 
curves shown model the linguistic hedges {definitely not (A), very unlikely (B), unlikely 
(C), improbable (D), possible (E), likely (F), very likely (G), definitely (11)) on a scale of 
probability (0-1). On answering a question a user may be offered each of these linguistic 
hedges. If the user wants to further quantify their uncertainty, a certainty factor could be 
used with any of these hedges as explained above, and the required probability read off the 
x-axis directly. 
The probability (linguistic hedge) of the conclusion can be calculated by using conditional 
probabilities attached to possible worlds or alternatively, heuristic measures [66,65]. The 
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result of combining these uncertainties with the uncertainty of the rule of inference could 
produce a maximum entropy probability distribution from which can be recovered: 
1. The most probable world 
2. The certainty of the distribution 
3. The probability (linguistic hedge) attached to the conclusion 
8.7 Meta Level Inferencing - 
This information can be used in Meta-Level reasoning if, when a rule is ready to be fired, 
(that is, the antecedent probabilities are all available, and all consistent with the strength 
of the rule), the entropy of the situation is recorded. Since, the higher the entropy of a rule 
situation, the more uncertain we are about the state of the real world from this rule, the rules 
to be expanded should be chosen on the basis of increasing entropy. In this way, the most 
positive statements, (either in terms of truth or falsity), are uncovered first. 
120 
8.7.1 A Function Describing Specificity of Probabilistic Rules 
Using this information, and the fact that minimum entropy means maximum speciricity in the 
probability distribution, a function returning the usefulness of a particular rule in reducing 
the uncertainty of a reasoning situation can be found. 
From consideration of the cases for minimum possible entropy and maximum possible 
entropy both equations use the probability of the rule of inference: 7rn. The probability of 
the rule is an important factor in the entailment. It is the means of producing an uncertain 
deduction in Probabilistic Logic, and when coupled with the maximum entropy formalism 
the strength of the antecedent probabilities only have a relative meaning with respect to the 
strength of the rule. 
8.8 A Certainty Function 
A simple certainty function which places the specificity of the probability distribution in a 
scale between zero and one is: 
specif icity(Rule) = 
Ent - Alinpossent (8.7) 
Maxpossent - Alinpossent 
where Ent is the entropy of the maximum entropy distribution with the probability constraints 
proposed in the problem, Minpossent and Maxpossent are the minimum possible entropy and 
the maximum possible entropy of the rule with the number of antecedents it has. 
Using this function, the specificity of the first five rules are shown in table 8.1. The results 
suggest a specificity ordering of. R2, R4, Rl, R3, R5. The greater the uncertainty in the 
Rl I 
OR2 OR3 
It4l I R5 
0.750 . 592 
1 
. 760 
1 
0.60 0.86 
Table 8.1: Specificity of Probability Distributions 
entailment procedure the closer the specificity is to 1. So a way to choose the next rule 
for expansion is to evaluate the specificity function for each entailment rule it is possible to 
expand and then choose the entailment rule which has the smallest specificity number. 
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This behaviour is consistent with the use of entropy as a measure of information [1141, 
and in this form it can be used to quantify the uncertainty which is inherent in a set of 
antecedents and a rule when each has a probability attached. What comes out immediately 
from this investigation is the dominant influence which the strength of probability attached 
to the rule has over the shape of the entropy diagrams. 
8.9 An Example of Meta Level Reasoning 
A, A2 I A3 I A4 I As I A6 I A7 I A8 I Ag I Alo 
0.83 
1 
0.57 0.91 0.78 0.45 0.95 0.9 0.8 0.6 0 
ý9 
Table 8.2: Ten Predicates and their Uncertainties 
These diagrams provide us with a way of using the experts knowledge without necessarily 
resorting to numerical probabilities. Consider the following example, where there are ten 
predicates, labelled A, to Ajo with a level of uncertaintY attached as show in table 8.2. 
Consider also that the rules which can be fired from this information are as given in table 
8.3. In this table the probability of the rule is shown in column one, the rules are shown in 
column 2 and columns 3 and 4 show the minimum possible entropy distribution for the rule 
and the maximum possible entropy distribution respectively (see section 8.5). 
Since there are probabilities for the antecedents of the first five rules these are in a state 
to be fired. The last three rules cannot yet be fired: they all depend on outcomes from Rl to 
R5. When the maximum entropy distribution is calculated for R1 to R5 the entropy values 
Prob Rule Minent Maxent 
0.8 Rl: Al&A2&A3 B1 0.5 2.18 
0.6 R2: A4&A5&A6 B2 0.67 1.82 
0.7 R3: A7&A8&Ag&Alo B3 0.61 2.44 
0.9 R4: AI&Ajo B4 0.33 1.57 
0.9 R5: A5&A8 B5 0.33 1.57 
0.8 R6: B1&A7 B6 0.5 1.61 
0.7 R7: B4&A4 B7 0.61 1.58 
0.8 R8: B3&B4 B8 1 0.5 1.61 
Table 8.3: Rules over the Ten Predicates 
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returned are: 1.75,1.41,2.08,1.08 and 1.4 respectively. However, a more interesting question 
would be: how specific is this answer? That is, how far is it from the simple case where all of 
the possible worlds are assigned the same probability? 
8.9.1 An Examination of Specificity 
To answer these questions we need to see the dispersion of probability amongst the possible 
worlds which has been assigned by the maximum entropy formalism. The probability dia- 
grams (figures 8.4 to 8.8) are for the first five rules of inference shown in table 8.3. In these 
diagrams the probability attached to each possible world is plotted. The probabilities (see 
appendix D for the actual maximum entropy probabilities used) are arranged in decreasing 
size so that distributions can be compared. 
In each diagram the line denoting the maximum possible entropy distribution is also 
drawn. This shows the distribution where each of the possible worlds could be assigned the 
same probability (rR/2n), and is included to show how the probability constraints imposed by 
the probabilities of the antecedents have caused the maximum entropy distribution to specify 
most likely possible worlds. 
It can be seen from these diagrams what is meant by specificity. The position of no 
information is shown by the maximum possible entropy line and so the distribution whose 
probability peaks sharply for a small number of possible worlds and drops away sharply for 
the all the others is the one we wish to choose as the next rule to apply in the knowledge 
base. 
Of special interest is the closeness of certain worlds to the point of maximum ignorancein 
the distribution. The most obviously skew distributions are in figures 8.5 and 8.7 and it 
is interesting to note the preference of rule 2 for expansion over rule 4. This is because in 
figure 8.7 the second most probable world was not forced to move very far from its point of 
maximum ignorance; wheras in figure 8.5 all of the possible worlds have been forced to move 
away from this point of maximum ignorance. 
The composite picture of all these distributions overlaid is shown in figure 8.9. 
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8.10 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the problem of how to deal with large knowledge bases of many 
facts and rules. Ultimately, the complexity problem will saturate any implementation of 
Probabilistic Logic which does not employ some simplification strategies. 
With this problem in mind, I have proposed an extended role for the maximum entropy 
formalism: namely, as a tool to aid meta-level reasoning. This new role for the maximum en- 
tropy formalism allows rules to be chosen for expansion on the basis of the information content 
in the probability of the rule and the probabilities of it's associated antecedent probabilities. 
The entropy diagrams which have been introduced in this chapter also show how Fuzzy 
Logic's linguistic hedges can succesfully be embedded in Probabilistic Logic. 
124 
Pmbakliv 
Figure 8.4: Probability Dispersion: Rl 
Pmbablv 
Figure 8.5: Probability Dispersion: R2 
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Chapter 9 
HEURISTICS IN 
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC 
9.1 Introduction 
A way of dealing with uncertainty, when not enough precise information is available, is to use 
heuristic measures. It is said that Archimedes was the inspiration for the word "heuristic" 
when in his bathtub he solved a problem pertaining to the propensity of some objects to 
float while others sink. It suddenly occurred to him that if the weight of the body in the 
water was heavier than the weight of water it displaced, that it would sink, and he exclaimed 
"Heureka! ". 
Heuristics can be coded in rules in a knowledge base, or can be coded into the ways 
uncertainty is stored and manipulated by the reasoning mechanism. These measures replace 
strict probability measures, trying to approximate them. As knowledge in an area increases 
these measures are replaced by probability measures; but heuristic measures are central to 
expert system reasoning where information is generally only undergoing development. In this 
chapter, a group of heuristics is presented which can be made available to the knowledge 
engineer when the structure of the probabilistic knowledge available is under-constrained. 
A way of evaluating selected possible worlds is presented which allows the uncertainty 
bounds of a problem to be effectively narrowed without the evaluation of many, essentially 
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non-informative, possible worlds. Finally, the notion of rule interleaving is examined, this 
involves combining together results from different rules which share antecedents and/or con- 
clusions. 
9.2 Using Context Splits 
If the expert provides all of the context splits, Probabilistic Logic is now able to produce point 
probabilities from the probabilistic entailment. If the expert wishes to specify all of these for 
a rule of the form Al&... &A,, #. B, the system requires: 
1. the probabilistic strength of the rule p(AI& &A, 
2.21 -1 context splits. 
As the number n increases, providing reliable context splits will become impracticable. 
This section suggests two heuristic mechanisms for dealing with this problem. 
9.2.1 Heuristic 1: The Equal Split 
If it is assumed that the probability of B and -B is the same in each split world, then the 
probability of the conclusion is given by: 
1 
p(B) = p(Aj,..., A,,, Aj&... &A,, =ý-B)+ý OrR - p(Al, ---i Ang Al&---&An #' 
B)) 
= 112(rR+p(A,,..., A,,, Al&... &A,, =:,. B)) 
n 
1/2(rR + a, aRIJ ai) 
i=l 
Table 9.1 gives the times for this algorithm. Again, as in section 5.4, the left hand column 
gives the number of antecedents, and the right hand column reports the amount of cpu seconds 
needed to reach the final result. 
These times compare very favourably with those shown in table 5.4. 
f 
9.2.2 Heuristic 2: Contextual Weights 
Another way of dealing with the problem would be to associate a contextual weight wi with 
each of the antecedent propositions Ai in the rule Al&... &A,, #-B, such that 
n 
Ewi 
i=l 
(9.2) 
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Antecedents Time (cpu secs) 
1. 0.017 
5. 0.017 
10. 0.033 
15. 0.044 
20. 0.062 
Table 9.1: Times for Rapid Calculation of Factors 
and the weight wi, given to proposition Ai, is a descriptor of how important the truth of 
proposition Ai is to the entailment of the conclusion. So that, in a possible world where the 
rule is -true, the size of the context split is determined by adding together the weights of all the 
propositions which are true in that world. This reduces the amount of information expected 
from the expert to the strength of the rule, and n contextual weights. 
Assigning Contextual Weights 
One way of assigning contextual weights would be to commit a weight of 1/n to each of the 
antecedent sentences in the rule. e. g. for the case of n=3, the contextual weight to each 
sentence is 1/3, and for the tree: 
Sentence a b C d e, f g h i 
- A, 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 T 
A2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
A3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
A, &A2&A3 B 1 0 1 1 A 1 1 1 
B x x x x x x x x x 
context split: 1 0 0 1/3 1/3 2/3' 1/3 2/3 2/3 
Table 9.2: Entailment Using Contextual Weights 
p(B) = a+ 
1 (d+ e+ g) + 
2(f 
+ h+ i) 
33 
For completeness, a final table of cpu times is given for this method of assigning weights. 
Another method is to get the expert to assign contextual weights to each of the proposi- 
tions A, to A,,. So, for example, in the rule given, the expert may assign weights: (Al = 0.5, 
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Antecedents Time (cpu secs) 
1. 0.017 
5. 0.100 
10. 0.201 
15. 9.9 
20. 16.17 
Table 9.3: Speed of Results Using Weights 
A2 = 0.3, A3 = 0.2), and with reference to table 9.2 
p(B) =a+0.2d + 0.3e + 0.5f + 0.5g + 0.7h + 0.8i (9.3) 
This system of Probabilistic Logic gives the expert all the necessary tools to fully design 
a subjective probability distribution which fully describes their level of expertise. The above 
methods were used succesfuUy in the expert system described in [68] and chapter 10. 
9.3 A Comparison of Results 
The two automatic methods for assigning the context split: the equal split, and the contextual 
weight of 1/n can be compared. Consider the example of the ten antecedents and five rules 
of section 8.9. The maximum entropy distribution is calculated for each of the problems, and 
then the heuristic splits are applied to each world. 
Consider the first rule Al&A2&A3 #- B, whose antecedents have probabilities 0.83,0.57 
and 0.91 respectively. The probability of the rule is 0.8. The maximum entropy formalism 
assigns a probability distribution to the constraints as shown in column 3 of table 9.4. This 
table also shows how the half-split and n-split are made from the distribution. 
From these results the resultant probability of the conclusion (in this case BI) is 0.57 for 
the nsplit, and 0.5293 for the half split. Of particular interest as regards a comparison of the 
two are the foHowing points: 
e N-split gives no probability to the conclusion in the world where all of the antecedents 
are false. Half split gives a half split. 
e As the probability of the rule approaches 1, the half split gives a probability close to 
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World Column ME Probability Half Split N Split 
1: [0,0,0] 0.01028 0.00514 0 
2: [0,0,1] 0.081095 0.0405 0.027032 
3: [0,1,0] 0.0088453 0.0044 0.0029,184 
4: [0,1,1] 0.06978 0.03489 0.04652 
5: [1,0,0] 0.038095 0.01905 0.012698 
6: [1,0,1] 0.30053 0.150265 0.20035 
7: [1,1,0] 0.03278 0.01639 0.021853 
8: 1 [1,1,1] 1 0.25859 0.25859 0.25859 
Table 9.4: An Example: Possible Worlds and Heuristic Splits 
0.5 (as discussed in section 4.3). 
For completeness, the heuristic splits for all of the rules of section 8.9 is given in appendix 
D. 
9.4 Entropy as a Tool to Narrow the Bounds of Entailment 
Results 
With this information we are in a position to deal with situations where perhaps there are 
too many possible worlds to evaluate all of them; or perhaps only a small number of possible 
worlds need be evaluated before the probability bounds of an entailment process fall within 
a narrow band of uncertainty. 
As shown in chapter 5, the aggregate factors for an entailment problem can be calculated 
immediately. This calculation is only possible if the probabilities Of each of the antecedent 
probabilities are above a certain threshold limit which is imposed by the strength of the 
probability of the rules of inference. We could use knowledge of the other two regions, that is, 
where the factors are consistent, but are either supportive or inhibitive to the probability of a 
, possible world. 
An inhibitive factor is one which is less than 1, and will therefore reduce the 
probability of any possible world in which it is applied; and a supportive factor will increase 
the standing of the probability of a possible world. 
Once the aggregate factors are calculated, they can be ordered in increasing order, since 
now they represent the presence of a world as well as give an indicator as to how the sentence 
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being true in the world alters its probability. Those factors greater than 1 can be skimmed 
off from the rest. In this way we can separate the good influences from the very bad, and 
thus narrow the bounds by working out the probabilities of each of these possible worlds. 
Since for each of the resultant worlds we have a context split (cs) either provided manually 
by the expert, or heuristically by the system, it is possible to provide accurate probability 
bounds quickly, using the algorithm in chapter 4, and choosing the information from the 
aggregate factors which will make the biggest impact on the bounds. For example consider 
the sentence set I Al, A2, A3, A4, A5, Al&A2&A3&A4&A5 =: ý- B} whose probabilities 
are: 10.99,0.06,0.98,0.96,0.92,0.95 }. , 
From equation 4.13 the bounds are shown to be 0 and 0.95, thus giving a 95% uncertainty 
in the result. The calculation of two possible worlds, that is, where all the antecedents are 
true and rule true, and all where all the antecedents true except A2 and the rule are true, 
gives probabilities of 0.01 and 0.8 respectively. Using this information, and the context split 
information on the latter world, the bounds become narrowed to: 
BOUNDS = 0.01 + es * 0.8 + [0,0.141 (9.4) 
That is, the uncertainty is now reduced to 14% with two calculations from a possible 32; and 
we have the added advantage of using conditional probabilities in the calculation. The interest 
of this is that if A2 is important to the entailment, the context split (cs) will be very low; 
whereas, if it is not so important, the split on this world may well be high. It is interesting 
to note, that for this example, Nilsson would give a result of 0.47925, which is almost exactly 
halfway between the points 0 and 0.95. This point is discussed further in section 10.5. 
9.5 Information Interleaving in the Knowledge Base 
I have presented a completely sound method of providing the maximum entropy result from 
a probabilistic rule. of inference, within the constraints of consistency. All of these rules may 
exist in a database independently of each other and be called on only when needed. One final 
problem that'arises is bow to combine the results of two reasoning processes, both of which 
it is consistent to fire, and both of which entail the same conclusion? One solution would 
134 
Form Simplification Probability 
Al&A2 =:,. Z 
A3&A4*Z 
- AIV - A2 vB 
-A3V-A4VB 
7rj 
72 
; Table 9.5: A Method of Combining Rules 
be to join the two rules together logically, and join the two probabilities using the maximum 
entropy principle. We join them using the logical or operator, since the conclusion can be 
entailed from either of the rules. 
If the only'shared variable in' a rule is the conclusion, then the logical connection using 
the or-rule means collecting together all the antecedents on the joined with the and-rule. 
And using the independence assumption which is built into maximum entropy to combine the 
probabifities. 
Example: Combining Two Rules, Four Antecedents 
The rules are shown in table 9.5. 
Logical connection of the two rules using the or-operator gives: 
, Al V- A2 V- A3 V- A4 vB= Al&A2&A3&A4 =>, B. (9.5) 
And the probability of the new rule is 7rl + 7r2 - 7rl * 72- 
A further problem occurs when an antecedent proposition becomes true, i. e. the strength 
of the probability becomes 1. In this case the rule can be collapsed (using the resolution 
principle [105,14]) to an entailment involving each of the antecedents except the tautological 
one. The antecedent proposition is then subsumed into the tautology, and instead of the 
tautology having no weight in calculating the probability of the conclusion, it's weight is now 
increased by the weight of the tautological antecedent. This process allows the reduction of 
the rule, and the preservation of the solution methods described above. 
9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the problem of knowledge management which faces all probabilistic 
logics, when they must deal with large knowledge bases of many facts and rules. Ultimately, 
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the complexity problem will saturate any implementation of Probabilistic Logic which does not 
employ some simplification strategies. This problem is inherent in the nature of uncertainty 
management where each possible world is modelled, and assigned a probability value from 
consideration of an appropriate probability model, (e. g. Bayesian Inference). I have examined 
the nature of the complexity problems and find that the new system of Probabilistic Logic 
proposed in this thesis offers significant advantages over that originally proposed by Nilsson. 
I have considered the measured use of heuristics in Probabilistic Logic. As with all heuris- 
tics, these are employed when there is a serious deficiency of reliable knowledge, or a major 
complexity problem which must be simplified. And, as with all heuristics, these mechanisms 
are designed upon semantic considerations of the problem domain area. 
The next chapter, describes how these ideas have been reallsed in an expert system de- 
signed to solve a formidable recognition-problem in the area of two dimensional vision. 
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Chapter 10 
AN APPLICATION OF 
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC IN 
TWO DIMENSIONAL VISION 1 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to a description of a vision expert system which was implemented 
using the enhanced Probabilistic Logic developed in chapters 4 and 5; and the heuristic 
methods introduced in chapter 8. 
The problem tackled was to match (imperfect) scene reconstructions against a known 
catalogue of possible objects and to report the certainty of matches. Very simple heuristics 
were used for the strength of the rule, and for the context splits attached to each possible 
world. The results of this work compare very favourably with alternative approaches examined 
by Wallace and McAndrew [81,82,128]. 
'The work reported in this chapter was done in collaboration with A. M. Wallace and P. McAndrew of 
Ileriot-Watt University's Computer Science Vision Group. 
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10.2 Segmentation and Feature Recognition ' 
The original scenes are captured as 256x256 pixel images with 256 grey levels using a video 
digitiser. These are then processed using a conventional edge detector which converts each 
pixel to give a local edge strength and direction. These sets of edge points are then used in a 
Hough transformation [8,81] to detect significant alignments which indicate the presence of 
the particular feature being sought. The types of features sought can be complex shapes or 
more basic structures such as circular arcs or straight lines. For simplicity the case where all 
the features are straight lines is discussed here, though other features can be handled in an 
almost identical manner. 
Following the segmentation process each straight line in the scene is described in terms 
of its start and end positions, length and orientation. When the object is being viewed it is 
assumed that the scale of the object is unchanged but that any position and orientation is 
possible (this corresponds to the case of components being viewed from a fixed camera above 
a conveyor belt). In isolation the parameters of each segmented feature will not necessarily 
correspond to the stored parameters in the model. However it is possible to construct relations 
by considering the features in pairs which will be fairly stable under changes caused by 
different viewing positions. By forming such relations for both the models in the database 
and for the scene it is poss ible to come up with sets which can be compared meaningfully for 
agreements. 
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Figure 10.1: Parameters in the Pairwise Relations 
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The translation and rotation invariant parameters which are constructed are the angle 
formed at the intersection of the continued lines, 0, the distance between the mid-points of 
the lines, d, and the normal distances from those points to the opposite line, nj and n2. These 
parameters are illustrated in figure 10.1. This was discussed fully in [81], with the exception 
that in this case both normal distances are used. This choice of parameters is not the only one 
possible but does carry certain advantages particularly in the context of extension to other 
basic features. The angle between the lines is a particularly stable factor in the automatic, 
segmentation of straight lines; this fact is used in the matching strategy of the expert system. 
Both the normal distance and the distance between points can also be found in the case where 
it is not possible to associate a direction with one of the features, that is where one of the 
features is a point alone. 
These coordinates of the form (d, nj, n2,0) will be considered as points in dntheta 
space. This space is the set of all possible (d, nI, n2,0) relationships which exist between 
any two lines in a picture. A match between a scene and a model will be made by comparing 
the dniheta points of the segmented scene with those of the stored models in an attempt to 
locate higher level relationships between the points which indicate a particular object being 
present. The difference in overall match between relations is then used within the reasoning 
process to decide the quality of a possible match. 
10.3 Rule Heuristic 
The heuristic is simply that when we have a rule of the form: A, & ... &A,, #- B, and a world 
in which the conclusion can be either true or false, then the context split for that world is: 
t/n, whbre t is the number of antecedents which are true in the world. The'final expression 
for the probability of B is then: 
P(B) = 
aaR 
ai 
n 
as explained in section 9.2.2. 
n 
aiaj) ++n Il aj) 
j=l 
This approach avoids the need to specify a large number of weightings explicitly but 
still requires the summation of the factors from each of the possible worlds. If a simpler 
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assumption is made, that in each uncertain world the proposition is equally likely to be true 
or false a single expression for the probability of B can be derived. Under this assumption 
the probability of the proposition is given by: 
1n 
P(B) 
2 
(IrR + aaRlIai) 
j=l 
(10.2) 
as explained in section 9.2.1. In this case the situation is equivalent to that described by 
Nilsson where the equal split is imposed on each uncertain possible world. The approach used 
allows calculation of this figure in a simple manner but also permits additional flexibility to 
specify the heuristic context split (t/n) when this assumption is no longer realistic. 
10.4 Applying Probabilistic Reasoning in a Visual Context 
Considering the visual context, we may express 
1. The set of antecedents, A,,..., An representing the propositions that a degree of simi- 
larity has been discovered between scene and model features. Normally this is based 
on a pairwise dntheta relation in the scene and a pairwise relation in a model. These 
propositions may be assigned a probabilistic value based on the similarity of the dntheta 
parameters. 
2. B is the proposition that the model is present in the scene. Each rule, for example 
A, #- B or A, & ... &A,, * B, has a probabilistic strength attached which is calculated 
in proportion to the importance of the constituent pairwise (or single) features. 
The maximum entropy method combines these to produce the probabilistic strength of B. 
If the approach is subject to no search constraints, the matching problem is combinatorially 
explosive. Therefore it is necessary to introduce additional constraints to obtain a workable 
system. 
In order to illustrate the technique, consider the limited number of object models shown 
in figure 10.2, and the corresponding idealised scene of figure 10.3, which has been used [128]. 
The relations detected in figure 10.3 are the pieces of evidence and the goal is to match the 
models of figure 10.2 against the scene data. 
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Figure 10.2: Models - Triangle, Pentagon and Quadrilateral 
To create the model database, all the pairwise dntheta relations for each of the possible 
models are derived and stored [128]. This can be rapidly accessed during the subsequent 
scene interpretation phase. In this case, there are three relations for the triangle, ten for 
the pentagon and six for the quadrilateral. To analyse the scene, pairwise dntheta relations 
for the scene are derived. When features in the scene are matched to features in the model, 
propositions are formed stating that the same pairwise relation holds between two features 
in the scene as between the two corresponding features in the model. 
In practice, there are many ways to match the scene features to the features of the various 
models. For each possible match of scene features to model features an interpretation table 
can be constructed containing a number of antecedent proposition A,,..., A,, and a rule of 
inference. This information, together with the subjective probabilities, forms the base set for 
the entailment of B (see sections 3.12 and 4.2), the proposition that the features chosen from 
the scene do bear the same relationship to each other as the features chosen from the model. 
The method of entailment is as follows: 
1. Chose features to match from the scene with those in a model. 
2. Assign probabilistic values to A,,..., A,, dependent on the match between dntheta pa- 
rameters. 
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Figure 10.3: Test Scene 
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3. Assign a probabilistic value to the rule of entailment dependent on the strength of the 
inference. 
4. Derive probability assignments for the possible worlds consistent with the sentence 
probabilities. 
5. Each of these worlds provides a context in which to test the consistency of B. Deduce 
the entailed probability of B as the sum of the probabilities of all the worlds in which 
it is true. 
Once a selection of m feature matches have been made, there will be n= m(M - 1)/2 
relations which can be constructed. The match between the relations formed in the scene 
with those in the model produce the n antecedent propositions A,,..., AnI to which is added 
the rule A, & ... &An :*B resulting in an interpretation table with n+1 rows for which 
probabilities must be assigned. 
The necessary values for the probabilities of the antecedents and rules may be determined 
heuristically. This is in contrast to the use of Bayesian techniques as applied in [128] where a 
predefined database is used together with assumptions about the probability of the occurrence 
of false and missing features to find values for conditional probabilities such as P(BIA, ). For 
the antecedent propositions, Al,..., A,,, a linear weighting function based on the similarity of 
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the dntheta parameters is used such that a weighting of 1.0 corresponds to an exact match, 
and a weighting of 6.0 corresponds to a deviation greater than 20 degrees in angle, and of 
40% in the 3 length parameters. These heuristic weighting functions were provided by the 
experts at Ileriot-Watt University's Computer Science Vision Group. 
P(Ai) = 0.25ae + 0.25ad + 0.25a,,, + 0.25an2 (10.3) 
where 
ao max 
(0, (20 10model Oscenel)) 
(10.4) 
20 
(0.4 
ad max 0, 
max(daceneg rn ýj 
0.4 
With a,,, and a, 12 defined in the same manner as ad. 
The strength of the rule, A,,..., A,, =:,. B, is based on the number of consistent feature 
relationships between the scene and the model which have been established as a function of 
the number of feature relationships which are possible for a perfect match. In the simplest 
case, the strength of the rule may be expressed as 
N P(AI&A2& ... &Alt #- B) =I 
where N is the number of matched features and m the number of model features. 
Whenever a set of feature matches is hypothesised the above heuristics can be applied 
and then the evidence combined using either equation 10.1 or equation 10.2 to determine 
the scene-model match probability. Allowing arbitrary selection of feature matches will not 
generally constrain the problem sufficiently, since there are many ways in which the features 
can be matched each leading to a different interpretation table. 
We considered two strategies for the selection of features from the scene and model - 
random selection of features and a heuristic search technique. These strategies were applied 
to the example of figures 10.2 and 10.3, and also to the more iealistic example of fig I ure 
10.4. This latter illustration shows a scene consisting of three metal brackets, selected from 
a possible set of eleven metallic and plastic objects. A model of one of the brackets is' also 
shown. 
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Model Equal Prob Weights Best Set 
Triangle 1.0000 1.0000 {s, a,, S2 = a2 , S3 = a3l 
Pentagon 0.5197 0.5004 Isq = bi, S8 b2s S7 = b39 S4 = b41 S5 = bs} 
Quadrilateral 0.3948 0.5013 JS4 = C1 9 S7 = C2 9 S6 = C3 9 S5 = C4 
} 
Table 10.1: Best Matches for Scene 
10.5 Random Selection of Features 
Random selection of features can be a valid approach to model matching [42], either where 
the subset of evidence supporting a model is significant, so that a random selection is likely 
to be correct, or if smaU data sets can be used to infer a more complete match. Table 10.1 
illustrates the final derived probabilities of the presence of objects in the scene shown in 
figure 10.3 based on the alternative formulations of equations 10.1 and 10.2 and considering 
the dntheta relations as antecedents. 
For the scene of figure 10.3 the simplest strategy of complete random selection proved 
capable of locating the perfect match between the model of the triangle and the scene applying 
either equation 10.1, where the context split is based on the number of true antecedents in 
each possible world, or equation 10.2 where an equal split is assumed. For the more complex 
models the weakness in the use of an equal split is apparent. As the term -j17rR (=0.5) 
dominates, the predicted probabilities occupy a small range making it difficult to determine 
when a match is satisfactory. In addition, the incorrect match to the quadrilateral is preferred 
over the correct match to the pentagon. 
This is avoided by using equation 10.1 which shows the correct behaviour in ranking the 
match of the pentagon above that for the quadrilateral. For these models the best set can 
be located using random selection over a large number of trials as the time to calculate the 
required probability is small for each hypothesis. Nevertheless, even in this case, the number 
of possible interpretation tables rapidly becomes large, for the triangle 504(9 *8* 7) different 
interpratation tables could be constructed; while for the pentagon there could be 15120. In 
more complex cases, such as the real scene shown in figure 10.4, this approach is unsatisfactory 
and some restriction on the combinatorial search is required. 
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Set Size N Partial Probability Model Probability 
2 0.8576 0.1909 
3 0.7113 Inconsistent 
4 0.6413 0.3080 
5 0.5848 0.4181 
6 0.4822 0.4822 
Table 10.2: Steps in Matching Model to Real Scene Data 
10.6 Heuristic Search Techniques 
We developed a heuristic search strategy using the match between the dntheta parameters of 
pairs of features in the scene and model data described in section 10.4. In this case, matches 
between pairs of features in the scene and pairs of features in the model are sought initially. 
The set of matches is then extended by one feature at a time. The feature match selected 
for expansion at each level is determined by the highest model probability calculated on the 
partial match. In applying the heuristic search using the suggested set of heuristics it is found 
that most of the tables formed would be inconsistent as the antecedent probabilities, 7rj, must 
be at least as large as the probability that the rule is false, 1- 7rR. This condition arises 
from the observation that the world where the rule is false, but all antecedents true, cannot 
have negative probability. This condition implies that when the rule strength is weak for 
consistency all antecedents must have high probability. The requirement is too rigorous when 
seeking partial matches for future extension. By replacing the proposition that the model is 
present with the proposition that part of the model is present, the strength of the rule can 
reasonably be increased to 1.0 allowing weaker antecedent probabilities. 
Using the heuristic search technique for the first example, the correct match is found more 
rapidly as anticipated. Of more interest is table 10.2. which shows the effect of applying the 
technique to the segmented scene data of figure 10.4(c). 
Convergence to the correct match and better probability estimates were found using equa- 
tion 10.1. For the case shown the model was located in the correct position and its probability 
estimated as 0.4822. 
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10.7 Conclusion 
The techniques of Probabilistic Logic have been applied to interpret segmented scenes in com- 
parison with stored models, in particular to ascertain the presence and position of objects 
in the original image. The basic pieces of evidence employed are the primitive linear scene 
features and the pairwise relations formed between these features. The pairwise constraints 
are useful in assessing scenes containing rigid bodies because of their invariance subject to 
rotation and translation of objects within the scene, and because of the capability of dealing 
with partial occlusion. Using the particular combination of Probabilistic Logic and the max- 
imum entropy formalism described here, we derived a probabilistic value of the likelihood of 
occurrence of a known object in a scene based on heuristically determined probabilistic values 
for the match between scene and model pairwise relations. 
The application of this technique provides a practical method to derive a measure of belief 
in the existence of an object in the scene, which is justifiable provided the source probabilities 
and heuristics employed are also meaningful. If the resulting probabilities are to give other 
than relative values, it is necessary to estimate the probabilities that linear features will be 
derived by the lower level image processing procedures, and the probability that consequent 
pairwise relations between them will exist, a process which is still subjective in the absence 
of complete models for image data in relatively unconstrained environments. 
In the absence of complete information heuristics are used to judge the quality of individual 
matches between these relations and to evaluate the strength of the rule that a set of evidence 
implies the presence of a model. These heuristics can be constructed fairly easily on the basis 
of a known set of models. The derived probabilities can then be used to determine the best fit 
between the models and a scene, but not the absolute probability for the presence of a model. 
This is demonstrated by the use of different antecedent heuristics in section 10.6, where the 
models are correctly located but the calculated values for the probabilities differ. 
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Figure 10.4: Reýd Scene, One Model and Segmentation 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
11.1 Introduction 
Expert systems have been developed to give intelligent and informative expert judgements 
when applied in difficult, perhaps critical, situations. An example of an expert system at 
work might be in an ambulance situation at the scene of an accident. A paramedic may be 
receiving guidance from an expert system as to what to do with a casualty who is in danger 
of losing a limb or bleeding to death. The paramedic might need to know how likely the 
casualty is to survive a trip to hospital; if it would be wise to cauterise the wound, whether 
or not this would cause further problems at the hospital; or a host of other critical pieces 
of information. If the expert system is to genuinely help the paramedic in this situation, it 
not only has to enumerate the relevant possibilities, but also to order them in terms of their 
importance. 
I believe there to be two important aspects of a good expert system. The first is that 
internally to the system resides a semantically reliable framework for representing uncertainty 
and performing inference with uncertain evidence. The second is that the system is capable 
of Meta-Level reasoning. That is, it has knowledge of what is important in the evidence 
given, and is able to structure reasoning goals. Such a system would be able to understand 
the notion of priority. 
I also feel that, although we are working towards such systems, they are still some way 
148 
off. This thesis has argued that it is practical to reason with uncertainty using Probabilistic 
Logic, which is a generalisation derived from predicate calculus and statistics. In the next 
sections I will summarise what has been achieved in this thesis, and how it could be built 
upon in such a way as to bring us closer to the type of reasoning with uncertainty that the 
paramedic could reasonably expect from the ambulance expert system. 
11.2 Summary of Results Achieved in this Thesis 
Uncertainty in Mathematics 
Present day methods for reasoning with uncertainty have grown from two major domains. 
The first is mathematical inference techniques. The second is automatic deduction tech- 
niques for the digital computer. Any attempt to integrate the. two, faces major complexity 
problems (semi-decidabifity and intractability). An understanding of these problems places 
us in a position to see why simplification methods, such as MYCIN, PROSPECTOR and 
the simplification approximations of Bayesian Inference, have had to be used in the early 
expert systems, and why ultimately, any system of reasoning both with mathematical logic 
and probability theory must also employ simplification strategies of one sort or another. 
On Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic 
I have investigated the nature of probabilistic entailment with a view to answering criticisms 
levelled against the structure proposed by Nilsson: i. e. the inability to use a complete proba- 
bility model, and the conservative estimate of probability using the half split. I have presented 
an interpretation of Probabilistic Logic slightly altered from Nilsson's proposed model. This 
new interpretation allows for the inclusion of conditional probabilities, an extended role for 
the maximum entropy formalism, and a new proof of the absolute bounds of an entailment 
problem. 
The extension introduced allows Probabilistic Logic to use conditional probabilities in 
such a way that it is now possible to specify a complete probabilistic model in Probabilistic 
Logic, as for Bayesian Theory, and so to get point probability results. Also, a proof is given 
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as to how to deduce the bounds of an entailment without resorting to tracing the path of 
a convex hull in multi-dimensions. A presentation of Probabilistic Logic is made which can 
incorporate heuristic information and rule integration into the reasoning process. 
On The Maximum Entropy Formalism In Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic 
The maximum entropy formalism is the vehicle with which uncertainty is represented and 
judged in this thesis. The formalism is introduced and discussed in chapter 5. The conception 
of merging the theory of the maximum entropy principle, and the representation schema of 
Nilsson's probabilistic logic looks from the outset to be an impossible task when one wants 
to model all possible worlds; and the other wants to assign each of these worlds a least 
commitment probability value commensurate with the probability constraints given in the 
problem formulation. Maximum entropy problems usually require iterative solution. It is 
shown that when Nilsson's probabilistic logic is extended to allow the inclusion of conditional 
probabilities, there is, a polynomial time algorithm for evaluating the terms of the non-linear 
equations. 
The Relationship Between Probabilistic Logic and Bayesian Inference 
With the extensions of chapter 4 Nilsson's probabilistic logic is able to use a complete prob- 
ability model, if one is available, and to give the same results as Bayesian Inference. The two 
formalisms use different conditional information and are compared in chapter 6. The findings 
are that a valid statistical meaning for probabilistic entailment is more in line with the defi- 
nition of conditional probability than with a generalisation of the rule of modus ponens and 
Bernoulli's rule of indifference. The difference between the two is that Bayesian inference is 
derived from a knowledge of the hypothesis whereas Nilssonian inference is derived from a 
knowledge of the evidence. In this regard the Nilssonian inference model is more amenable 
to expert systems situations where, the evidence may be uncertain or incomplete than the 
Bayesian model. 
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On Incidence Calculus As A Probabilistic Logic 
Bundy's incidence calculus is shown to be an approximation of Nilsson's Probabilistic Logic. 
Chapter 7 examines the effect of using a semantic tree theorem prover to produce all of 
the possible worlds for an uncertainty problem before making the probability assignment. 
This is a departure from Bundy's proposed model in which an arbitrary number of points 
are chosen, and these points become possible worlds when all the semantic relations can be 
represented within them (the Nilsson method in reverse). Four algorithms are presented, 
in this chapter, which allow a complete implementation of Incidence Calculus within the 
framework of Probabilistic Logic. It is shown how to involve the expert in order to deal with 
theorem proving problems which will lead to non-terminating proofs. The new system can 
be useful in situations where a complete implementation of Nilsson's probabilistic logic is 
impossible or impractical. 
Meta-Level Reasoning 
The entropy of a probability distribution is a measure as to how probability is spread over 
the possible worlds of an uncertain data set. The lower the entropy of a distribution, the 
more the probability is concentrated in small areas of the uncertainty set (i. e. the more 
certain it is). When the maximum entropy formalism is applied to an uncertain set and the 
entropy of the resultant distribution is low, then it is clear that the uncertainty is small in 
the result. Consequently, entropy can be used for judging the "certainty" of a maximum 
entropy probability distribution. This allows for the possibility of Meta-Level Inferencing: 
choosing the most informative rule to expand. A certainty measure is introduced to facilitate 
Meta-Level Inferencing in Nilsson's probabilistic logic. The proposed model also shows how 
"possibility" can be related to "probability". 
Heuristics In Probabilistic Logic 
I have considered the measured use of heuristics in Probabilistic Logic. As with all heuristics, 
these are applied when there is a serious deficit of reliable knowledge, or a major complexity 
problem which must be simplified. And, as with all heuristics, these mechanisms are designed 
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upon semantic considerations of the problem domain area. It is also shown how the aggregate 
factors of the maximum entropy solution can be used to effectively reduce the probability 
bounds in an entailment solution. 
An Application For Probabilistic Logic In Two Dimensional Vision 
The techniques of Probabilistic Logic have been applied to interpret segmented scenes in 
comparison with stored models, in particular to ascertain the presence and position of objects 
in the original image. The results are shown in chapter 10. Using the particular combination of 
Probabilistic Logic and the maximum entropy formalism described in this thesis, a heuristic 
value of the likelihood of occurrence of a known object in a scene has been derived from 
heuristically determined probabilistic values for the match between scene and model pairwise 
relations. The application of this technique provides a practical method to derive a measure 
of belief in the existence of an object in the scene, which is justifiable provided the source 
probabilities and heuristics employed are also meaningful. 
The heuristics were constructed easily on the basis of a known set of models. The heuris- 
tically derived "probabilities" were used to determine the best fit between the models and a 
scene, but not the absolute probability for the presence of a model. This was demonstrated 
by the use of different antecedent heuristics and different segmentations, where the models 
are correctly located but the calculated "probabilities" differ. 
11.3 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis is at at that level of reasoning with uncertainty which tries 
to represent beliefs and act on these intelligently. I believe it is important to move on from 
this level of reasoning in an attempt to characterise the higher level issues relating to the 
process of reasoning, and in particular, to the process of expert reasoning. I can see the 
following three ways of extending this work. 
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11.3.1 Applications and Investigations 
Fuzzy Logic. From the work in chapter 8 it becomes semantically possible to fit Fuzzy 
logic inside the framework of Probabilistic Logic. It would be interesting to apply 
these results in a working system and make a comparison with a corresponding Fuzzy 
implementation. 
Bayesian Networks. Since there is such a simple structure to the algorithm which finds the 
solution to the entropy equations in Probabilistic Logic, I feel, it would be worthwhile to 
search for analytical solutions to entropy equations derived from problems of Bayesian 
Networks. It would also be interesting to know how informative a deduction from a 
Bayesian Network actually is. 
Nonmonotonic Logics. The analysis in chapter 6 shows equivalence between Bayesian In- 
ference and Probabilistic Logic. It also shows under what conditions the conditional 
probabilities of the entailment rules may be interchanged. Such a system, in its versa- 
tility at being able to cope with changing antecedent information is non-monotonic in 
nature. Thus it would be interesting to demonstrate how Probabilistic Logic could be 
used to reason nonmonotonically with uncertainty. 
Heuristic Reasoning. The search for applications which would genuinely benefit from a 
heuristic reasoning system is also a possibility for future research. 
11.3.2 The Importance of Efficient Parallel Processing 
With the completion of the probability model for Probabilistic Logic we are left again facing 
problems of computational complexity; which are manifest in both SPACE and TIME. Spacial 
problems become overwhelming when the logical uncertainty space becomes too wide. As for 
example when too many of the proposition sentences arc uncertain. Luckily, there are only two 
possibilities for a logical sentence- 'true' and 'false'. However, when the uncertainty ranges 
over n sentences, the system must necessarily deal with 2' possible worlds. A situation which 
can easily become out of hand. Temporal problems enter the system either through building 
the semantic tree using a theorem prover, or solving complex non-linear entropy equations, 
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or simply through precisely estimating the probability of every possible world when there are 
many proposition sentences. 
For example, it would not be practical to implement a possibility space suitable to com. 
pletely map out an uncertainty space for, five hundred rules and then to prune this space 
until a conclusion is reached. In such a situation the system would have somewhere in the 
region of 2'0' (10150) possible worlds to deal with- each containing five hundred proposition 
sentences- and one of these would be the true state of the world. (Although this number 
may seem arbitrary, MYCIN has more than five hundred rules in its database at present, and 
although there will be some redundancies of overlap, these would be more than made up for 
by including uncertain proposition antecedents in the tree. ) 
The fact that experts are capable of coming quickly to a conclusion from evidence of a 
highly complex nature testifies to the fact that time computations should be simphriable. 
In the brain this is achieved through coordination of parallel processing. The computational 
analogy in Probabilistic Logicis that each entailment could be performed on a single processor. 
Each entailment producing results similar to those shown in appendix D. The coordination 
of the partial results from each processor is another area for research. Foreseeable problems 
will be those of: what to do when there are more rules than processors; how to make the best 
use of processors; and how to collate and integrate the results from the entallments back into 
the reasoning process. 
11.3.3 A Theory of Knowledge Structuring 
Another obvious area for the continued development of reasoni ng with uncertainty will be 
the development of theories of knowledge structuring. Such theories should be able to incor- 
porate the dynamic aspects of expert reasoning: efficient parallel processing, goal formation, 
independent lines of analysis, the ability to summarise the current state of reasoning. 
The development of such theories of knowledge structuring will probably have roots in 
psychology as well as mathematics. They will need to encompass both default Teasoning 
(drawing conclusions from tentative evidence) as well as autoepistemic reasoning (reasoning 
about one's beliefs at the moment). What Probabilistic Logic offers in this endeavour is a 
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semantically justifiable structure which can easily be experimented upon. 
11.4 General Conclusions 
Present day expert reasoning systems perform a trade-off between semantic clarity and al- 
gorithmic performance in time. In this thesis I have examined Nilsson's probabilistic logic, 
a paradigm for reasoning with uncertainty which is built up from the simplest principles of 
dealing with uncertainty- namely to enumerate all of the possibilities of an uncertain sit- 
uation, and then to apply some qualitative judgements among them using an appropriate 
utility measure. This system has been extended to be capable of operating over a complete 
probability model, which in turn has given Probabilistic Logic an extended role in the area 
of reasoning with uncertainty., 
. 
In particular when Probabilistic Logic is combined with the maximum entropy formalism, 
we have a system capable of producing point probability values, similar to those produced 
by MYCIN for example. These results can be thought of as "guesses" as to the true value of 
the probability based on the amount of information available. This "guess" is based on the 
principle of maximum entropy which imposes the least amount of assumptions on the available 
information and always gives a consistent estimate, and as such it has a sound mathematical 
calibre. I have also examined the utility of this guess in various conditions of uncertainty and 
related it to the bounds of uncertainty in which it is placed. 
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Appendix A 
Thesis Nomenclature 
Each of the operators and operations summarised below will be introduced more formally in 
the thesis proper. This section collects together the typographical conventions used through- 
out the text. 
Logical Notations 
LOGICAL AND & 
LOGICAL OR 
LOGICAL NOT ....................................................................... I 
LOGICAL IMPLICATION ............................................................ * 
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY ........................................................ I 
Statistical Notations 
The probability of X ................................................................ P(X) 
The prior probability of X .......................................................... PIM 
The probability of X conditioned on Y ............................................ P(XIY) 
where p(X I Y) is defined as: p(XIY) = p(X&Y)lp(Y) 
Interpretation Tables 
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Sentence abcd Probability 
A 1111 1 
B 1011 72 
C 1001 73 
Table A. 1: An Example Interpretation Table 
Shown in table A. 1 are three logical sentences A, B and C; which have been assigned 
the probabilities Irl , Ir2 and 73 respectively. The uncertainty leads to four possible worlds, 
here labelled a, b, c and d. In general, possible worlds are denoted with lower case letters, 
and logical sentences with upper case letters. The logical conditions which hold in a possible 
world are read in the columns of the matrix. Ones in the columns represent the logical value 
'TRUE', and zeros represent 'FALSE'. So that, for example, in world cA is true, B is true 
and C is true. 
The probabilistic equations from the above table are: 
a+b+c+d =1 
a+c+d = 72 
a+ d= 7r3 
The probability of a sentence is the sum of the probabilities of all the possible worlds in 
which the sentence is true. Sentence A is true in each world, and is consequently a tautology 
(with probability 1). The probabilities attached to sentences B and C provide equational 
constraints on an acceptable probability distribution. 
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Appendix B 
Prerequisites 
Knowledge Modelling in Mathematical Logic 
Aristotle introduced two of the most important of the tools necessary for systematically 
investigating this area: a logical calculus for reasoning (which led ultimately to predicate 
calculus); and the systernised notion of possible worlds, (which led to the development of 
Modal Logics). Consider the following example which demonstrates the utility of these two 
formalisms. 
Janet is constantly forgetting what day of the week it is, but she does know that: 
1. if the church bells are ringing it is Sunday; 
2. if it is Sunday there will be brocoll! bake for lunch; 
3. any other day there is porridge for lunch. 
This knowledge of Janet's is simplified by making some abbreviations. For example, as below 
where the token in bold case may be used to denote the logical proposition on its right. 
CBR The church bells are ringing. 
ISU It is Sunday. 
BBL There will be brocolli bake for lunch. 
PFL There will be porridge for lunch. 
These tokens are basic sentences of the predicate calculus. To represent a deductive step the 
notion of implication, or alternatively, entailment, is used. In predicate calculus a proposition 
A implies a proposition B if whenever A is true B is true (but not necessarily conversely). 
158 
Proposition A is called the antecedent proposition, and proposition B is called the consequent 
proposition. In this regard, the three sentences above may be rewritten: 
1. The ringing of the church bells implies that it is Sunday; 
2. Today being Sunday implies that there will be brocolli bake for lunch; 
3. 'Today not being Sunday implies that there will be porridge for lunch. 
A further stage in the abstraction process is to represent the function implies Mat with a 
symbolic operator. I will use the symbol =ý- for this purpose. The sentences which represent 
Janet's knowledge may be considered as rules and can be expressed as follows: 
1. CBR =::,. ISU 
2. ISU =ý- BBL 
3. - ISU =: ý PFL 
Let us assume that Janet hears the church bells ringing, that is, CBR is true. From this 
we can conclude that ISU is true, and from this that BBL is true. So that on hearing church 
bells, Janet can conclude that there will be brocolli bake for lunch. 
Modal logic [9,58] allows propositions to be possibly true as well as certainly true. In 
the example above, the church bells might also ring at a marriage. Now, the integrity of the 
reasoning process is lost when we conclude that every time Janet hears church bells there will 
be brocolli bake forlunch. If instead of saying that it is a rule that when the church bells are 
ringing we can imply that it is Sunday, we say that when the church bells are ringing we can 
imply that it is possible that it is Sunday, the integrity of the reasoning process is regained. 
Sentences are now no longer just of the values "true" and "false" but can also be "possibly 
true" and "necessarily true". When Janet hears the church bells it is only possible that there 
will be brocolli bake for lunch, and therefore still possible that lunch will be porridge. 
The real world is only one of a number of possibilities, each of which can be shown 
consistent with the uncertain sentences. These possibilities for the real world are known as 
possible worlds. A drawback with modal logic is that it is not able to use any other information 
so as to say that one possible world is more likely than another. That is, there is no way to 
judge the quality of the uncertainty spread amongst the possible worlds. 
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Uncertainty Management 
In the eighteenth century Jakob Bernoulli proposed a concrete manner of placing judgement of 
uncertainty on a scale from 0 to 1; hence formalising a concept of probability. Two definitions 
of probability came from this work. 
Range Theory If there are n equi-possible states for an event, and A is true in m of these, 
then the probability of A is m/n. 
Frequency Theory If you take a large number of measurements, say n, of an event, and A 
is true in m of these, then as n tends to infinity, so also does the ratio of m/n tend to 
the probability of A. 
The theory of probability developed various other concepts of probability, but all follow simple 
axioms, and can be used in a more descriminating for choosing between a host of possibilities, 
and furthermore, to quantify the strength of judgement of a proposition. 
One further aspect of expert reasoning is the expert's deployment of intuitional or in- 
spirational procedures for reasoning, based upon personal rules of thumb. This final aspect 
of expert system reasoning moves further away from a logical basis for action towards the 
cultivation of fruits of experience, and psychological preference. In modelling this aspect of 
reasoning with uncertainty, the expert system must be capable of structuring the knowledge, 
and acting in what might appear to a novice to be an unpredictable manner. In artificial 
intelligence, this requirement is addressed by the emerging theory of heuristic reasoning. The 
word heuristic has good and bad connotations in Artificial Intelligence. It means inspired 
guesswork. 
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Appendix C 
Entropy Aggregates for Rules of 
Probability I 
In this appendix is presented a proof that the aggregate factors in an entailment problem 
whose probability is I are given by the equations: 
ai 1 to n) 
rj 
I (C. 1) 
aR (C. 2) + aj)' 
C. O. 1 Inductive Proof of Entropy Algorithm 
The proof proceeds in two stages. First, to show that for each of the terms aj (i =1 to n) there 
is a direct match of terms on the numerator and denominator of the expression: (7ri)/(l - 7rj), 
i. e. all the unknown worlds where sentence Aj is true divided by all the worlds where Aj 
is false. The second stage is for the final factor aR and is based on the worlds in which the 
rule is true, and a recursive expression for describing the contribution of each of the possible 
worlds to this probabifity: aRrjjl=l (1 + aj) 
Base Case (n=l) 
From the equations of table CA: 
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Sentence Possible Worlds Equations 
A, 
A, =:,. B 
01 
11 
alaR = 7r, 
aR+a, aR= I 
Table CA: Sentences, Worlds, and Equations 
a, - 
a, aR ? rj (C. 3) 
aR (1-71) 
a, R(I + a, ) = 1; aR (C. 4) 1+ al 
And the above equations satisfy the algorithm with n=1. 
Step 
The algorithm is true for n antecedents, now to prove it, true for n+1 antecedents. 
The new premise A. +j is added to the antecedent arm of the rule, and placed after premise 
A,, in the premise list. We now have aggregate factors a,, ..., an+1 I aR. 
1. In each row there are now 21+1 possible worlds, where there used to be 2n. The difference 
between the tree for n+1 propositions and n propositions, being that in row n+1 there 
are now 2n 1's and 2n O's, and the rule is pushed down to position n+2. 
For the half of the tree with O's in row n+l we proved that there is a direct match to 
give each of the previous ai's. For the other half, we use the same enumeration, and find 
that the factor for proposition n+1 cancels out on top and bottom. Furthermore the 
numerator still only holds the worlds where sentence Ai is true, and the denominator 
the worlds where Ai is false. Therefore the equation still holds. 
Is the formula true for new row n+1? 
The new tree was made up of two identical copies of the old tree, one of which has a1 
in row n+I, the other of which has a zero in row n+l. Consequently, again it is possible 
to cancel the terms of the true worlds divided by the false worlds so that there is only 
a factor of a,, +l left. 
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So, for each of the antecedents, A, to An+l the expression for the associated aggregate 
factor is: 
aj(j=lton+l)= Iri 1- ri, 
2. The expression for all the worlds where the rule is true is: aR rjjý, + aj) J= 
When we include the new row, we have a new multiplicative factor: We have two copies: 
one with an a,, +l in row n+1, and one with a 1. So the new expression for aU the worlds 
is: 
nnn 
an+, aR 
Il (1 + ai) + an 
11 (1 + ai) + a,, +I)an 
Il (I + aj) (C. 5) 
j=l j=l j=l 
n+l 
a. R 
11 (1 + ai) 
j=l 
(C. 6) 
The probability for these worlds all summed together is 1, and so consequently, the factor 
associated with the rule of inference is: 
aR = rln+l 
j=l (1 + aj) 
and again the expression has been succesfuUy extended. 
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Appendix D 
An Example of The Use of 
Heuristics 
The data in this appendix refers to the rules and associated antecedent probabilities shown 
in chapter 8 tables 8.2 and 8.3. The first section of each of the figures is the rule number and 
its probability. The next shows the probabilities assigned to the antecedents. In the third 
section is a list of the possible worlds with the rule true, the associated maximum entropy 
probability for the possible world, and then two columns showing the half split heuristic result 
and the n-split result. Note that in all these figures there is one world missing. That is tile 
world with all of the antecedents true and the rule false. It's probability is always 1 less the 
probability of the rule, and the conclusion is never true in this world so it is not included. 
Another point of note is that in the possible world with all of the antecedents true and the 
rule true, the probability of this world is not reduced from that assigned by tile maximum 
entropy formalism. This is because the conclusion can only be true in this world. 
The fourth section then gives the heuristically estimated probability of the conclusion 
from the n-split and the half split; plus the entropy information: first tile entropy of tile 
resultant maximum entropy distribution, then the minimum possible entropy and then max. 
imum possible entropy for the rule wfth this number of antecedents. Finally, tile specificity 
of the rule and it's antecedent probabilities is shown. 
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D. 1 Heuristics for Rules 1-5 
Rule 1: 0.8 
Antecedents: [0.83,0.57.0.911 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [010,01 0.01028 0.0051399 0 
2: [0,0,11 0.081095 0.040548 0.027032 
3: [0,1,01 0.0088453,0.0044227 0.0029484 
4: [0,1,11 0.06978 0.03489 0.04652 
5: [1,0,01 0.038095 0.019048 0.012698 
6: [1,0,1] 0.30053 0.15026 0.20035 
7: [1,1,01 0.03278 0.01639 0.021853 
8: 
------- 
[111,11 
---------- 
0.2S859 
---------- 
0.25859 
------------- 
0.25859 
-------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.57; Hsplit = 0.5293). 
Entropy : 1.7478; Minent: 0.5004; Max ent: 2.1639 
Specificity: 0.74986 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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---------------------------------------- 
Rule 2: 0.6 
mmm--mm ----------- 
Antecedents: [0.78.0.45.0.951 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [0,0,01 0.016806 0.0084028 0 
2: [0,0,11 0.18486 0.092431 0.06162 
3: [0,1,01 0.0015278 0.00076389 0.000SO926 
4: [0,1,11 0.01680S 0.0084027 0.011204 
5: [1.0,01 0.029028 0.014514 0.0096769 
6: [110,11 0.3193 0.15965 0.21287 
7: [1,1,01 0.0026389 0.0013194 0.0017593 
8: 
------- 
[111,11 
--------- 
. 0.029028 
------------ 
0.029028 
------------- 
0.029028 
------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.32667; Hsplit - 0.31451). 
Entropy: 1.4115; Hinent: 0.67301; Maxent: 1.9207 
Specificity: 0.59191 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Rule 3: 0.7 
Antecedents: [0.9.0.8.0.6.0.91 
Worlds: 
1: (010,0101 0.0023324 0.0011662 0 
2: [0,0,0,11 0.013994 0.0069971 0.0034986 
3: [0,0,1,01 0.0017493 0.00087464 0.00043732 
4: [0,0,1,11 0.010496 0.0052478 O. OOS2478 
5: [011,0101 O. OOS8309 0.0029ISS 0.0014S77 
6: [011,0111 0.03498S 0.017493 0.017493 
7: [0,1,1,01 0.0043732 0.0021866 0.0021866 
8: [0.1,1,11 0.026239 0.01312 0.019679 
9: [1.0.0,01 0.013994 0.0069971 0.0034986 
10: [110,0111 0.08396S 0.041982 0.041982 
11: [110,1101 0.010496 0.0052478 O. OOS2478 
12: [1,0,1,11 0.062973 0.031487 0.04723 
13: [1,1,0,01 0.03498S 0.017493 0.017493 
14: [1,1,0,11 0.20991 0.10496 O. IS743 
is: [1.1.1.01 0.026239 0.01312 0.019679 
16: 
------- 
[111,1111 
---------- 
0.15743 
------------- 
O. IS743 
------------- 
0.1S743 
----------- 
(Nsplit = 0.5; Hsplit = 0.42871). 
Entropy : 2.0818; Minent: 0.61086; Maxent: 2. SS17 
Specificity: 0.75792 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Rule 4: 0.9 
Antecedents: [0.83,0.91 
----------------------------- m -------------- m--m--mm-m 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.018889 
2: [0,11 0.15111 
3: [1,01 0.081111 
4: [1,11 0.64889 
-------------------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.765; Hsplit 
Entropy: 1.0752; Minent: 
0.0094445 0 
0.07SSSS 0.07SSSS 
0.040SS6 0.040SS6 
0.64889 0.64889 
------------------------- 
a 0.77444). 
0.32SO8; Maxent: I. S727 
Specificity: 0.6012 
------------------------------------------------- m-m-- 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Rule 5: 0.9 
---- mm-m ---- mmm ------------------ 
Antecedents: [0.45.0.81 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.12222 0.061111 0 
2: [0,11 0.42778 0.21389 0.21389 
3: [1,01 0.077778 0.038889 0.038889 
4: 
------ 
[1,11 
-------- 
0.27222 
----------- 
0.27222 
------------ 
0.27222 
----------------- 
(Nsplit = O. S2S; Hsplit = 0.58611). 
Entropy: 1.4032; Minent: 0.32508; Maxent: 1.5727 
Specificity: 0.86414 
--------------------------------------------------- 
IG8 
D. 2 Rules 6,7,8 with lialf split 
Rule 6: 0.8 
Antecedents: [0.5293,0.9] 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.058838 0.029419 0 
2: [0,11 0.41186 0.20S93 0.20S93 
3: [1,01 0.041163 0.020581 0.020S81 
4: 
------- 
[1,11 
--------- 
0.28814 
---------- 
0.28814 
---------- 
0.28814 
--------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.51465; Hsplit = O. S44 07). 
Entropy : 1.3438; Minent: 0.5004; Maxent: 1.6094 
Specificity: 0.76046 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Rule 7: 0.7 
Antecedents: [0.77444,0.781 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: 10.01 0.07089 0.035445 0 
2: [0,11 0.15467 0.077335 0.077335 
3: [1,01 0.14911 0.0745SS 0.074SSS 
4: 
------- 
[1,11 
--------- 
0.32S33 
---------- 
0.32S33 
----------- 
0.32S33 
----------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.47722; Hsplit = 0.51266). 
Entropy : 1.4866; Minent: 0.61086; Maxent: 1.5813 
Specificity: 0.90242 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Rule 8: 0.8 
Antecedents: [0.42871,0.774441 
--------------------------------------------- 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.16108 0.080538 0 
2: [0,11 0.41021 0.20SII 0.20SII 
3: [1,01 0.064485 0.032242 0.032242 
4: 
------ 
[1,11 
-------- 
0.16422 
----------- 
0.16422 
------------ 
0.16422 
------------ 
(Nsplit = 0.40157; Hsplit - 0.48211). 
Entropy: 1.455; Minent: 0.5004; Maxent: 1.6094 
Specificity: 0.86072 
------------------------------------------------------ 
D. 3 Rules 6,7,8 with n split 
Rule 6: 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Antecedents: [O. ST. 0.91 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [0101 0.05375 0.026875 0 
2: [0,11 0.37625 0.18812 0.18812 
3: [1901 0.04625 0.023125 0.023125 
4: 
------- 
[1,11 
--------- 
0.32375 
----------- 
0.32375 0.32375 
--------------------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.535; Hsplit = 0.56187). 
Entropy : 1.3541; Minent: 0.5004; Maxent: 1.6094 
Specificity: 0.7697S 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Rule 7: 0.7 
----------------------------------- m-m ----------- m-m-- 
Antecedents: [0.76S. 0.781 
--------------------------------------- m -------------- 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.073857 0.036929 0 
2: [0,11 0.16114 0.08OS71 0.080571 
3: [1,01 0.14614 0.073071 0.073071 
4: 
------ 
[1,11 
-------- 
0.31886 
----------- 
0.31886 
------------ 
0.31886 
----------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.4725; Hsplit = 0.50943). 
Entropy: 1.4933; Minent: 0.61086; Maxent: 1.5813 
Specificity: 0.90936 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Rule 8: 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Antecedents: [0.5,0.765] 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Worlds: 
1: [0,01 0.14688 0.073438 0 
2: [0,11 0.35312 0.17656 0.17656 
3: [1,01 0.088125 0.044062 0.044062 
4: 
------ 
[1,11 
-------- 
0.21187 
------------ 
0.21187 
----------- 
0.21187 
----------------- 
(Nsplit = 0.4325; Hsplit = 0.50594). 
Entropy: 1.514; Minent: 0.5004; Maxent: 1.6094 
Specificity: 0.91397 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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